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DISCLAIMER
This report has been compiled from available documented information provided in response to enquiries
made to lifeline utilities and other parties who seemed likely to have learnt from direct experience of natural
hazards in Canterbury.
Effort has been taken to summarise the source documents accurately. However, the summary material in
this report is not a substitute for the source documents. Readers should review the source documents,
consider other authoritative best-practice information, and take professional advice, before any investment
or other decisions are made. The parties involved in preparing this report do not accept liability for losses
arising from use of, or gaps in, the information it contains.
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The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority
(CERA) and the Canterbury Lifeline Utilities Group
have collaborated to assemble documented infra-
structure-related learnings from the recent Canter-
bury earthquakes and other natural hazard events
over the last 15 years (i.e. since publication of Risks
and Realities1). The project was led by the Centre for
Advanced Engineering (CAE) and was undertaken to
promote knowledge sharing by facilitating access to
diverse documents on natural hazard learnings, a
matter of ongoing relevance and very considerable
current interest.
This compendium contains 96 summaries of source
documents assembled during 2012. The documents
are from a variety of sources including lifeline utilities,
international commentators and researchers. Each
summary has been checked with original authors.
The project focussed mainly on learnings from the
recent Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes but
some documents on other natural hazard events
such as snowstorms are also included.
The summaries, predominantly organised by lifeline
sector (electricity, telecommunications, transportation
etc.), cover:
• asset-related learnings
• learnings related to organisation performance, i.e.
– intra-organisational performance
– inter-organisational performance including
relationships with CDEM.
A separate Overview Report outlines the methodolo-
gies used and presents a high-level summary of
findings including key themes. The Overview also
identifies some gaps in source material leading to
recommendations for possible future work.
In most cases, the summaries in this compendium
are accompanied by the source documents (PDFs or
links). However, a few authors, while agreeing to
publication of summaries, have requested that their
source documents be withheld.
The summaries draw attention to the main learnings
in the source documents and are not to be read as a
full or definitive account of the authors’ views and
findings. Readers should refer to the source docu-
ments if firm or detailed information is required.
Preface
1 Lifeline vulnerability to natural hazards including
earthquakes had been given prominence in a
comprehensive project undertaken by the Christchurch
Engineering Lifelines Group in the first half of the 1990s.
The project report Risks and Realities records the
processes, findings and mitigation steps (risk reduction
and readiness) identified at the time.
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1 ELECTRICITY
1.1 Transpower 4 September
2010 Darfield Earthquake
Lessons Learned
(Transpower New Zealand Ltd, 2011a)
This March 2011 report documents main learnings
from the Darfield earthquake.
The main points are:
• Although Transpower was in a position to fully
supply power within 4 hours of the September
2010 earthquake, restoration of power supply
was constrained by the damage to the distribution
networks.
• Transpower sub-stations incurred minor non-
structural damage (broken windows, fallen ceiling
tiles etc) but this did not disrupt service.
• Transmission lines are generally more resilient to
seismic events than substation assets.
Design and Installation Issues
• Transpower needs to continue to reduce the risk
by replacing or upgrading existing buildings or
items of plant not complying with its seismic
policy and by supporting the improvement of
seismic design and construction standards in the
electrical industry.
• Failure of the surge arrester part of the SVC
system at Islington (new substation designed to
IEEE693 high performance level) was due to a
poor detailing of its mountings.
• A number of transformers tripped during the
event mainly because of the malfunction of the
mercury switches used in some of the on-load
tap-changer (OLTC) oil relays, main Buchholz
relay and temperature relays. This issue was
identified by Transpower some years ago and a
programme to replace these old relays with
modern seismically rated models commenced
prior the 4 September earthquake.
• Continued seismic assessment of infrastructure
should be carried out, e.g. equipment restraint for
in-service and stored equipment.
• Except for the mercury switched type relays, all
other relays, cabinets cabling, wiring, connections
and terminations remained stable and secure as
did the protection signalling blocking, permissive
and intertrip systems.
• It is recommended that the integrity of oil contain-
ment systems of any substation likely to be
affected by liquefaction be tested.
Dependency on Telecommunications
and Fuel
•  Generally remote access technolo gies were
also used to allow staff to deliver business
services from non-office locations.
• General comments suggested that more satellite
phones were required across the industry, as
should PSTN network have been affected, and
power have remained out longer, then mobile
phone network followed by radio phone network
would have become non-operational. There was
limited access to a number of satellite phones,
and poor knowledge of how to contact other
satellite phone users.
• It is noted that should radio phones have been
required there is a dependency on radio repeater
sites and therefore for radio repeater site batter-
ies to hold up until power is restored.
• While Transpower’s initial response was relatively
unimpaired, the impact of damage to roading
infrastructure and ability of Transpower contrac-
tors to source fuel when undertaking emergency
inspections and repairs was a cause for concern
and requires consideration in emergency proce-
dures.
Response Performance
• Fine weather and low network loading post-
earthquake helped power restoration.
• Need improved paper management (to avoid
paper mess in offices as a result of shaking).
• There is limited flexibility in the law when an
emergency occurs. The better alternative would
be to amend the regulations to provide disaster
safety management as codes of practice cannot
over-ride regulations.
Electricity Distribution
• Orion bridge strengthening programme signifi-
cantly contributed to reduced level of damage to
cable network.
• MainPower’s seismic restraint programme over
the past 15 years following Edgecumbe greatly
contributed to lower damage levels.
• MainPower’s mutual aid agreement – additional
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staff, fault location equipment and portable
generators from Marlborough Lines and Electric-
ity Ashburton facilitated quick power restoration to
a large part of the Canterbury region.
Main Lessons Learnt
• Transpower assets did not suffer serious damage
and system interruption was minimal.
• A number of interconnecting and feeder trans-
formers tripped during the event due to the
malfunction of protection switches.
• Distribution infrastructure was affected more
significantly than transmission as is consistent
with experience overseas.
• Although most Transpower buildings in the
affected region were designed prior to
Transpower’s current seismic policy, they met or
exceeded the current performance criteria.
• Only minor impediments to the response/recov-
ery outside of Transpower’s control e.g. control of
fuel supplies, but they did not seriously affect the
response effort.
• Contractors and staff need to consider the safety
implications of mobilising in the dark to inspect
substations (e.g. liquefaction-induced road
hazards and risk of aftershocks).
• A high level of industry cooperation occurred in
response/recovery.
• Participation in lifelines exercises was recognised
as being extremely valuable in forming relation-
ships that come to fruition in a disaster situation.
• Had the event been during the day, the pressure
on mobile phone services would have made
mobile telecommunications essentially unavail-
able. Had the power outages lasted longer, back
up batteries would have run out rendering mobile
telecommunication service unavailable.
• Fuel availability became a concern early on with
no apparent prioritised access to fuel supplies for
essential services – a protocol has to be devel-
oped. It was also noted that Transpower mainte-
nance contractors do not usually have fuel stored
at their facilities available for emergency use.
• The seismic compliance of equipment against
Transpower seismic policy should be thoroughly
checked when purchasing new equipment or
installing equipment in a new configuration,
particularly for the equipment that is known to be
prone to damage, e.g. cantilevered equipment,
transformer mounted surge arresters or bushings.
• Develop better understanding of seismic perform-
ance of base isolation devices for computer
racks, through shake-table tests for instance.
• Fuel supply for the vehicle fleet of the mainte-
nance contractors should be ensured by having
emergency fuel storage facilities at contractor’s
sites.
• Regular assessment of individual ability to use
fleet link radios and mobile phone should be
made.
• Review whether Transpower has a sufficient
number of satellite phones.
1.2 Transpower 22 February
2011 Christchurch
Earthquake Key Findings
and Lessons Learned
(Transpower New Zealand Ltd, 2011b)
This June 2011 report documents main learnings
from the Christchurch earthquake.
The main points are:
• This earthquake, as well the 4 September 2010
event, has highlighted the reliance of Transpower
transmission network on aged infrastructures.
• This event has also highlighted the potential
issue of repairability of some aged equipment
after an earthquake due to the lack of readily
available spares (such was the case of the 66 kV
transformer bushings that broke at Bromley
substation).
• The satisfactory performance of Transpower
assets during this event does not provide cer-
tainty on how well equipment, systems and
buildings would perform in another event of a
similar or greater magnitude.
Design and Installation Issues
• The seismicity (the frequency or magnitude of
earthquake activity) over a region can change
following an earthquake. As a result of the 4
September 2010 and 22 February 2011 events,
New Zealand structural design standards are
likely to be amended to account for an increased
seismic hazard in Christchurch region.
• The very short straight connection between the
CVT4 and rigid bus at Bromley substation was
identified as a possible cause of the failure of the
CVT.
• As a general comment, the lack of standardised
practice for the installation of flexible conductors
and the amount of slack that should be provided
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was identified as an issue prior to the Darfield
and Christchurch earthquakes.
• The current level of specification allows satisfac-
tory performance of aseismic Buchholz relay
during aftershocks and lower magnitude earth-
quakes but may not prevent false operation
during large earthquakes.
• It is however understood that increasing the
specified level of acceleration to ensure correct
performance of Buchholz relays during rare and
large earthquakes will have a detrimental effect
on the sensitivity of the devices to actual internal
transformer faults.
• Buried cables are vulnerable to soil deformation
and their failure significantly impedes prompt
restoration of supply. Cable repair process
usually requires skilled crews, special equipment
and takes significantly longer than overhead lines
to repair. Damaged cables may require construc-
tion of temporary overhead lines to reroute power
supply during the repair works.
• At present there is a lack of comprehensive
design and installation practices in the industry to
address this risk.
Communications
• A variety of communication mechanisms need to
be used to keep in touch with staff. In this event,
text messaging was more effective than phone
communication due to the phone network being
congested. Other methods, such as 0800 What
To Do and intranet page were also effective
mechanisms, although not as direct as text
messaging.
• A variety of communication mechanisms need to
be used to keep in touch with field crews. There
is limited use of radios at present but this will
improve once it is made more explicit in the
maintenance contractor’s agreements. In addi-
tion, an increase in the number of satellite
phones will provide a strong alternative should it
be required.
Recommendations
General: Transpower needs to continue to reduce
the risk by removing or strengthening existing
buildings or items of plant not complying with our
seismic policy and to support the improvement of
seismic design and construction standards in the
electrical industry.
Seismic risk assessment: Transpower should
ensure that the new values for seismic actions are
used when designing future projects in the
Christchurch region.
Flexible conductors: Visual inspections should be
carried out in all substations to identify any flexible
connections between equipment that are obviously
too tight. (It is understood that these inspections are
under way).
• It is also recommended that flexible connection
design and installation guidelines be completed
to ensure appropriate slack is provided with
consideration to seismic aspects and electrical
clearances. A project has been set up to prepare
these guidelines.
Equipment replacement: All instrument transform-
ers with insulators held by “finger clamps” should be
replaced as this type of clamping is known to perform
poorly during earthquakes.
Buchholz relays: Transpower should decide
whether it is required for relays not to falsely operate
during rare and large earthquake. If that is the case,
the specified acceleration levels should be reviewed.
The performance of relays should be demonstrated
by shake-table tests reproducing the as-installed
arrangement of the device.
Transpower should continue to purchase the ETI
model relays for new Buchholz relay installations,
unless it is decided that relays should remain stable
during rare and large earthquake.
High voltage cables: The following actions are
recommended to improve Transpower understanding
of the risks to its 220 kV underground cable circuits
assets:
1. Sponsor a study of the damaged 66 kV cables
either uniquely or in conjunction with other utilities
(NZ or overseas) or IEEE 693-Consortium. A
suggested brief is given in Appendix C. This was
provided by Cable Consulting International Mr.
Brian Gregory a pre-eminent EHV cable expert
who is based in the UK.
2. Leading from Item (1) above, develop technical
standards that could be used to mitigate the
probability of damage to underground cable
circuits during a significant seismic event. Note: It
is understood that PG&E and BC Hydro have put
in place separate investigation initiatives in this
field. We could benefit from coordinating our
activities.
3. Place a much greater emphasis on geotechnical
studies during the development of 220 kV cable
circuits and develop appropriate policies.
4. All optical fibre cables should be installed within
separate plastic ducting, i.e. not buried direct – in
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Christchurch all these cables have now had to be
abandoned and alternative protection communi-
cation paths sought.
Communications: Staff contact lists should be
regularly updated and should contain mobile phone
numbers (company and personal phones) as text
messaging was found to be the most effective way of
communication.
Transpower should develop a coordinated approach
on FleetLink radio and satellite phone for internal
communication and communication with mainte-
nance contractors after disruptive events.
1.3 4 September 2010 and 22
February 2011
Christchurch Earthquakes
from a Transmission Grid
Infrastructure Perspective
(Renton, A. 2011)
This November 2011 presentation to the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group contains learnings from
the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes.
The main points are:
• Because of previous resilience upgrades the
overall transmission grid performed well.
Transpower experienced only a small number of
equipment breakages and transformer trips in
these earthquakes.
• Transpower’s network benefited from seismic
restraint programme undertaken in the 1990s
following the Edgecumbe earthquake.
• Transpower classes essential buildings and
facilities as category 4 in terms of AS/NZS 1170.
• The earthquakes were in the 500 to 2,500 year
return period zone. Moderate structural damage,
repairable equipment failure and reduced security
are expected in this zone. The performance of
aged infrastructure was above expectations and
the grid was returned to service quickly (following
safety inspections).
• Transpower needs to continue to use and support
the development of international seismic design
standards for HV equipment.
• Transpower needs to further identify and mitigate
the risk of earthquakes on the transmission
network to ensure resilience going forward.
1.4 4 September 2010 and 22
February 2011 Christchurch
Earthquakes from a
Transmission Infrastructure
Perspective: Asset
Structural Performance and
Lessons Learned
(McGhie, C. & Tudo-Bornarel, C. 2011a)
(McGhie, C. & Tudo-Bornarel, C. 2011b)
This is a combined summary of Transpower’s paper
and PowerPoint presentation to the June 2011
conference and exhibition of the Electricity Engi-
neers’ Association. It contains learnings from the
Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes.
The main points are:
• The CDEM Act and the Building Act (and related
territorial authority policies) are legislative drivers
for Transpower to seismically upgrade / maintain
their structures / infrastructure.
• Overall the transmission grid performed well.
Transpower experienced only a small number of
equipment breakages and transformer trips in the
September 2010 and February 2011 earth-
quakes. System interruption was minimal.
• Damage to Transpower substations included
minor cracking of reinforced concrete buildings,
non-structural building damage such as broken
windows, fallen suspended ceiling tiles and light
fittings and settlement damage due to liquefac-
tion. Damage to primary plant included failure of
candle-stick equipment (one 220 kV current
voltage transformer), transformer mounted
equipment (one 220 kV surge arrester and one
66 kV bushing) and damage to an 11 kV switch-
board.
• A number of transmission towers were affected
by surface rupture, liquefaction induced settle-
ment and/or lateral spreading resulting in tilting
towers; suspension insulators being pulled out of
alignment; tension / slack in overhead lines; and
bent earth peaks. But this did not affect service/
function.
• Length of time taken to put grid back into service
was the time taken to do safety inspections
(compounded by traffic issues).
• Transformers and heavy plant were restrained,
following learnings from the 1987 Edgecumbe
earthquake.
• These events highlighted the reliance on existing
aged transmission infrastructure.
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• Transpower needs to continue to use and support
the development of international seismic design
standards for HV equipment.
• Further identification and mitigation of earthquake
risk to the transmission network is required to
ensure resilience going forward.
Summary of lessons learned
• Overall Transpower assets did not suffer serious
damage and system interruption was minimal.
• The events highlighted the reliance on existing
aged transmission infrastructures. Although most
were designed and installed prior to Transpower’s
current seismic policy, they met or exceeded the
current performance criteria.
• The implementation of the lessons learned
following the 1987 Edgecumbe earthquake, i.e.
the seismic restraint retrofit programme, was
demonstrably worthwhile.
• Transpower needs to continue to reduce risk by
removing or strengthening existing buildings or
items of plant not complying with current seismic
policy.
1.5 Orion – Network Asset
Management Risk Control
Summary
(O’Donnell, J. 2004)
This March 2004 presentation outlines Orion’s
approach to asset management risk control.
The main points are:
• Orion worked to plan for and mitigate hazard
events following their involvement in 1999 Risks
and Realities report.
• Activities undertaken include network diversifica-
tion, seismic upgrading.
• Upgrades were based on risk profile, including:
– risk rating – probability and consequence (MM
scale used)
– priorities assessed
– action plan established.
• Action plan included attention to substations
(including unreinforced masonry distribution
substations), pole substations, oil-filled cables.
•  Benefits of diversity, spares management and
other risk mitigation steps noted.
1.6 Orion – Wind Storm April
2005
(O’Donnell, J. 2005a)
This brief presentation outlines Orion’s experience in
the major 2005 windstorm.
The main points are:
• Key issue: safety of the public and safety of staff
and contractors.
• Overall the event management and network
repair went well. Support obtained from another
lines company and this also worked well.
• The point at which the event is scaled up needs
to be reviewed.
• Contractor and operator hours need to be
managed. Adequate food needs to be provided.
• Adequate levels of stock for repair work need to
be established.
• Development of text communication strategy
would be useful.
1.7 Orion – Snow Storm 2005
Debrief
(O’Donnell, J. 2005b)
This document records an internal Orion debrief
following the September 2005 snow storm.
The main points are:
• Better communications with remote areas is
necessary.
• Manual job management system caused some
mix-ups. Need to better prioritise jobs and staff
deployment.
• Send advance parties to assess what is required
for repair before sending operations parties (to
ensure right personnel and equipment is sent first
time).
• Issues arose relating to coordination between
Control and Call Centre – Call Centre staff did not
always have the right information to pass out.
• Need to develop an emergency dashboard to
keep staff informed of developments.
• Need more channels for communication (too
much traffic just for one channel). Need enough
handheld radios in the event of cell phone
network disruption.
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• Mobilise the Salvation Army kitchen if the event
will run more than 2 days. Different staff like
different food options (e.g. linemen like food
taken to them, operators like to come in for a hot
meal).
• Keep list of individuals requiring specialist
equipment / medical requirements updated.
Provide accommodation for out of town workers.
• Need to ensure the appropriate people hold the
necessary keys.
• Need to communicate to stores / suppliers /
warehouses likely material requirements.
• Ensure there are enough vehicles for staff and
equipment. Ensure enough fuel available.
1.8 Orion – Infrastructure
Snow Storm Report 2006
(O’Donnell, J. 2006)
This July 2006 report to the Canterbury CDEM Group
outlines Orion’s experiences and learnings from the
June 2006 snowstorm.
The main points are:
• A severe snow storm impacted the South Island
on 12 June 2006. Electricity supply was lost to
thousands of customers. The depth of snow
hampered restoration.
• It took about 5 days to restore electricity supply
and about 6 further weeks to get the electricity
network back to its pre-storm condition.
• Tree damage caused many of the outages,
largely from trees outside the regulatory compli-
ance zone. Locating poles on the roadside makes
access for restoration easier but creates prob-
lems with shelter belts and trees.
• Prior work to replace concrete poles with wooden
poles (which are more resistant to snow and ice)
and ensuring poles are placed so that the
conductors act as mechanical fuses, likely
reduced the number of damaged poles and thus
restoration time.
• Helicopter reconnaissance is OK for damage
assessment but does not provide sufficient detail
for restoration planning. Need to allow storm to
abate before commencing restoration. Also need
to assess damage before restoration starts in
order to manage resources.
• Central coordination is essential for setting
priorities and managing resources. Repair on a
rural feeder basis minimises the chance of
missing damage. Good communication is
essential to avoid wasted operational resources
(e.g. isolated areas).
• Mutual aid agreements within the electricity
industry worked well. Need to brief staff before
they go into the field. Manage work hours and
worker fatigue.
• Geographic maps online were beneficial for
public.
• Telecommunications were affected by loss of
power to cell sites.
• 4WD vehicles and chains are necessary for
snowy conditions. Need to consider and manage
fuel supply in rural areas.
• Workers must have resources to plan and
manage own food supply
• Retailer Call Centre needs to have information on
damage.
• Public and operators need to be vigilant and
assume all wires are live. Education on how to
avoid back feed from generators into line.
• There is a need to improve job management
systems and training for larger events.
1.9 Orion – Snow Storm June
2006
(O’Donnell, J. 2007)
This March 2007 presentation to an Engineering
Lifeline Workshop outlines Orion’s experience in the
June 2006 snow storm.
The main points are:
• Need to filter early warning information from
weather forecasters to avoid false warnings and
complacency.
• Three activities of restoration planning – gauge
damage, set priorities and communicate
(progress, priorities, and limitations) with CDEM,
media and customers. Actual snow events are
regular enough to not to need to practice.
• Initial information transfer and priority setting was
too detailed. High level information (constraints
and limitations) and priority setting was important.
“Let operational people do what they do best.”
• Maintaining lines assets up to building entry
reduces conflict but is not the standard arrange-
ment within electricity distribution.
• Trees caused 59 per cent of the damage.
• Response constrained by loss of cellphone
communication. Cell phones were best for point
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to point contact. UHF best for global communica-
tion with operational and contract staff. Robust
radio network is essential for repair and safety.
• Summary daily update with regional CDEM
groups worked well.
• Best use of repair resources is when the storm
subsides (H&S issues). Joining broken lines
together is faster and more cost effective than
replacing poles. Make maximum use of daylight
hours. Adding manpower can slow things down
temporarily. Access to 4WD vehicles was essen-
tial.
• Public communication was managed through
central control centre so that operational staff can
get on with their work. Providing internet map of
damage reduced call centre numbers. Proactive
media releases and internet based information is
important (don’t underestimate restoration time,
and emphasise safety issues). Daily communica-
tions with other lines companies and daily press
release also assisted. Communication lesson –
keep it simple and focussed.
• Managers should brief staff in future events
(context, conditions, hours of work, PPE, commu-
nications, fuel supply etc).
• On average snow storms affect twice as many
customers as wind and take 50 per cent longer to
restore (this equals three times more customer
minutes lost).
1.10 Orion Presentation –
South Island Emergency
Officers Conference 2009
(O’Donnell, J. 2009)
This July 2009 presentation to the South Island
Emergency Officers’ Conference outlines Orion’s
experience in the June 2006 snow storm.
The main points are:
• On average the snow storm affected twice as
many customers and took twice as long to restore
as a wind storm (which equates to three times
more lost customer minutes). Restoration took 4-
5 days but recovery took about 1 month for this
event.
• Company culture of emergency preparedness
based on CDEM’s “4 R’s” works well. (The “4 R’s”
are Risk Reduction, Readiness, Response and
Recovery.) Risk reduction commenced following
Lifeline Group Risks and Realities report.
• Centralised control and contractor management
worked well, including resource planning, engi-
neering assesses, work planning, stakeholder
and public communications. Allow operational
staff to perform their normal roles. Need a
comprehensive event management system. Keep
communication simple and focussed, with regular
updates.
• Managers need to provide context to staff/
contractors, including work conditions, work
hours, PPE required, communications, fuel
supply, maximising daylight hours, minimising
travel between jobs, setting clear priorities and
ensuring self-sufficiency for meals.
• Mutual aid agreement between lines companies
was in place (it’s a simple, “agreement in princi-
ple” form). Adding manpower initially slows
response down. Daily communications needed
between lines companies working under mutual
aid agreements.
• Cell phones best for point to point communica-
tion. Minimal backup standards for power to
telecommunications sites need to be established.
1.11 Orion – Christchurch
Earthquake 2010, 2011
(O’Donnell, J. 2011a)
This November 2011 presentation to the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group summarises Orion’s
learnings from the Darfield and Christchurch earth-
quakes.
The main points are:
• The seismic strengthening recommended in
Risks and Realities significantly paid off in
reducing damage, repair times and costs. (Direct
cost of $6 million with an estimated saving of $60
excluding indirect costs).
• Having an interconnected network allowed
options for power restoration and reduced the
time needed for supply restoration.
• Good communication with the public, staff,
contractors and stakeholders is extremely
important. Strong liaison with CDEM and media
was critical
• Do not be pressured into accepting multiple offers
especially of inappropriate resource (e.g. linemen
verses cable technicians and repairers). Let
people perform their normal work where possible.
• Plan for the absent of key personnel and to be
able to operate the recovery plan without them.
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• Having a National Civil Defence Controller who
can make decisive decisions is essential (Orion
had to demolish buildings quickly for safety
reasons and build temporary overhead power
lines).
• Lack of communication and continually changing
of rules at cordon checkpoints adversely im-
pacted the service Orion was able to provide.
• Plan for the damage of key infrastructure /
buildings that form part of the recovery plan.
Post Script: In June 2012, Orion advised those
involved in developing commercial premises that
electrical equipment, such as transformers, needs to
be easily accessible for safety reasons and to ensure
robust electrical supply. Equipment located below
ground-level may flood during hazard events creating
long delays for power restoration. Locating equip-
ment at street level minimizes flooding risk and
improves access for emergency response needs.
Fire is a further risk and clear, safe access is re-
quired for fire fighting. Orion recommends that
commercial building developers make contact with
Orion at the start of design work, noting that Orion
can assist with assessment and design of electricity
requirements.
1.12 Key Infrastructure Impacts
of the Canterbury
Earthquake Series –
Electricity
(O’Donnell, J. 2011b)
This November 2011 presentation summarises
Orion’s learnings from the Darfield and Christchurch
earthquakes.
The main points are:
• Fifteen years of seismic mitigation measures paid
off – minimal damage to substations, cables,
poles, critical equipment and communication
sites.
• Orion’s large size helped in the scale-up of work
(arrangements with suppliers, mutual aid etc).
• “Plan to plan” (i.e. detailed advance planning to
be avoided). Don’t be pressured into accepting
the wrong resources (this may slow things down).
• Set high level focus/priorities (e.g. top priority is
preservation of life).
• Let people perform their normal work.
•  Communication was the key to rapid restoration
of power. Need to communicate well with staff,
public, contractors and stakeholders, including
updating contractors on scale of event and
resource impact. Having just one point of contact
between contractor and Orion worked best.
• Need better job management system (to avoid
duplication).
• Determining competency of contractor staff was
challenging (especially the different Australian
system).
• Radio channels worked well (especially when cell
phone down).
• Contractors were not recognised by Civil Defence
as an essential service, leading to cordon access
difficulties.
• Maintenance programme up to property entry (i.e.
beyond industry norms) helped with resilience.
1.13 Resilience Lessons:
Orion’s 2012 and 2011
Earthquake Experience
(Kestrel Group, 2011)
Orion commissioned this independent review of their
earthquake performance following the February 2011
earthquake.
The main points are:
• Orion’s approach to emergency planning is to
keep documents at a high, principle-focused,
level, relying on trained and motivated staff to
make sound decisions once the nature and
extent of the emergency is known.
• Orion’s management approach based around
CDEM’s “4 R’s” helps with role clarity in electricity
distribution management.
• Orion has undertaken a systematic seismic risk
mitigation programme following the mid-1990s
“Risk and Realities” report. Systematic and
sustained investment in seismic mitigation was
central to rapid and effective electricity restora-
tion. It was also very cost-effective for Orion.
• Orion’s emphasis on route diversity for under-
ground cables was advantageous in areas of
liquefaction.
• Since the September earthquake, Orion has
demonstrated an on-going willingness to seek
self-improvement.
• The earthquakes are likely to have shortened the
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life of some of the underground and (to a lesser
extent) overhead services.
• The question arises: how will earthquake impacts
on Orion’s performance be accommodated under
the Commerce Commission’s new price-quality
regulatory regime? Looking ahead, a balance will
need to be found between longer-term reliability
and expenditure on security.
• Maintaining safety is a top priority despite the
pressure of work. Time-outs, pauses and regular
meetings are valuable and need to be included in
response arrangements.
• The inter-dependency between power and
telecommunications was highlighted in this event.
• Assistance from CDEM was not required other
than for approval of new lines. However, the
working relationships around cordon manage-
ment between CDEM, Police and Army personnel
were unsatisfactory (inflexible) to the point that
response and recovery objectives were compro-
mised.
• Pro-active communication is most important.
Recommendations:
• Introduction of the Outage Management System
(OMS) should recognise the needs or all Orion
users.
• Steps should be taken with contractors to
facilitate identification and consideration of
emergency response matters such as job referral
processes.
• Mutual aid agreements should be written up
(including issues such as roles and responsibili-
ties for food, accommodation, HSE etc) for the
benefit of other electricity distributors in New
Zealand.
• HSE issues should be discussed with contractors
with a view to improvements (improvements
could be documented in Orion processes, the
mutual aid agreement or referred to regulators if
significant issues are identified).
• Orion should reconsider aspects of its spare parts
management taking into account location, likely
timing of delivery of new supplies (both from
alternative New Zealand sources and overseas
suppliers) and storage rack design.
• Orion should take into account the approaches
set out in the National Loading Standard A/NZS
1170 Part O in considering future premises.
• Orion should write to the Ministry of Civil Defence
& Emergency Management to note its concerns
about cordon and demolition management, so
that cordon management takes the needs of
infrastructure companies and their contractors
more effectively into account in future events.
1.14 MainPower Earthquake
Recovery September 4th
2010
(Batten, P. 2010)
This brief presentation outlines MainPower’s recov-
ery experience following the September 2010
earthquake.
The main points are:
• Eighteen known cable faults were the result of
sideway forces and stretching – damage often
over several meters around the ground rip.
• Cables often pulled tight against their termina-
tions due to insufficient slack.
• Traditional cable fault finding and repairs proved
to be fruitless. 3.5 km of new cabe was laid over
11 cable sections.
• Two ground-level substations required rebuilding.
• There was minimal damage to LV cable –
problems may however be an issue later.
• Overhead line network stood up well and was fast
to repair. Some poles were leaning and a number
of concrete poles sunk due to liquefaction.
• MainPower’s seismic restraint programme over
the past 15 years following Edgecumbe earth-
quake greatly contributed to lower damage levels.
• Six portable generators were used for up to 12
days.
• Mutual aid with Marlborough Lines and Electricity
Ashburton also assisted.
• Low network load post-earthquake helped reduce
the restoration times.
1.15 Business Continuity
Earthquake Response
(McDrury, D. 2010)
This brief internal email reports on MainPower’s
debrief on immediate staff management issues
following the September 2010 earthquake.
The main points are:
• The use of the E-Text system would have been
useful in being able to text multiple staff cell
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phones from one email to check on families. For
this to be effective it is necessary to keep contact
details of staff and families up to date and training
provided to staff to use the system.
• Provide families of staff with a ‘back door’ number
to contact the control room directly. This would
allow the call to be diverted to someone else if
the person they are attempting to contact is busy.
• Regular updates of staff locations is important to
monitor who is at work, whether fatigue issues
are possible and whether breaks are being taken.
Self-monitoring of hours is better in the first
instance.
• Need to stockpile water at easily accessible
locations pre-event.
1.16 Christchurch, New
Zealand Earthquake
Sequence of Mw 7.1
September 04, 2010, Mw
6.3 February 22, 2011, Mw
6.0 June 13, 2011: Lifeline
Performance – Electric
Power
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 4 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter 4
is on Electric Power.
The main points are:
Experience
• Buried high-voltage distribution cables posed the
biggest power outage challenge in Christchurch
after the earthquakes due to difficult access and
damage from liquefaction. Damage to transmis-
sion assets was relatively minor.
• Both Transpower (transmission) and Orion
(distribution) had undertaken seismic mitigation
prior to the earthquakes. For example, retrofitted
seismic upgrades to URM brick substations by
Orion using steel supports worked well in both
September 2010 and February 2011. Seismic
mitigation relating to 66 kV cables across a
footbridge proved effective in September but the
cables failed in February.
• Transmission towers which had their four founda-
tions tied together experienced no lateral spread-
ing, whereas towers within the same area that did
not have their foundations tied suffered from
spreading due to liquefaction and secondary
member buckling. There was no loss of service
but repairs will be necessary. Transmission,
conductor sags and misaligned insulators, and
bent tower extensions were experienced, but no
loss of supply occurred from these. Damage at
substations was minor. Vibration of some mercury
switches resulted in false readings, requiring
switch resetting.
• A few Orion substations were seriously damaged
in February 2011 from liquefaction or rockfall. The
Orion headquarters was also damaged.
• Damaged 66 kV and 11 kV Orion cables were the
main cause of outages. Damage was generally in
areas with lateral spread and/or settlements.
These were in areas of moderate liquefaction
displacement for the 66 kV cables (one example:
direct burial XLPE-type with thermal backfill and
direct burial oil-type with thermal backfill), while
the 11 kV (direct burial, both PILC and XLPE)
cables mainly failed in areas of severe liquefac-
tion. Six per cent of 11 kV failures occurred in
areas where there was no liquefaction. New
temporary overhead lines and a new substation
were quickly built.
• For two of the 66 kV cables the lack of reinforce-
ment allowed permanent ground deformations to
concentrate movement at a discontinuity of the
thermal backfill, leading to high curvature and
failure.
Advice
• Ensure that batteries within battery racks have
spacers and are secured to reduce / eliminate the
possibility of sliding – no significant adverse
effects were recorded as the batteries remained
operational, but the experience could have been
worse.
• Ensure when a circuit breaker is put into its “not-
in-service” position, there is additional bracing to
stop their heavy eccentric mass causing it to
topple. As well as reducing the potential damage
of the circuit breaker, this reduces the risk that
movement will damage other nearby assets.
• Ensure that ties to voltage transformers have
sufficient slack to reduce the potential for a high
“yanking” load to be put on the component.
• Heavy liquefaction caused foundations of one
substation to lose bearing capacity, with failure of
the foundation and tilting of the building. When
upgrading or building a substation the potential
for liquefaction needs to be fully considered.
• Rockfall needs to be fully considered as a
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potential hazard for infrastructure such as
substations and placement of transmission
towers. Adequate risk reductions should be put in
place where rockfall could occur during a seismic
event.
1.17 Performance of Buried
High Voltage Power
Cables due to
Liquefaction
(Eidinger J. M., 2012)
This paper reports on an investigation into the
performance of buried cables in liqefaction zones.
The main points are:
• Descriptions (including photographs) of deformed
HV cables as they were dug out in liquefaction
zones following the earthquakes are included in
the paper. For example, the impact of shear on
oil-filled cables associated with thermal concrete
surrounds is shown – high curvature as the
ground moved led to strain on the aluminium
cover, tearing it. In another example, high reverse
curvature in XLPE cables caused the insulation
around the copper core to wrinkle outwards,
tearing the outer copper sheath.
• There was no lateral spreading in the six areas
surveyed and the cable damage appears to have
been due to liquefaction.
• A series of non-linear structural analyses of
buried cables was performed to attempt duplica-
tion of the field observations. The paper offers the
following possible explanation of the forces
leading to these cable failures:
– A combination of travelling waves and local
differential settlements create a high bending
moment around the horizontal axis of the
unreinforced cemented sand / concrete
thermal backfill. Before the concrete cracks,
the underground cables are intact. When
there is an increase in the bending moment
there is a resulting induced tensile stress in
the concrete. A weak spot in the concrete is
found and this results in the concrete crack-
ing. The two ground layers then “slosh” and
when they come back together the high forces
occur in the thermal concrete causing the
cables to buckle sideways. This results in a
crushed power cable.
A test programme on full-scale samples is being
undertaken at Berkeley, sponsored by Pacific Gas
and Electricity. The samples include four 150 mm
PVC or HDPE ducts supported by spacer grids every
1.5 meters within reinforced and unreinforced
concrete, about 0.8 to 1.0 meter in cross-section.
Initial tests show:
• Unreinforced ducts: when the bending moment
on the concrete duct bank exceeds the tensile
cracking strength, a large crack forms in the
concrete. The ducts maintain their circular cross
section sufficiently, preventing crushing of the
power cable.
• Reinforced ducts: steel-reinforced duct banks
easily absorb the cracking and there is no
significant damage.
Conclusions and recommendations:
• Avoid the use of underground cables in liquefac-
tion zones.
• Direct burial in moderately-strong thermal backfill
concrete can result in cable failures.
• When buried cables are required in liquefaction
zones, a reinforced concrete thermal backfill can
control curvatures and prevent knife-edge offsets.
Reinforcement (steel or fibre) should be used for
such burial situations. Cemented PVC joints can
be expected to crack under high bending action
when placed in thermal concrete.
1.18 Impact of the Darfield
Earthquake on the
Electrical Power System
Infrastructure
(Watson, N.R. 2010)
This is a summary of a paper from the December
2010 Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earth-
quake Engineering, Vol 43, No. 4.
The main points are:
• The seismic events caused the mercury in
Buchholtz relays to move and trip the transform-
ers which resulted in a partial loss of supply in
Transpower’s network. The Buchholtz devices
have now been updated to replace the mercury
switches with reed switches as these are less
sensitive to seismic events.
• A lesson learnt from the Edgecumbe earthquake
was the need to seismically restrain transformers.
These were fitted prior to the earthquake and
ensured no transformers toppled off their founda-
tions.
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• The use of flexible cables rather than solid
conductors to make connections between
busbars and substation equipment also allows
some flexing without breakage.
• Clashing of conductors in both Transpower and
lines companies’ overhead lines occurred which
caused temporary faults.
• Orion acted on many of the recommendations
that came out of Risks and Realities and were
prepared for an event like this. They have been
actively pursuing a policy of earthquake (and
storm) hardening in their electrical network.
• Pole mounted structures and transformers
(Orion) were strengthened to withstand earth-
quakes. The result was that only a few of Orion’s
substations were affected by the earthquake.
• MainPower have been working over the last 15
years to upgrade zone substation transformer
seismic restraints as this was a lesson learnt from
the Edgecumbe earthquake. This resulted in no
real damage at zone substations.
• Mutual aid agreements meant that MainPower
were able to have access to aid from
Marlborough Lines and Electricity Ashburton
which allowed for access to equipment, staff and
cable jointers.
• Underground cables were damaged due to major
ground movement but there is no easy way to
prevent this apart from moving to overhead lines.
However these are more prone to storm damage
and being hit by vehicles.
1.19 Impact of the Christchurch
Earthquakes on the
Electrical Power System
Infrastructure
(Massie , A. & Watson, N.R. 2011)
This is a summary of a paper from the December
2011 Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earth-
quake Engineering, Vol 44, No. 4.
The main points are:
• Most cable damage to paper-lead cables
(PILCA).
• Fracturing in hill slopes caused some cables to
tear.
• 66kV oil-filled cables deemed un-repairable
(Bromley – Dallington and Bromley – New
Brighton) and replaced with overhead lines as an
emergency repair.
• The cable repairs were undertaken with the
support of local and overseas specialist cable
jointers.
• The low voltage network of predominantly
polyethylene and polyvinyl chloride (PE and PVC)
cables have performed well and suffered fewer
faults when compared relative to the observed 11
kV cable networks.
• The major fault with overhead lines were pre-
dominantly LV issues such as barge boards being
ripped off houses and conductors being torn out
of terminals due to the ground shaking. Liquefac-
tion caused several poles to sink.
• Orion’s head office was damaged but a hot
standby control office had been set up pre-event.
• The loss of chimneys potential would increase
the winter electricity demand.
•  The risk reduction action taken over the past 15
years reduced the network damage:
– Seismic strengthening of substations
– Improvement to key bridge approaches
– Improvement in design standards
– Establishment of a backup hot-site for
Network Control & Call Centre.
• Other design features such as ringed 11 kV HV
cable systems and interconnected low voltage
network helped give flexibility in restoring loads.
Use of deterministic security standard, and the
policy of maintaining lines up to the customer
building entry, were also beneficial.
• Also helpful to mobilize staff and resources
quickly:
– Mutual aid arrangements in place with other
lines companies
– Arrangements with suppliers & contractors
– Relationships established.
• Pre-event plans and disaster scenarios were
beneficial.
• Communication with public and media important.
Dallington Hub was set up for people to use
telephones and computers if they couldn’t at
home.
• Looking after staff was critical – e.g. food, water,
washing.
• Bringing help from outside the region reduced the
burden on local staff (and their families). Similarly
retaining local staff in normal functions helps to
reduce the load.
Page 13Electricity
• Looking after medical needs (e.g. Hep A vaccina-
tions for those working in / near ruptured sewer
lines).
• Impossible to carry enough spares for this event
– good supply chains were imperative.
• The optimal size of temporary generators was
found to be 400 kVA – 500 kVA, 415 V. As they:
matched kiosk load; no transformation necessary;
not dependent upon possible faulty 11 kV cable
network.
• Generators are expensive to run and require fuel
supply but if fuel is available they are good to use
and can enable the ability to expand resources.
• More economically viable to buy rather than
lease.
• More redundancy needed between key substa-
tions and national grid.
• Loads are changing and temporary overhead
lines will have to be replaced.
• Underground cables will need to be planned, not
on the shortest route, but in land least likely to
deform (>500m from waterway to avoid lateral
spreading). Thus care is needed when crossing
waterways.
• Review required of the encasing cable practices
in weak concrete or hardfill. Ducting protects
cable from damage during ground deformation or
using extra cables with different cable routes to
provide redundancy.
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2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
2.1 Earthquake Performance of
Telecommunications
Infrastructure in
Christchurch 2010/2011
(Foster, C. 2011a)
This 2011 paper reports on the performance of key
components of Christchurch’s telecommunciations
network following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes.
The main points are:
 • The Telecom core network continued to operate
both through and after each event and the many
aftershocks. There were call overloading issues
on both the PSTN and mobile networks, but
much more significantly on the February 22
event. After the immediate aftermath panic,
calling levels returned to manageable levels.
 • Many sites had been provisioned to be easily
connected to portable engine alternators because
it had been recognised from earlier events that
the mobile network would be a prime mode of
telecommunications for both restoration and
normal communications.
 • All telephone exchanges have at least a battery
back-up for reserve and the larger ones also
have generator (engine) in case of mains failure.
 • Equipment in the Telecom buildings had been
seismically supported and continued to operate
because of this.
 • The main points of failure of buildings were
connections, i.e. where they had been structurally
extended since their original construction.
 • There were insufficient engines locally to support
the continued operations of the field sites provid-
ing services (such as broadband) to customers.
There were also logistical issues with keeping
them operational (refuelling etc).
 • It was important that staff rostered to work
following the earthquake were given days off to
ensure they did not burn out during the highly
stressful period.
 • Preplanning can only be effectively done to a
certain level. It usually needs to include those
issues that can take some time to put in place but
have a considerable impact on being able to
manage and mitigate the effects of the event. In
this case having more of the most suitably sized
generators would have been more effective in
keeping mobile sites operational initially, espe-
cially when their nominal battery reserve is only 2
hours.
 • Use a mixture of local and distant people to
manage and control the event. The distant
management need to be willing to listen to the
locals and the locals need to be aware that what
might seem the most logical solution may not
provide the most effective answer. The locals’
families came first.
 • Because so many of the basics (water, food,
toilets etc) were not readily available, special
supply arrangements were required often from
outside the region.
 • A control bunker (or War Room) was set-up with
basic computer and phone connection facilities,
audio conferencing, whiteboards and controlled
access. It is essential that generator power is
available.
 • Early liaison is important with key people in
support infrastructure especially power distribu-
tion and those that control physical access.
 • Be prepared to change at short notice the way
events are being managed where critical success
factors will be compromised if the present
approach is continued.
 • Gel technology in roadside cabinets appears to
be relatively resilient. The resilience of AGM
batteries in the mobile network has yet to be
determined.
2.2 Christchurch February 22
Earthquake – A Lifelines
Presentation
(Chorus, 2011)
This presentation describes issues arising in Cho-
rus’s response to the February 2011 earthquake.
The main points are:
 • Location of the “War Room’ was in the process of
being changed following September, from the
central city to the eastern suburbs. Focus on
keeping mobile network operational.
 • Call centre activities moved to other national
Telecom sites. 111 services moved.
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 • Staff put on ‘special leave’, but effort taken to get
staff back into work place within a week.
 • Some staff brought in from other locations for
specific tasks. Contractors also brought in to
increase resources.
 • Significant calling congestion, access faults four
times greater than September, local cable
damage in some areas, core network continued
to operate.
 • Temporary working spaces for call centre staff
difficult to find.
 • Power outage a significant concern. Power
outage affected rate of restoration – especially in
east of city. Approx 80 generators “imported” from
other parts of New Zealand. Improvements in
availability of timetable information for power
restoration compared to September earthquake
noted.
 • Telecom had a priority contract for structural
engineers to check key sites – building checks
initiated the following day.
 • Chorus had a staff presence in main civil defence
EOC for first 2 weeks (12 hours per day).
 • Plastic and fibre cabling has had minimal dam-
age. Damage to lead cables (most with paper
insulation) in some locations through sheaths
cracking and letting in liquefaction water, and
being pulled apart.
 • Telephone exchange / Telecom House – in red
zone, no power, no reticulated water for cooling
towers (local bore set up as back-up proved very
useful), significant cracks in telecommunications
cable tunnel in the street, risk from neighbouring
buildings.
 • Problems around disconnecting cables / protect-
ing equipment from buildings being demolished.
Those cables were often also providing services
to other customers who were not affected by
demolition etc.
2.3 Earthquake Performance of
Telecoms Infrastructure in
Christchurch
(Foster, C. 2011b)
This November 2011 presentation to the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group summarises Chorus’s
learnings from the Christchurch earthquake.
The main points are:
 • Resilience in the network is noted, i.e. duplicate
sites, ring fibre networks, back-up generators and
batteries in reserve.
 • Immediate impacts arose from by power outages,
traffic congestion and cable damage.
Key points for managing disasters:
 • High level pre-planning essential. Details can be
adjusted during the event to account for specific
circumstances.
 • Need a mixture of local and national resources,
and to ensure that staff have water, food etc.
 • Establishing good working relationships with
CDEM and electricity suppliers early in the
response is essential.
 • Be prepared to change approach at short notice.
Match the new situation with the required re-
sources, rather than just assuming the current
resources are appropriate.
 • Use robust technology, such as portable genera-
tors and Gel v AGM batteries. Minimise the
reliance on plant that requires a water source.
2.4 A Telecommunication
Provider’s Response to the
2011 Christchurch
Earthquake
This summary is from an internal review conducted
by a Telecommunication Service Provider following
the February 2011 earthquake. The author has
approved release of this summary but has requested
that the source document be withheld.
The main points are:
Things that worked well
 • The organisation’s efforts to put in place pro-
active safeguards and establish a crisis manage-
ment plan was very effective.
 • Very good internal and external corporate
relations ensured the organisation’s brand was
protected. The organisation pulled out all stops to
assist its customers and emergency services.
 • Great staff commitment to the organisation’s
survival and to its staff and contractors aided the
response.
 • HR response was essential in supporting staff
and helping them to return to work.
 • Crisis management teams were more effective
since previous events (indicating good internal
learnings processes, stemming from detailed,
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clear reporting to the senior management team).
 • Risk prevention measures applied to physical
assets radically reduced damage and restoration
time.
Lessons Learnt
• Check assumptions made when preparing crisis
management plans (e.g. having a strong building
housing staff is not enough in itself if the event
causes surrounding buildings and structures to
be dangerous or damaged, thereby preventing
access).
• Further thought required into strategies needed
where access to office building is impossible (e.g.
working from home, implementing remote
working technologies; relocation to Work Area
Recovery sites; developing geographic diversity
for key time-critical functions; work load shedding
to other teams). Imposition of cordon required the
company to completely change its operating
model from centralised to decentralised in a very
short time and its business continuity arrange-
ments allowed this to happen and thus minimised
the impact to the business.
• Right at the start of the crisis event, set arrange-
ments for crisis communication, set crisis man-
agement roles and responsibilities, and determine
staff health and safety and welfare response.
• Need to develop relationships in “peace time”,
including at senior management level, with local
authorities, CDEM and power companies.
• Need to pre-plan for crisis-centres and work area
recovery sites – including back-up communica-
tions equipment and food and water.
2.5 Christchurch Earthquake
Report
This summary is from an internal review conducted
by a Telecommunication Service Provider following
the February 2011 earthquake. The author has
approved release of this summary but has requested
that the source document be withheld.
The majority of the lessons were taken direct from
the report (see tables on pages 18-23).
Green – Observation relates to something that
went well and should be repeated or built on in
future
Amber – Observation relates to something that
should have been avoided or could be improved
in future
! – General observation on events.
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Emergency Management Process and Preparedness 
 Observation Lesson 
Green Experience of September earthquake meant that 
many effective tactics learned in the previous event 
were very quickly implemented, e.g. 
• initial media releases 
• technical change blackout 
• minimum coverage modelling to prioritise 
generator deployment 
• deployment of dedicated H&S lead to CTP 
Ensure these lessons are 
incorporated as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Green Exec-level Crisis Management team provided 
effective governance at the strategic level, and the 
appropriate decisions were referred to CMT for 
approval. 
Process is well-practiced through 
annual exercise, good use of support 
materials such as template agenda. 
Green Engagement with Civil Defence worked well and 
proved useful to get priority access to transport, to 
get staff through cordons, and to get information 
about the activities and priorities of other utilities. 
Relationship with civil authorities as 
a “lifeline utility” is important to 
cultivate and engagement process 
needs to be ready. 
Amber Meetings between telco CEOs were useful, could 
have happened earlier. 
Include as guidance in support 
documentation. 
! A number of alarming and incorrect rumours 
emerged in the aftermath, particularly during the 
first week (e.g. Civil Defence had confiscated telco 
generators) 
Need to actively consider the source 
and the plausibility of information 
before acting on it or disseminating 
it.  
 
 
Health & Safety 
 Observation Lesson 
Green Checking in on affected staff was accomplished as 
a priority. 
Process and tools could be valuable 
here, e.g. capability to text staff 
based on place of work. 
Green Health & Safety rules were communicated to 
Christchurch staff on Day 1. 
Include as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Amber Some Health & Safety processes not standardized 
and documented e.g. instructions to staff entering 
the ‘quake zone, process to conduct checks of staff 
safety, tracking staff travel. 
Ensure these processes are 
documented and included in review 
and testing schedule. 
Amber Contractors were not always aware of the 
company’s health and safety requirements. 
H&S requirements need to be 
communicated effectively to 
contractors. 
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HR / People 
 Observation Lesson 
Green Extraordinary efforts and co-operation by staff 
across the business. Staff were motivated not only 
by loyalty to the company and each other, but also 
by the sense that they were working to provide an 
essential service and assist the people of 
Christchurch. 
Benefits of strong company culture 
and a focus on corporate 
responsibility. 
  
Formal acknowledgement and 
reward for extraordinary efforts is 
also important. 
Green Effective response from engineering vendors based 
on strong personal relationships with our staff. 
Benefit of fostering strong 
relationships and understanding the 
vendor’s capability to deliver beyond 
BAU supply arrangements. 
Amber Some contact details in the HR database were not 
up-to-date, which delayed contacting some staff. 
Incentives and ongoing effort 
required to keep staff database 
current. 
Amber Some out-of-town staff sent into Christchurch in the 
first week did not have a clear role. 
Some planning required before 
sending people in. Ensure that 
people entering the regions are 
adequately briefed on what they will 
be doing and the authority they have 
to make decisions. 
Amber Some staff in Sales relief teams had a difficult time 
dealing with the heightened emotion and stress 
encountered when dealing with traumatised 
members of the public. 
Make sure this is better considered 
in future and all staff are prepared for 
the situation that they will encounter. 
May need expert advice in 
developing a plan here. 
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Network and Technology Facilities 
 Observation Lesson 
Green Well-equipped workshop and spares storage at key 
facility was valuable e.g. in setting up microwave 
equipment before going to site. 
Should be considered in the design 
of key facilities. 
Green Impressive stability of core network infrastructure 
under high load – several units ran at 100% 
capacity in the first hours after the earthquake but 
remained stable. 
Stability under high load should be 
considered in the assessment of 
network hardware or configuration. 
Amber Some cellsite batteries did not perform to standard. 
 There were two issues: 
1) battery life degraded due to age 
2) battery spec no longer adequate for site 
following additional equipment installation 
1) Battery replacement program 
required as part of BAU (kicked off 
two years ago). 
  
2) Delivery process should evaluate 
whether battery upgrades are 
required when power load at site is 
increased (e.g. site expansions). 
Amber Portable generators with small fuel tanks (2 hour 
supply) were problematic when deployed in large 
numbers – refuelling rounds became burdensome. 
Recommend investment in modular 
fuel tanks to expand capacity. 
Amber Initial set of generators available to the region was 
not adequate to the scale of the power outages. 
We were fortunate to be able to procure additional 
generators reactively. 
Review number, location and type of 
portable generators available. 
Amber Difficulties encountered in deploying generators to 
rooftop sites. 
Consider including fixtures to install 
mobile generators at ground-level in 
standard design for rooftop sites. 
Amber The requirement from Civil Defence to send bulk 
SMS targeted to people in impacted areas was 
difficult and time-consuming to execute using 
existing capability. 
It is preferable to leverage cell 
broadcast or location-based SMS 
solution for this purpose if possible. 
  
The NZ Government is currently 
investigating a centralized solution 
for the “National Warning System” 
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Marketing & Public Communications 
  Observation Lesson 
Green Media releases aimed at controlling congestion 
were effective – messaging encouraged limiting 
use of data, voice for emergency use only, and 
use of SMS. “Tips and tricks” were also useful, 
e.g. suggesting that people record a voicemail 
message before their batteries run down. 
Most of these messages are relevant 
to any major incident and if prepared in 
advance can be released very soon 
after the event. 
Green Pro-active media releases were effective once 
these began. Reporting of network impacts in 
terms of coverage areas affected rather than 
“number of cellsites down” was more meaningful. 
Incorporate as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Amber Some important local media were missed in press 
releases due to focus on national media. 
Feedback from local staff was useful in 
determining which media were most effective in 
communicating local messages (e.g. which stores 
are open). 
Incorporate as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Amber Relief offers to customers were well-received but 
could have been offered more quickly. 
Develop reference principles and 
procedure for domestic and 
international incidents, to allow a pick 
and choose of workable relief offers to 
affected customers, including roamers. 
Amber Descriptions of network impacts were not clear 
and consistent at first.. 
The format of network status reports 
towards the end of the response phase 
was very good and should be used as 
a model for future incidents. 
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Sales Regional HQ, Retail, and Dealer Channels 
  Observation Lesson 
Green Increased DLAs to staff to assist customers 
worked well and was appreciated by both staff 
and customers. 
Empower front-line staff to deal with 
issues immediately then tighten 
guidance as appropriate. 
Green Effective redeployment of Christchurch Sales staff 
from closed stores and HQ functions into retail. 
Consolidate staff who are available to 
work in the places they will be most 
effective. Roles can be flexible during 
emergency response. 
Amber We anticipated demand for cheaper devices and 
accessories. However there was unexpectedly 
high customer demand for smartphones as a 
means to get online. 
Stock management strategy should 
take this into account. 
! Higher levels of demand for stock were 
experienced in surrounding regions such as 
Ashburton, Queenstown and Dunedin. This was 
driven by displaced people relocating to other 
centres. 
Stock management strategy should 
take this into account. 
  
Finance & Corporate Affairs 
  Observation Lesson 
Green Corporate Affairs team linkage into central 
government was effective and valuable, e.g. in 
securing fuel supply, and for escalation of issues 
with local authorities. 
Incorporate as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Green We designated a single liaison contact for aid 
agencies, emergency services and volunteer 
groups to ask for assistance (e.g. Prepay top-ups 
for volunteer forces). 
Incorporate as guidance in support 
documentation. 
Amber Difficulties were experienced in pulling together 
insurance claim information. Costs and insurance 
claim information were not adequately tracked 
from the outset of the event. 
Include this as a formal role in the 
response framework. The person in 
this role needs to know the technology 
and understand insurance claim 
requirements, so ideally a staff 
member with appropriate training from 
Finance. 
Amber While new collections activity was ceased on day 
1, activity that was already underway continued.  
Need a procedure to pull back or undo 
collections activity in progress as well 
as ceasing new activity. 
Amber An issue was encountered with standard Prepay 
top-up rules that are intended to prevent fraud 
(i.e. maximum daily top-up amounts). Emergency 
responders and aid agency staff using Prepay 
phones were hitting this limit. 
Need to be aware of this in future 
incidents. Incorporate in support 
documentation. 
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2.6 Christchurch, New Zealand
Earthquake Sequence of
Mw 7.1 September 04, 2010,
Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011,
Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:
Lifeline Performance –
Telecommunications
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 5 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter 5
is on Telecommunications.
The main points are:
Experience
 • Customers have become more reliant on cell
phones and wireless services compared to
landlines. It is recommended that a stronger
emphasis is placed on mobile network earth-
quake-resilience as a result.
 • Pre-event preparation reduced earthquake
damage but outages occurred nevertheless.
 • Liquefaction extensively affected buried cables,
especially near rivers. The damage included
cracked sheaths, water leaking into cables and
cables being pulled apart. However, the most
common service outages arose from loss of
battery power, antenna towers out of alignment
and circuit congestion.
 • Sustained periods of battery use can degrade
their capacity. This can result in shorter up-times
during the next event, especially for those
batteries that have started to age. Replacing old
batteries after a disaster needs to be a priority to
ensure sufficient battery uptime for a second
event.
 • During the first event, initial priority access to
generators proved difficult. It is recommended
that there needs to be better planning around
power generation needs. Quick connect boxes on
the outside of facilities, Base Transmission
Stations (BTSs) and cabinets helped with power
generators being quickly connected once on site.
 • Repeat speed dialling by customers contributed
to circuit congestion.
 • Old fashioned POTS phones proved useful to
customers who did not have mains electricity, as
these phones can operate using power provided
via the POTS lines.
 • Coordinating BTS restoration with power restora-
tion timetable proved challenging. Until general
power was restored there was also no need to
restore FTTN cabinets.
 • FTTN broadband can be used as a substitute for
POTS service when the damage sustained
cannot be repaired quickly (or at all).
Customer Service 
  Observation Lesson 
Amber In the first days of response, a small number of 
external messages were not consistent between 
service and media relations e.g. details of network 
impact. 
Co-ordinate and align all channels via 
the Comms Recovery Team 
Amber Free diversions from fixed line to mobile were 
offered on Day 1, however in some early cases 
we were unable to deliver this as it depended on 
the availability of the wholesale operator and their 
ability to access exchanges in the region. 
Ensure the process is understood 
before making the offer. 
! Call volumes were manageable, they went up but 
were less than might be expected. The type of 
queries coming in from customers changed over 
time, e.g. requests for assistance were common 
at first, later we received increasing queries from 
customers anticipating bill shock. 
Incorporate in support documentation. 
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Response
 • Service providers’ responses included switching
off 3G while retaining 2G services (3G drains
batteries more quickly). Text messaging and
voice communication were prioritised over data.
 • Cellsites on wheels proved to be a real asset in
replacing BTSs that were out of service.
 • Contractors offering support were turned down
due to difficulties in managing additional re-
sources. Better planning around these resources
would help to draw a better picture of potential
resources needed.
 • A good working relationship with Civil Defence
proved essential – especially when there were
cordons are in place. It was however difficult to
keep up with condemned buildings being demol-
ished, in order to know what buildings needed
their cables disconnected. There is a need to
ensure emergency procedures include plans to
deal with cordons and that there are sufficient
plans to quickly relocate essential functions (e.g.
“war rooms”).
 • Power restoration timetables with local providers
(electricity lines companies) can be difficult to
ascertain. Knowing what vulnerabilities exist in
the power company’s networks would allow for
more detailed planning in what facilities and
BTSs are most at risk to power outages. This
would allow better planning around batteries and
back-up power generators.
Advice
 • It is recommended that BTSs should have
sufficient batteries to cover the time estimated to
be required to get a generator to that site while
accounting for road congestion in the aftermath of
a large event.
 • Storage facilities should be strategically located
to ensure quick deployment of equipment (such
as cabinets and BTSs). Storage facilities should
include mobile power generators, fuel, Cellsites
on Wheels, Switching on Wheels and spare parts
for at least 75 – 80 per cent of the calculated
damage in the area. Plan alternative routes to
BTSs and storage facilities in case primary routes
are not available.
 • Quick access to structural engineers is needed to
assess building safety.
 • Ensure any BTSs placed on top of buildings are
seismically stable. Several stations were im-
pacted due to either the building collapsing or
needing to be demolished. BTSs on top of
buildings that are dangerous to enter can result in
access and electricity supply challenges.
 • Ensure plans are in place if important sites are in
vulnerable positions. Many phone companies
needed to work quickly to transfer functionality to
other facilities.
 • Ensure sufficient plans are in place to provide fuel
to generators. There also needs to be planning
around refuelling schedules to ensure sufficient
resources.
 • Have in place redundancies for loss of water to
cooling towers.
 • Run tests including different scenarios covering
the logistics of mobilizing large numbers of
generators including moving equipment into the
region from outside the area.
2.7 Emergency Telephone Call
Services and the February
2011 Christchurch
Earthquake
(Fenwick, T. 2011)
This report outlines the performance of the 111
emergency calling system immediately after the
February 2011 earthquake. Commercially sensitive
data has been withheld.
The report notes that:
The telecommunications sector generally performed
well following the February 2011 Christchurch
earthquake. Telecommunication service providers
(TSPs) took strong steps to restore services, and
most services were back (or close) to normal within a
week or so (except in the CBD where immediate
restoration was not possible – nor was it a priority
given cessation of most CBD activity).
The ability to make calls immediately after the
earthquake, including 111 and other priority calls,
was impacted by electricity outages, cable failures in
liquefaction areas and congestion. Cordless phones
immediately ceased to work where electricity failed.
Some physical damage to telecommunications
assets also occurred but the effects were secondary
– congestion largely resulted from the sudden
substantial increase in call attempts rather than to
equipment failure. Battery life at cabinets and cell
towers also quickly became a constraint on telecom-
munications performance and significant losses of
cellular coverage arose.
It is not possible to assess the extent to which calls
may have failed due to impacts in the access
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networks. Further, an unknown number of 111 calls
failed to complete due to interconnection and
exchange congestion in the immediate post-earth-
quake period despite buffer capacity and overflow
arrangements. This is not to say that the emergen-
cies leading to these calls were not notified to
emergency services. Most of the callers would have
succeeded with redialling / retries or by using other
telephones (e.g. landlines), or the emergency could
have been notified by another person at the site.
Twenty further unsuccessful (abandoned) calls were
followed up by 111 call centre operators and Police
applying the standard failed-call process.
ICAP1 call takers experienced a very sharp increase
in 111 call volumes immediately following the earth-
quake (the Christchurch impact briefly took national
volumes to a level approximately three times nor-
mal). 111 calls that would normally have been
received in Christchurch were diverted Wellington.
The ICAP warm site at Palmerston North was
opened the next day to reinstate diversity.
Emergency Service Providers (ESPs) considered
that TSPs generally performed well following the
earthquake. Reports received noted that ICAP
continued to perform its normal functions. 111 call
retries due to congestion within telecommunications
system and links prior to handover to Telecom were
however not visible to the ESPs.
The steps taken by TSPs to improve services in the
immediate post-earthquake days included deployment
of over 200 portable generators. Significant logistical
challenges arose in keeping generators refuelled.
Access restrictions and building demolition pro-
grammes also needed to be actively managed. Special
measures were required to keep key TSP assets at the
badly damaged TVNZ building operational.
The Christchurch experience is instructive but it is
difficult to draw definitive conclusions from a single
event. Physical damage to telecommunications
equipment (especially core infrastructure) was very
light. Although road conditions were challenging,
roads generally remained open facilitating generator
deployment and refuelling. These favourable condi-
tions might not be repeated in other emergencies.
This and other comparable events demonstrate the
very high reliance on cellular networks in emergen-
cies. Congestion may reach high levels as callers,
including those involved in the emergency response,
make coincident demands on suddenly fragile
infrastructure.
Telecommunications networks are typically designed
to meet normal traffic demand with a surplus to deal
with sudden peaks. A totally fail-safe, unlimited
capacity 111 system is unattainable. Judgements
need to be made about cost-effectiveness, both of
incremental improvements and of any more funda-
mental changes to the 111 system that might be
suggested. One ESP (the Fire Service) noted that, as
businesses, TSPs cannot be expected to cover all
contingencies. Of course the same is true of the
ESPs themselves (average wait times to Ambulance
and Fire rose briefly immediately after the earth-
quake).
Development of the emergency call system will
always be a work in progress as technology opens
new opportunities and challenges, and as community
expectations change. A broadening of the dialogue
between TSPs and ESPs, and the community at
large, is required. The Fire Service, for example,
noted that “if ESPs know what limits and risks TSP
services have in CDEM events we can more effec-
tively plan our own telecommunications processes”.
Strong governance arrangements will be needed for
improvements requiring coordination across the 111
system as a whole to be made effectively.
2.8 Telecommunication:
Promoting Awareness of
the Implications of a
Wellington Earthquake
(Telecommunications Emergency Forum, 2012)
This brief report, prepared for the Wellington Lifelines
Group by the Secretary of the Telecommunications
Emergency Forum, includes a summary of learnings
relating to telecommunication performance.
The report notes that immediately after the
Christchurch earthquakes:
 • Cellular performance suffered for some hours due
to extreme congestion (exacerbated as batteries
ran down after a few hours). Congestion resulted
from calling spikes (spikes also occurred follow-
ing significant aftershocks). Some cell towers and
other assets were damaged but the service
1 Initial Call Answering Platform, a Telecom operated
facility for supplying emergency calling services to fulfil
Telecommunications Service Obligations (TSO).
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impact from damage was secondary (i.e. conges-
tion was primarily due to increased calling rather
than reduced capacity). In urban and suburban
areas, coverage from cell-sites generally overlaps
reducing the impact of loss of individual sites.
Cellular providers took steps to stabilise networks
and ration available bandwidth (e.g. curtailing
data to protect voice and text communications).
 • Cordless PSTN phones ceased to work where
electricity failed. Numerous faults occurred in the
local access copper network. Roadside cabinets
were generally undamaged.
 • Some microwave dishes were misaligned and
many PSTN copper and lead-covered cables
were damaged. Fibre held up well.
 • Main nodes / exchanges (where back-up electric-
ity supplies are available) and connections to
other parts of New Zealand held up well.
 • Radio services held up well. Radio services are
used by the emergency services and many
infrastructure providers and their contractors
(radio links to the rest of New Zealand were also
uninterrupted).
In the hours / days following the February 22nd
earthquake:
 • Cellular performance temporarily declined where
electricity was unavailable as batteries at cell
sites depleted (batteries generally last around 4
to 12 hours depending on the importance of the
site and the volume of call traffic).
 • Cellular performance then improved to usable,
and then to near-normal levels as generators and
mobile sites were deployed (around 200 mobile
generators were used).
 • Generator refuelling presented major logistical
challenges due to road conditions and conges-
tion.
 • Landline availability declined a little (in areas
without mains supply) as batteries at roadside
cabinets depleted.
 • Performance then improved progressively as
generators were deployed, numerous telephone
cable faults were repaired (a slow, labour-
intensive process) and electricity was restored at
customer premises.
 • Systems in the core network also improved
progressively. On-site generators at key nodes
functioned as planned – these generally have fuel
sufficient for many days.
 • TSPs collaborated to maintain services by
sharing assets (including smaller generators),
information and sites. TSPs kept each other
informed as opportunities (access windows)
arose to service, and progressively relocate
equipment at the damaged (and now demolished)
TVNZ Building in Gloucester Street where many
TSPs had key communication links. More
generally, building demolition and site access
restrictions threatened fragile telecommunication
services in the CBD and other areas where
damage was widespread.
 • The main Telecom exchange in Hereford Street
benefitted from back-up access to on-site
artesian water for air conditioning.
2.9 Telecommunications
Carriers Forum Annual
Report 2011
(NZ Telecommunications Forum, 2011)
This is a brief extract from the Telecommunications
Carriers’ Forum’s 2011 Annual Report (pages 14
to 17)
The Annual Report notes that:
 • The Telecommunications Emergency Forum,
convened directly after the February 2011
earthquake, was successful in sharing informa-
tion and resources between competitors. Tel-
ecommunication companies worked collabora-
tively, including with Civil Defence, through the
mechanisms that the Forum provides. This
helped rapid response and reduced customer
outages.
 • Farmside’s mobile satellite platform supported
Urban and Land Search and Rescue activities
(independent of disruption of land-based sys-
tems).
 • Providing for staff was very important for telecom-
munications companies including: housing,
counselling and support, safety, paid leave and
home security. Multiple modes of communication
with staff were also important (text, email,
Facebook, twitter, webpage).
 • Some companies also provided additional
support services (e.g. bandwidth) to support key
corporate and government organisations.
 • Working with businesses to provide backup
services for their data was important. Many also
offered free services, waived regular fees,
provided free equipment, and worked with other
industry providers to get their customers con-
nected quickly.
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Telecommunication providers are thinking about:
 • Satellite contingency planning for business reliant
on broadband
 • Investing in additional core network infrastructure.
 • Monitoring staff working long hours under
stressful conditions.
 • Appointing a dedicated recovery leader to align
recovery needs with business strategy.
 • Back-up power supplies.
 • The need for preparedness across the country
(e.g. re-routing through other centres).
 • The need for close personal and business
relationships both inside and outside the affected
area.
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3 POTABLE WATER AND WASTEWATER
3.1 Christchurch, New Zealand
Earthquake Sequence of
Mw 7.1 September 04, 2010,
Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011,
Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:
Lifeline Performance –
Water
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 6 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter 6
is on Water.
The main points are:
Experience
• Due mostly to widespread liquefaction there was
sustained damage to a great number of buried
water pipes and water wells.
• Major portions of the CCC water system became
depressurized very rapidly after the September
2010 earthquake, owing to the large number of
broken pipes in the liquefaction zones and the
loss of water supply from the wells due to power
outages.
• However, despite a PGA equal to 0.7g to 0.9g,
HDPE pipe at Lyttelton sustained no damage.
During the February and June 2011 earthquakes,
no damage was sustained to new HDPE pipes
installed after the first earthquake, in an area
heavily affected by liquefaction. Large diameter
PVC pipes also performed well. Small diameter
PVC pipes performed poorly. “Repair-in-kind”
repairs failed again.
• AC pipe sustained massive damage where
exposed to 2 to 4 inches of settlement or 12 to 40
inches of lateral spreads. In many such areas,
the AC pipes will need to be replaced entirely.
Where damage was more limited, pipes were
repaired using external clamps, new sections of
PVC pipe cut into damaged pipes, etc.
• Although the main water tank for the CBD
(36,000,000 litres) sustained substantial damage
which resulted in its contents emptying, there was
no inundation or life safety threat to nearby
residences.
• With only one significant fire in the CBD in the
first few hours post-earthquake, loss of piped
water supply did not result in fire spread.
• Supply from some wells was impacted where
mains electricity was lost and where generators
were not in place.
Response
• The immediate earthquake response was
focused on restoring potable water. The second-
ary response was on the wastewater collection
and treatment plants.
• The distribution of potable water to customers
with broken water mains was an important part of
the post-earthquake response. Distribution was
normally required in areas of heavy liquefaction.
It is important that Civil Defence and others
coordinating the response have adequate plans
in place to quickly supply this potable water.
• Because of Christchurch’s very high water quality
from the aquifers, there is normally no water
treatment. After each earthquake health officials
issued warnings requesting everyone to boil their
water as they were worried about contamination.
Portable chlorination stations were installed at
various locations throughout the city.
• Often repairs were made to be functional rather
than be sustainable in the long term. Except in a
very few cases, short repair lengths were inserted
instead of replacing old fragile pipes with new
seismic-resistant pipes (considered nice to do but
not realistic in the immediacy of post-earthquake
restoration efforts).
• After the second event, tracking of the damage
become much more detailed, GIS databases
were updated with many more attributes than
simply the repair location. This will help with long-
term asset management and should help develop
a more resilient network.
Advice
• Inspections and damage assessments need to be
made quickly so that the level of effort for re-
sponse can be quantified.
• Emergency response plans need to be developed
to reflect the likely vulnerabilities of the water
agency, and the needs of the local community. A
balance of emergency response and pre-earth-
quake mitigation will need to be considered.
Page 30 Lifelines: Lessons from Natural Hazards in Canterbury
• Water tanks on hillsides need to be built to
sustain landslides.
• The lessons learned with repair of water pipes
are that seismic upgrades can be especially cost
effective (worthwhile) if the hazard (future
earthquakes) occurs on a regular basis. When
upgrading the network over the long-term (20-50
years) consideration needs to be given to both
the aging of pipes due to corrosion or leaks and
pipes that are seismically vulnerable. Further
guidelines are contained in the Chapter on capital
works programmes that address these issues.
3.2 Christchurch, New Zealand
Earthquake Sequence of
Mw 7.1 September 04,
2010, Mw 6.3 February 22,
2011, Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:
Lifeline Performance –
Wastewater
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 7 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter 7
is on Wastewater.
The main points are:
Experience
• The wastewater infrastructure was so badly
damaged after the February 2011 earthquake that
for several months households were asked to
conserve water to reduce the risk of the sewage
ponds overloading.
• Dry well lift stations and dry well pumping stations
were lifted due to extensive liquefaction. This lift
exceeded 1 meter at some stations. Inflexible
connections at pumping stations caused break-
ages.
• While some pumping stations suffered no
damage from the seismic activity, inlet and outlet
pipes were damaged. One station floated when
sewage was sucked into trucks.
• Pipes may be vulnerable where they are too
rigidly supported on bridges (e.g. settlement of
one abutment can lead to failure).
• The previous use of push-on-rubber-jointed AC,
PVC, vitrified clay or concrete pipe in liquefaction
zones resulted in most of the adverse impact to
buried pipes in Christchurch and Kaiapoi. Instead
fusion butt-welded HDPE or clamped electric-
welded HDPE or ductile iron pipes with chained
joints are recommended for consideration.
• There was no damage to rod-hung cable support
trays and pipes at the Bromley Waster Water
Treatment Plant (WWTP) despite shaking with
PGA = 0.5g.
• The WWTP has an underground corridor (called
a gallery) constructed of reinforced concrete,
used for housing piping and conduits. The gallery
was damaged and separated at the construction
joints. Water and sand flowed into the gallery
through the drainage pipe system and the joint
separations.
• The WWTP had to be able to deal with an influx
of debris and sand which infiltrated the
wastewater collection pipe system, putting
pressure on the already-distressed filtering tanks.
Sewage can bypass the treatment plant to the
ponds, but the ponds cannot be bypassed to
send sewage directly to the outfall.
• Sloshing forces were the likely cause of many
aeration pipe breaks at the WWTP.
Response and Advice
• The extent of pipeline damage to the sewer
system equalled or exceeded that of the water
system but took 3 to 10 times as long to repair
owing to the depth of gravity sewers. Crews had
to dewater the sewer, install sheet piles (or trench
shields) before the pipe could be either repaired
or replaced (this is because they were often 3
meters deep).
• Interior inspection of sewer pipes was hampered
by having so many of them clogged with sand.
• Crew worked to flush sewer pipes with a water
jetting method. This cleaned the pipes enabling
cameras to be deployed to inspect the pipes. At
locations where large sewer pipe breaks had
occurred, the jetting process sometimes effec-
tively mined the sand from the ground surround-
ing the pipes and resulted in sink holes in the
roadway above. Some cars fell into the sinkholes.
The process was modified to reduce the possibil-
ity of creating sinkholes by monitoring the rate of
progress of the jetting holes, when the rate
significantly slows the crews stopped the jetting
and report a location of potential significant
damage.
• The repair strategy was to first restore the larger
downstream sewer mains then continue working
upstream. In this way CCC could take as much
sewage as possible to the WWTP and also
contain as much sand as possible in the pumping
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station wet wells, thus removing a significant
sand load from the WWTP.
• Slow moving effluent in pipes caused the biggest
headache for both the city council and health
authorities because of leakage into backyards,
rivers and the sea.
• Portable toilets proved essential in providing
temporary service to customers – generally one
per two houses. Another approach was to install
small tanks on berms or in the front of properties
without sewer service, where the sewer mains
couldn’t be repaired. This allowed use of the
household internal toilets, showers and washing
machines. Finally chemical toilets were deployed
to some residents to replace the usage of
portaloos.
• HDPE pipe was useful in establishing temporary
sewage bypasses over bridges.
• It is noted that relative to other lifelines, sewer
systems have often been neglected with regards
to seismic vulnerability assessments and mitiga-
tion. Liquefaction has a major impact on the
network’s performance and had a very large
impact on people’s daily lives.
• There needs to be adequate preparation for
storing silt if liquefaction is a possibility.
3.3 Recent Earthquakes:
Implications for U.S. Water
Utilities
(Davis, C. & Eidinger, J. 2012)
This paper draws on experience from the
Christchurch earthquakes and makes recommenda-
tions for consideration by US water authorities.
The main points are:
Experience
• Water pipes and wells in Christchurch had not
been designed for earthquakes although some
seismic upgrades to reservoirs had been under-
taken.
• The bulk of the earthquake damage to water
systems was due to failure of hundreds to
thousands of smaller diameter distribution pipes
in zones of infirm ground. Liquefaction caused
water pipe breaks. Landslides and road-fill
slumps damaged pipes in hill areas. AC pipes
were the most vulnerable to settlement or lateral
spreading.
• One water storage tank had damage to the roof
in September, likely due to uplift forces by water
sloshing. More damage occurred to tanks in
February.
• Difficulties arose in water well performance after
the February earthquake in liquefaction zones.
Soil settlements due to liquefaction resulted in
broken well casing pipes. Some wells did not
have generators (for emergency response
phase). Fortunately there were no / few fires.
• For common distribution pipes and service
laterals (from under 1" to 8" diameter), HDPE
pipe (either fusion butt welded or electro-welded
with clamped joints) appeared to have excellent
earthquake performance.
• Christchurch City Council had installed some
HDPE pipe in its water distribution system after
the first earthquake. In the subsequent earth-
quakes, no HDPE pipe was damaged, while
nearby older pipes were damaged.
Response
• Water was the number one restoration priority,
wastewater was second.
• Shallow pipe burial depths simplified immediate
repair efforts (most consumers had water within
10 days, the last about 6 weeks).
• Deep sewer pipes (9-10 feet) complicated repair.
Dewatering and shoring was required.
• Christchurch utilised small water tankers to
provide potable water in liquefied zones. When
plans are being made for these tankers, consid-
eration should be given to who will operate them,
how they will obtain petrol and where / how the
tankers will refill with potable water.
• Water quality was managed through boil water
alerts and mobile chlorination stations. Boil water
notices were removed after 14 days.
• Most immediate repairs were replacing “like for
like”. Where HDPE was used instead of “like for
like”, less damage occurred.
Advice and Recommendations
• The report recommends the adoption of perform-
ance goals. Goals may include the seismic
performance of upgraded assets, how long is
acceptable for customers to be without water
after an earthquake as well as measures around
mitigation and preparedness. This would provide
a “yardstick” as to what constitutes acceptable
water system performance. Targets should be
discussed with all involved parties.
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• The following two recommendations are amongst
a group addressed to the US Water Research
Foundation:
– A cost-effective pipe replacement strategy
should be developed that factors in on-going
aging pipeline replacement as well as earth-
quakes. A seismic design guideline for water
pipes (ALA 2005) is currently available, but it
addresses only seismic issues. This guideline,
supplemented with attention to pipe aging/
corrosion and on-going lessons learned,
should be updated.
– A review of the various post-earthquake
restoration targets and strategies, addressing
forecast benefits, and actual costs, would be
useful to utilities to help them select their own
strategies.
• The report also notes that:
– Seismic upgrades are more likely to be cost
effective if the hazard occurs on a regular
basis.
– Non-gravity sewer systems should be consid-
ered as an option.
– Emergency response plans should have
provisions for major increase in work crews
after an earthquake. These can be from either
outside contractors and/or mutual aid. For
practical purposes, the work crews should not
increase by more than 100 per cent unless
the utility has the ability to manage a much
larger workforce.
– Backup power generators with sufficient fuel
supplies for critical well supplies will reduce
the need for electric power restoration.
– Emergency response plans need to be
developed to reflect the likely vulnerabilities of
the water agency, and the needs of the local
community. A balance of emergency response
and pre-earthquake mitigation will need to be
considered.
– Fire spread was not a problem and existing
fire prediction models may need to be up-
dated. This will affect the strategy for water
supply design / resilience levels.
Detailed recommendations are made in the paper for
pipe renewal, water tank design and water well
design. Extracts from the relevant sections follow
(see the full report for further information).
Seismic Design for Pipes
Distribution pipes. Pipes (diameter 12 inch and
smaller) that have leaked and been repaired more
than 2 times (3 times in residential areas) over the
past 7 years, per 1 km length, deserve replacement
in the next 5 to 10 years. The replaced pipe, if
located in soils that are prone to liquefaction, should
be designed to accommodate up to 150 mm of
movement; plus all other requirements, with suitable
corrosion protection. The replaced pipe, if located in
soils not prone to permanent ground deformations,
does not need any special seismic design – impor-
tant exception: the author recommends that pipes
supplying essential facilities such as hospitals and
evacuation centres be able to be isolated from other
areas where damages may be sustained.
Transmission pipes. Pipes (diameter 30 inch and
larger) that have leaked and been repaired more
than 2 times over the past 7 years, per 1 km length,
and are in soils prone to liquefaction, landslide or
faulting, deserve replacement in the next 5 years.
The replaced pipe, if located in soils that are prone to
liquefaction, landslide or surface faulting, should be
designed to accommodate the expected permanent
ground deformations associated with earthquakes
that occur once every 1,000 to 2,500 years or so;
plus all other requirements, with suitable corrosion
protection. The replaced pipe, if located in soils not
prone to permanent ground deformations, still
requires proper design of any slip joints in order to
accommodate seismic ground shaking effects; or
avoid the use of slip joints.
Storage Tank Sites
For sites exposed to permanent ground deformation
in the design basis earthquake, the following is
recommended:
• Avoid using the site. If this is not feasible, then
consider the following mitigation measures:
– All attached pipes must be able to absorb the
estimated ground settlements or lateral
spreads. A variety of flexible pipe hardware
can be used, which will be most effective if
the pipe is above ground (or in an under-
ground vault) to allow the pipe to move
without soil resistance.
– Steel tanks might be able to take as much as
a few inches of ground settlements, without
rupture of the tank.
– Concrete tanks (pre-stressed or reinforced)
appear to be more fragile than steel tanks,
and ground settlements of 2 to 3 inches
appear to be enough to crack the tank.
For new tank installations in high seismic zones, we
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recommend site-specific subsurface investigations to
establish the potential for permanent ground move-
ments. If the site is thought to have potential move-
ments, use steel tanks (not concrete tanks) unless
the hazard is mitigated. If the tank site requires pile
foundations (for example, a site atop young bay
muds, etc.), then the pile-pile cap detail must be
designed to accommodate the design basis earth-
quake, inclusive of soil-structure interaction effects,
with ductility demands low enough to assure no
leakage in the tank.
Avoid placing tanks at sites prone to surface fault
offset from normal or reverse faulting movements, as
it will be hard to design for these movements.
If other mitigation schemes are impractical or not
cost-effective, and if a suitable water drainage
system is included to avoid life-threatening inunda-
tion impacts to nearby residents, and if the tank is
sacrificial (not needed) post-earthquake, then a tank
can be placed in faulting, landslide or liquefaction
zones.
Water Wells
Where possible wells should be situated outside of
zones subject to seismically induced permanent
ground deformation. These can include areas prone
to liquefaction, landsides or fault crossing etc.
For wells located in zones prone to liquefaction, a
prudent design approach would be to design the
casing pipe (top 40 feet) to be able to resist all
imposed loads due to
liquefaction. The geotechnical parameters needed for
this type of design can be adopted from ALA (2005),
but specific geotechnical site investigations are
recommended. If the well casing can survive the
effects of liquefaction (including seismically induced
settlements), and if the attached discharge pipes are
provided with suitable flexible connections, most
such wells should remain functional once power is
restored. Backup power generators with sufficient
fuel supplies for critical well supplies will eliminate
the need for electric power restoration.
3.4 Liquefaction Impacts on
Pipe Networks
(Cubrinovski, M., Hughes, M., Bradley, B.,
McCahon, I., McDonald, Y., Simpson, H.,
et al. 2011)
This 2011 paper, prepared with funding from the
Natural Hazards Research Platform, provides advice,
solutions and recommendations to the Christchurch
City Council on geotechnical, liquefaction and
seismic issues relevant for potable water and
wastewater pipe systems, documents and evaluates
the performance of the systems and develops
procedures towards improved seismic resilience.
The main points in this paper are:
• Submains suffered a higher percentage of
damage than watermains for any given type of
material
• Polyethelene (PE) submains suffered, on aver-
age, five to six times less damage than galva-
nised iron (GI) pipes
• For all potable water pipe materials except PE
pipes, there is a clear increase in the affected
length (percentage of damage) with increasing
liquefaction severity
• The depth of the wastewater network caused
difficulties for observations and repairs.
The paper includes recommendations on seismic
resistance materials and how to improve construction
and design processes.
Soil Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading
• Liquefaction at a given site does not increase
liquefaction resistance of soils and does not
prevent re-liquefaction at a site in subsequent
earthquakes. The types of soils that were most
affected by liquefaction were non-plastic sands,
silty sands, sandy silts, and silt-sand-gravel
mixtures.
• Starting from the Colombo Street Bridge, practi-
cally all downstream bridges on the Avon River
were severely impacted by lateral spreading.
Rotation movements of abutments, damage to
foundation piles and subsidence of approaches to
bridges and in some cases, structural damage
were the most typical spreading-induced dam-
age.
• “When evaluating lateral spreading one should
carefully consider ground elevation (direction of
sloping), river geometry (meandering, loops, cut
banks, point bar deposits), presence of weak-
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ened zones (old river channels, fills, etc.) and
geotechnical conditions, next develop lateral
spreading zoning and probable range of spread-
ing displacements and their distribution, and then
anticipate loads and deformation of [pipelines]
having in mind [their] particular layout relative to
the direction of lateral spreading.”
Performance of the Potable Water and
Wastewater Systems
• “PE submain pipes suffered, on average, five to
six times less damage than GI pipes.”
• “Comparing the damage to watermains and
submains, it appears that for each pipe material
the damage to the submains was larger than the
damage to the mains. The total damaged length
of submains was smaller, however, because over
80% of the submains were comprised of the well
performing PE pipes.”
• Although damage is associated to a certain pipe
material, the “failures” include (and probably are
dominated at least for the PE pipes) by failures of
particular components (joints, connections, fire
hydrant details, crossovers, laterals) rather than
material failures. It is critically important therefore
to discriminate between different types of failure
and carry out more rigorous analysis.”
• Inspections of and repairs to the wastewater
network were much more difficult than to the
potable water system because of the depth at
which the pipes are installed (often exceeding 2.5
meters) and, once the need for repairs had been
identified, dewatering and trench support was
necessary before repairs could take place.
• Detailed information on damage to the
wastewater system was not available at the time
the paper was written. Further studies and
analysis are required.
CCC Issues and Considerations
• “A significant effect on the gravity pipe network
has been the movement of pipe sections relative
to each other, the surrounding ground and/or
structures. This movement is evidenced by
changes in grade, varying grades along a pipe
length, or joint dislocation either within the pipe
length, or at connections to structures.” The
effects included:
– Reduce capacity particularly in gravity lines,
– Inconsistencies in the invert level
– Partial or complete blockage of mains or
laterals
– Joint damage or movement allowing silt and
groundwater infiltration or discharge of
wastewater to groundwater
– Depressions in carriageways caused by
infiltration of subgrade materials into the
gravity system.
• Portions of Christchurch’s gravity reticulation
network are installed at depths exceeding 2.5m
resulting in delays and high reinstatement costs.
Note: The following material (“Construction Alterna-
tives” and “Design Alternatives”) summarises:
– recommendations, applicable to all
Christchurch zones, and
– best practices, applicable dependent on
liquefaction resistance in the particular area
as identified on a Liquefaction Resistance
Index map in the paper.
Research is continuing in many of the areas listed.
Readers should refer to the full paper for details.
Construction Alternatives
1. Pipe Haunching or Surround / Backfill Details
• Imported gravel backfill under roads to reduce the
potential for trench settlement also “increases
resistance to liquefaction damage by forming a
zone of non-liquefiable soil above the pipe,
providing a zone of much more permeable
ground to relieve excess pore pressures immedi-
ately under and around the pipe and higher
strength material along the trench.”
• Alternative methods and materials for pipe
haunching, surround and backfill have been
investigated. Recommended solutions included:
– Detailing a “soft ground” or “raft” foundation
wrapped in geotextile with strength class C,
installed to TNZ F/2
– Continue using M/4: AP40 or AP20 as pipe
haunching or surrounding
– Continue using M/4 AP40 or AP65 as trench
backfill
– Tightening bedding or haunching compaction
requirements.
“Best practice” solutions include, in relation to flexible
gravity pipes, wrapping haunching or surrounds in
geotextile, strength class C, installed to TNZ F/2.
2. Polyethelene Pipe Construction
• Recommendations for improved seismic resist-
ance in pressure networks using polyethylene
material include:
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– Providing quality records including methodolo-
gies and weld records to support welder
competence
– Ensuring welder competence, e.g. by requir-
ing current qualifications
– Improving weld construction through amend-
ments to construction specifications including
equipment and processes
– Providing commentaries and graphical plots
of electrofusion peel de-cohesion test results
to confirm weld competence and allow
tracking of material or welder related perform-
ance issues
– Updating polyethylene weld test requirements
ensuring testing is relevant to pipe size and
use
3. Material Selection
• Recommendations for material selection take into
account increasing pipe stiffness, specifying
ductile materials and improving the material
specifications for connections between pipes and
for fittings. Specific recommendations include:
– For gravity applications, use of PVC-U pipe,
SN16 for 100 and 150 diameter and SN8 for
225 and above to improve pipe resistance to
becoming oval or buckling under seismic
loading
– For wastewater pressure applications, use
polyethylene pipe as it has experienced no
known failures under seismic loading
– Increase the minimum PN for polyethylene
pipe in wastewater pressure applications to
PN10 to improve resistance to seismic
loading
• Best practice solutions include use of
polyethelene for potable water.
4. Joint Details
• For pipe joints it is recommended to:
– Wrap PVC-U gravity pipe joints, including on
laterals, in geotextile with strength class C to
prevent ingress of silt where joints open up
under seismic loading
– Install long socket connectors to manholes on
PVC-U gravity reticulation to increase the
potential to accommodate longitudinal joint
movement
– Improve socket lengths and so joint move-
ment capacity on PVC-U pipes by specifying
minimum socket lengths and marking two
witness marks (one as a reference mark)
through CCC PVC-U material approval
Design Alternatives
1. Providing for Future Events
• “Improved resilience can be provided through
increasing the capability of the network to
withstand seismic events by allowing for future
settlement, by providing a system that will not be
as affected by liquefaction or land movement e.g.
pressure systems, by adding redundancy into the
network, by using more robust materials and by
designing to reduce the recovery time involved in
repairs or replacement.”
Best practice solutions are suggested as follows:
– Allow, in designing gravity line grades, for
liquefaction settlement as determined by the
LRI zone and associated settlements table
– Carry out detailed geotechnical investigations
of sites to determine the liquefaction potential
and therefore likely settlement or lateral
spread and subsequent movement
– Apply the guidelines from NTC 33 clauses 32-
37, detailing what the geotechnical investiga-
tion for pump station sites should address
– Consider alternative depths or wastewater
reticulation systems instead of large scale
gravity networks serviced by substantial lift
pump stations.
2. Differential Movement Risk Areas
• “Network analysis suggests that the water
reticulation experienced greater damage rates at
the hill/plain interface by comparison to similar
reticulation in other areas. This area may require
special consideration to ensure there is sufficient
ductility in the reticulation and the reticulation
performance is still being analysed.”
3. Lateral Spread Risk Areas
• Liquefaction encourages lateral spreading in
those areas where the land is sloping or is not
confined (e.g. adjacent to rivers). To counter this
effect on damage to reticulation it is recom-
mended that:
– Designs consider ease of repair, e.g. fittings
between structures and pipes should be
placed above ground
– Flexibility in the pipes be improved through
use of polyethylene and through designing
adequate compensatory flexibility in connec-
tions to structures etc.
4. Sewer Depths and Grades
• There are a number of ways to reduce the depth
of gravity sewers in selected areas and as a
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larger scale solution. Recommended solutions
include:
– Installing collector sewers over existing deep
(over 2.5m) sewers, where depth permits.
This is to prevent future repairs on laterals
and junctions
– Apply depth restrictions of 3.5m to gravity
sewers to prevent possibility of repairs at
depth
– Apply depth restrictions of 2.5m for the
connection of laterals to gravity sewers to
prevent the possibility of repairs to depth.
5. Material Selection
• Ductility of materials within and between pipes
and robust connections between pipes and
fittings or structures are fundamental to maintain-
ing a functioning network after an earthquake
event. Material choices to counter the seismic
load on pipes, which can occur in all directions,
include:
– Avoiding brittle piping materials
– Detailing long socket connectors to manholes
on PVC-U gravity reticulation to provide
increased longitudinal joint movement.
6. Foundation Treatments
• “Liquefaction substantially reduces the strength of
the pipe foundation materials. Foundation
treatments designed to counter this include the
use of “soft ground” or “raft” foundation options
for pipes laid in areas where foundation bearing
pressures are less than 50kPa.”
7. Redundant Infrastructure
• Treatment options for large volumes of damaged
infrastructure in the ground still require further
consideration, however recommended solutions
include:
– “Removal, because these pipes form voids
which can undermine the foundations of
pavements and adjacent services and can
disrupt groundwater flows”
– “Treatment is dependent on the proximity to
all services, the pipe’s position in the road
cross-section and the size of the pipe. If
grouting, ensure it is continuous along the
pipe length. Low strength concrete (3MPa) is
preferred to prevent future issues where the
pipe may require removal”
– “Obsolete asbestos cement (AC) pipes should
preferably not be left in the ground due to
contamination problems”
Summary and Conclusions
Potable Watermains
• “For all pipe materials except PE pipes, there is a
clear increase in the affected length (percentage
of damage) with increasing liquefaction severity.”
• “For steel (S), asbestos cement (AC) and other
material pipes, the percentage of damaged pipes
in areas of severe liquefaction was very high,
between 15% and 22%.”
• “PVC pipes suffered two to four times less
damage than S, AC and other material pipes.”
• “The level of pipe damage in no liquefaction and
not-inspected areas are similar, indicating that
ground displacements/performance were similar
in these areas (with general absence of liquefac-
tion manifestation). This fact together with the
findings that the percentage of damage was
linked to and increased with liquefaction severity
provide an independent verification of the good
quality and reliability of the generated liquefaction
map.”
Potable Submains
• “GI pipes performed poorly with 17% damaged
length in areas of low to moderate liquefaction
and 26% damaged pipes in areas of severe
liquefaction.”
• “PE pipes suffered, on average, five to six times
less damage than GI pipes.”
• “Comparing the damage of watermains and
submains, it appears that for each pipe material
the damage to the submains was larger than the
damage to the mains. It is important to under-
stand what features/details contributed to this
outcome. The total damaged length of submains
was smaller however because over 80% of the
submains were comprised of the well performing
PE pipes.”
• “Even though in the simplest form of the analysis
the damage is always associated with certain
pipe material, the nominally defined “failures”
include (and probably are dominated at least for
the PE pipes) by failures of particular compo-
nents (joints, connections, fire hydrant details,
crossovers, laterals) rather than pipe failures.
It is critically important therefore to discriminate
between different types of failure and carry out a
more rigorous second stage analysis, which will
help us to identify key weaknesses and also
“good design/construction details/characteristics”
of the pre-earthquake potable water system.”
• “Having in mind the severity of ground shaking
and failures caused by the earthquakes, as well
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as the reasonably quick restoration of potable
water services throughout the city, one may argue
that, by and large, the potable water system
performed satisfactorily under the extreme
seismic events.”
Wastewater
• “By and large, the performance of the wastewater
system was poor and not satisfactory (below
desirable level/standard) despite the acknowl-
edgement of the extreme severity of the earth-
quakes and liquefaction-induced ground failures.”
• “Detailed information on the damage to the
wastewater system was still not available be-
cause of the extensive damage and very difficult
accessibility due to the large embedment depth.”
• “Further studies and analyses of the wastewater
network are required and strongly recom-
mended.”
3.5 Impacts of Liquefaction on
Pipe Networks in the 2010 –
2011 Christchurch
Earthquakes – PBD Issues
and Perspectives
(Cubrinovski, M., Hughes, M., McDonald, Y.,
Henderson, B., McCahon, I., Orense, R.,
et al. 2012)
This is a summary of a paper presented on to the
May 2012 International Conference on Performance-
Based Design in Earthquake Geotechnical Engineer-
ing, Taormina.
The main points are:
• The wastewater system was hard hit by earth-
quakes with loss of grade in the gravity pipes,
numerous breakages of pipes/joints, and infiltra-
tion of huge amounts of liquefied silt into the
pipes. Nearly 40% of the network pipes had
limited or no service approximately one month
after the February earthquake.
• PVC and PE pipes performed very well in the
potable water system, suffering several times less
damage than other material pipes (i.e. asbestos
cement, galvanized iron and steel pipes).
• In both networks, there is a strong correlation of
damage to liquefaction severity for all pipe
materials (except PE in the potable watermain
system).
• Nearly 80% of the damaged watermains were in
liquefied areas.
• In comparing damage of watermains and
submains, it appears that for each pipe material,
submains experienced a higher percentage of
damage. The total damaged length of submains
was smaller, however, because over 80 percent
of the submainss were comprised of well-
performing PE pipes.
• It is important to emphasize that even though in
these preliminary analyses the damage is always
associated with a certain pipe material, the
nominally defined ‘failures’ include (and probably
are dominated at least for the PE pipes) by
failures of particular components (joints, connec-
tions, fire hydrant details, crossovers, laterals)
rather than actual failures of the material (pipe
breaks).
• The paper sets out Christchurch City Council’s
performance objectives for recovery of both
potable water and wastewater systems based on
the observations and experiences of the 2010 –
2011 earthquakes. This criterion may be a useful
comparison for other water utilities which have
similar risks and can be viewed in Table 3 on
page 11.
3.6 Lateral Spreading and Its
Impacts in the 2010-2011
Earthquakes
(Cubrinovski, M., Robinson, K., Taylor, M.,
Hughes, M. & Orense, R. 2012)
This paper appeared in the New Zealand Journal of
Geology and Geophysics, September 2012. It
summarises the effects of lateral spreading following
the 2010-2011 earthquakes. Many valuable photo-
graphs, charts and diagrams appear at the end of the
paper.
The main points are:
• Lateral spreading caused damage to a large
number of bridges, where the results were
induced rotational movements of abutments,
damage to foundation piles, and subsidence of
approaches to bridges. In some cases this
caused structural damage.
• The spreading induced lateral displacement of
the banks towards the river. This was resisted by
the stiff and strong upper structure of the bridges
(girders and deck), causing a pinning effect and
rotation of the abutments as the foundation piles
could not resist the large lateral movement of the
foundation soils. Additional stress was imposed
on the top of the piles because of the large
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abutment rotation which resulted in further
damage.
• In cases when the lateral spreading was very
large, it was accompanied by slumping of the
approaches which produced large vertical offsets
between the approaches and the bridge itself.
• Preliminary GIS analyses of the performance of
the potable water system show clear link between
the damage to the network and occurrence /
severity of liquefaction.
• Approximately 80% of the water mains breaks
(repairs) occurred in areas affected by liquefac-
tion, and nearly 60% of the damage was in areas
of moderate to severe liquefaction where lateral
spreading was the key contributing factor to the
damage.
• The impacts of lateral spreading were even more
pronounced on the wastewater system because
its network of pipes is laid at larger depths (2.0-
3.5 m), and hence is more susceptible to damage
and also more difficult to access for repair/
reinstatement.
• The typical types of failure to both water and
wastewater networks was the loss of grade,
breakage of brittle pipes and the failure of joints
or connections (laterals).
3.7 Liquefaction impacts in
Residential Areas in the
2010-2011 Christchurch
Earthquakes
(Cubrinovski, M., Henderson, D.
& Bradley, B. 2012)
This 2012 paper, in part prepared with funding from
the Natural Hazards Research Platform, summarizes
the characteristics of liquefaction and discusses its
impacts on residential houses and buried pipe
networks.
The main points are:
• Typical damage to the wastewater network
included loss of grade in gravity pipes, breakage
of pipes/joints and infiltration of liquefied silt into
pipes (often accompanied by depression of
carriageways, undulation of road surface and
relative movement of manholes), and failure of
joints and connections (particularly numerous
failures of laterals).
• The potable water system was proven to be
much more resilient than the wastewater network.
• Preliminary GIS analyses using the pipe network
damage data and liquefaction observation maps
show a clear link between the damage to the pipe
network and liquefaction severity.
• The GIS analyses also revealed that PE pipes
and PVC pipes suffered significantly less damage
(three to five times less on average) than AC,
steel, GI and other material pipes.
• There is a clear link between the severity of
liquefaction and observed damage to the potable
water network with nearly 80% of the damaged
pipes being in liquefied areas, and 50% in areas
of moderate to severe liquefaction.
• The Christchurch experience clearly shows that
special consideration should be given to an
improved design of the waste water system,
which is more vulnerable to liquefaction and more
difficult to recover/repair due its large depth of
embedment.
3.8 Pipe Performance and
Experiences during
Seismic Events in New
Zealand Over the Last 25
Years
(O’Callaghan, F.W./ Iplex Industries 2012)
This is a summary of a paper delivered to a confer-
ence of the American Society of Civil Engineers,
August, 2012.
The paper notes that:
• Nothing is earthquake proof – the ground move-
ment happens anyway, particularly in liquefaction
and lateral spread zones – anything can, and will,
break at the weakest link. No pipeline material
survived undamaged in Christchurch where the
ground movement exceeded the yield or break
limit of the pipe material.
• Pipes must be designed with flexible joints to
accommodate movement or deliberately selected
“weak” points such as at bridge and structure
connections, to manage the location of seismic
breakage. Continuously welded pipelines, without
designed ability to accommodate compression
and expansion movement, or lacking designed
“weak” points, performed badly in severe lique-
faction and lateral spread zones, and are difficult
to repair on a large scale, if the repair system
requires heat or electricity.
• Ductile, flexible pipes with rubber ring joints
generally performed well in Christchurch.
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• Other New Zealand councils should identify and
focus limited pipe upgrade budgets in their
liquefaction zones first.
• Real risk (not estimated or perceived risk) for
seismic insurance evaluation of pipelines is quite
different in non-liquefaction zones (much lower),
compared with high liquefaction risk or lateral
spread zones (much higher or extreme).
• There is ample evidence that the extent of
pipeline damage is very closely related to
liquefaction occurrence.
• Pipe movement observed in liquefaction and
lateral spread zones was consistent with Seismic
“P” wave axial movement. The mode of pipe or
joint failure in liquefaction and lateral spread
zones was closely linked to the angular direction
of the pipe asset with the seismic epicentre.
• Do not use gravity based pipeline designs in
liquefaction risk zones – the grades will change
and disable the pipe system, regardless of pipe
material, with every seismic event.
• Design to accommodate movement, allow
compression (most damaging), expansion, and
grade changes, rotation and axial movement, and
lateral spread.
• Use materials and designs which are easy to
repair in the future. Ease of pipe repair, in the
rain, mud and wet, with low skill installers, without
electricity, roads, bridges, is a vital factor.
• Design to avoid or manage assumed or certain
pipe failure sites (fault crossings, liquefaction
sites, lateral spread sites, ground displacement
areas).
• A dedicated resource is needed of technically
skilled pipeline specialists, to be available to
quickly and fully use future opportunities to
research first hand information on actual pipe
performance in future events.
3.9 Earthquake Damage to
Buried Pipelines
(Black, J. 2012)
This summary is from a paper delivered to the
INGENIUM Conference in June 2012.
The following are the main points:
• Ductile pipes (e.g. modern PVC-U and others)
with rubber ring joints provide an acceptable and
cost effective option for most repairs and renewal/
replacement works for all but the most critical of
the water supply and sewage pipelines, particu-
larly in areas that do not have a high risk of
lateral spreading.
• The older, brittle, pipe materials e.g. ceramic
(earthenware), cast iron, AC and small diameter
concrete pipes have performed poorly in areas
affected by liquefaction. Lateral spreading and
pipe stream crossings were a cause of failure.
• Connections to pumping stations must be flexible
and fixable.
• Avoid laying infrastructure (pipes, manholes,
pumping stations) in lateral spreading zones.
Brittle pipe with rigid joints has the greatest
number of failures. Deeper and bigger pipes are
less susceptible to earthquake damage.
• Pipe manufacturing quality may impact perform-
ance. Installation affects performance as well –
e.g. insertion depths of spigot and socket pipes
and angular deflection at joints.
• Corrosion (cast and ductile iron, AC pipes) and
chemical breakdown (PVC, PE) can reduce
strength of materials.
• Consider building weak links that can be easily
repaired (indestructible pipe systems are almost
impossible to build and are costly).
• High vulnerability pipes include:
– Ceramic pipes with mortar joints.
– Brick and stone barrels generally with lime
mortar jointing.
– Old reinforced concrete pipes with rigid, lead
joints.
– Ceramic pipes with rubber ring joints.
– Cast iron (CI) pipes with rigid, run-lead joints.
– Unreinforced concrete pipes with rubber ring
joints.
– Asbestos cement (AC) pipes of ≤ DN 150.
– Old, small diameter reinforced concrete pipes
with rubber ring joints.
– Screwed steel pipes (generally ≤ DN 50).
– Steel pipes with lead joints.
– CI pipes with rubber ring joints.
– AC pipes with rubber ring joints, ≥ DN 200.
• Least vulnerable pipes:
– DI pipes with locking rings e.g. Tyton-Lok.
– PE 80B or PE 100 pipes with end-load
bearing mechanical joints.
– CLS pipes full strength welded joints.
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– DI pipes, with seismic joints.
– PE pipes with butt or full strength electro-
fusion joints (Pipes of PE 80B & PE 100).
• It is important to learn from pipe failures (e.g.
investigate pipe failures as repairs are done).
• A measured approach to priority for repair and
replacement of damaged pipes needs to be
made, e.g. taking into account the nature and
location of the damage and damage to street
pavement as well as the existing condition and
remaining life of the pipe.
3.10 Christchurch Earthquakes
– Impact on Infrastructure
& Services
(Christchurch City Council, 2011)
This November 2011 presentation to the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group summarises a range of
Christchurch City Council’s infrastructure learnings
from the earthquakes.
The main points are:
• In an emergency good information is rarely
available. Need to obtain information on the
extent of the damage.
• The road transport network is the most vital first
response infrastructure. Liquefaction cannot
easily be prevented within the road corridor.
• Have emergency service agreements and
response plans in place and review them regu-
larly.
• Don’t underestimate the value of institutional
knowledge.
• Set key priorities with Civil Defence. Think ahead
and use all available resources – must be
strategic from day 1.
• Communication is critical.
• Analogue phones have the advantage that they
are independent of mains power.
• While the Christchurch City Council being
prepared helps a little, everyone being prepared
can help a lot.
• Plan and model worst case scenarios for major,
acute network failures and have alternatives.
• Create a platform to deliver the recovery phase of
the work.
3.11 Canterbury Earthquakes –
A Contractor’s
Perspective
(Gibson, T. 2011)
This November 2011 presentation to the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group summarises City Care’s
infrastructure learnings from the earthquakes.
The main points are:
• Need a detailed picture of the extent of damage.
• Public health needs particular care and attention
(water and sewerage).
• Have an emergency management structure
prepared and be well linked into the CDEM EOC.
• Have alternative access to resources such as
accommodation and management tools, i.e.
computers, phones and maps.
• Develop a planning culture within management to
be able to deal with changing in events. Planning
must be flexible.
• Look after staff outside of work and ensure that
their basic needs are met. Develop networks for
staff support and replacement. Maintenance of
health and safety standards is challenging.
• Access to the following is most helpful: high
pressure blasting trucks, combination sucker
trucks, CCTV cameras, pipe welding equipment
and pipe bursting equipment.
• Maintaining information technology connections
including GIS capabilities, communication links to
providers and clients, access to satellite phones,
radio phone and other equipment as well as the
ability to store data.
• Understand when a fix is not working – i.e. where
permanent fixtures were not holding, temporary
fixes were quite often the only course of action. It
is important to determine this quickly.
3.12 Water Lessons Learnt
from the Christchurch
Earthquakes
(Free, P. 2011)
This November 2011 presentation to the National
Lifelines Forum summarises GHD’s water-related
learnings arising from the earthquake emergency
response.
The presentation covers:
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• Careful consideration is needed on the topo-
graphical location of settlement areas. Considera-
tion must be given to flooding and liquefaction
etc, as these have physiological impact as well as
a physical impact. Large emergencies are rarely
single-cause events, they involve multiple smaller
emergencies clustered around the initial event,
e.g. loss of power or fire, localised flooding, civil
unrest etc.
• Backup needed for critical assets. Stocks of
spare parts, replacement pipe etc, are not
needed if robust arrangements with suppliers are
in place (although holding some critical long-
delivery lead-time items may be useful). Arrang-
ing or having access to engineering workshop
facilities for running repairs is important. Develop
closer ties with neighbouring authorities as they
will be most useful contacts in an emergency.
• A good accurate (and accessible) map of infor-
mation is essential showing what’s working, what
has been assessed, what is at partial or low
service and where there is no service. This type
of information needs to be available to decision-
makers with regular updates, especially in the
early days of an emergency.
• Keep multiple hard copies of key operational
plans in different locations. Also duplication
equipment should be sourced and available early
in an emergency.
• Having a combination of 4WD (and 2WD)
vehicles in the fleet is essential. Often commer-
cial decisions are made about the usefulness and
need vs cost of 4WD vehicles but they give great
flexibility in many types of emergencies.
• Keep priority messages simple. And keep the
target goals changing to drive progress. Be
careful to not change focus too regularly due to
outside influences and if necessary create a
separate team to deal with side-line issues, often
politically or media driven.
• Pre-agreed repair techniques are useful as they
minimise rework at a later date and help with
materials supply. They also give comfort to works
staff and supervisors as they can get on with the
job and not have to worry about misalignment
with BAU repair techniques and procedures
compared to emergency repairs.
• Environment standards and some H&S normal
standards may not be applicable during an
emergency as they are designed for a totally
different environment.
• Valving control practices should be in place. This
should include easy to understand position
marking techniques to ensure workers are safe
from accident when working on mains, pumps
etc.
• Emergency water sources need to be available
quickly. Need a lot of low volume distribution
points for suburban areas that do not have mains
water. However these sources should be made
as safe as possible as there is huge reliance on
these key facilities.
• Identify and empower those who can make quick
decisions. And allow for new management
structures and personal to evolve, all people (for
various reasons) aren’t necessarily able to lead
teams in an emergency compared to normal
times.
• Availability of temporary / portable disinfection
plants are essential. In an emergency extra care
is required to ensure water is safe.
Outside help (staff resources) from other areas is
useful, as these people don’t have the family issues
that local staff will have and will be able to work
longer hours due to lack of family commitments. Also
emergencies require a much large number of people.
Doubling (or more) of normal staff numbers may be
necessary depending on the type and size of
emergency.
• Make time to help/discuss or give time to team
members who are struggling, sooner or later
even the toughest people struggle in a large
emergency. When all else fails, keep calm and
carry on.
3.13 WDC Earthquake Lessons
Learned Workshop
Outputs
(Waimakariri District Council, 2011)
Waimakariri District Council (WDC) held a series of
internal workshops to gather lessons from the
September 2010 earthquake. Sessions focussed on
what went well and areas of improvement during the
response phase, which was defined as the first 2-4
weeks after the event. The response from the
February 2011 earthquake (which had a lesser
impact in WDC’s area) provided a good comparison
of suitable arrangements for less significant but more
frequent events. The majority of the lessons below
were extracted directly from the workshop write-up.
Water Learnings
• No repairs required on PE rider mains. PE should
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be used for rider mains unless there is a good
reason not to.
• PVC was easier to lay in short lengths, particu-
larly where there are many other services in the
ground.
• Performance of PVC laterals was OK, not many
repairs required.
• There was significant benefit of having
headworks on either side of the river. The river
crossing is now valved resulting in increased
resilience.
• AC pipes did not perform well but no material
would have withstood the earthquake.
• PVC failures observed were only at joints.
Recommend use of restrained joints or extended
push fit joints on critical mains.
• PVC in Pines Kairaki may have performed better
if it was D class. No D class PVC was seen to
pull apart however ground movement in Pines
and Kairaki could have been the differentiating
factor.
• Eliminate the use of glued fittings in high seismic
risk and liquefaction areas.
• PE should be used for all riders and where
possible directionality drilled. This may be difficult
where there are a number of other services and it
may be easier to lay short lengths of PVC.
• Critical mains should be more uniform in diameter
to ensure more resilience. Lead times for delivery
of unusual diameter mains were too long. It is
proposed that all critical mains are laid in PE.
• PVC riders were less resilient. Repairs on small
diameter PVC were easier to perform than on
large diameter PVC.
• Experience has shown that PE can fail due to
weld defects. Therefore performance is depend-
ent on both the joints and the quality of the welds.
Where welding repairs are necessary, the right
conditions must exist such as dry uncontami-
nated surfaces.
• PE will stretch and deform under earthquake
stress. The longevity of the deformed PE is
unknown and while service may continue, the
damage may not be detected for some time.
• When selecting what pipe diameter to use,
ensure there are sufficient resources available to
maintain and repair the pipe in the result of a
disaster.
• There were occurrences where unoccupied
properties did not have water reinstated, but
when the owners returned they wanted water.
Further consideration needs to be given to the
management of water supply to unoccupied
properties.
• While water was restored using patching, over-
land and relay methods, there was a view that the
overlanding method could have been utilised
much earlier and would have enabled quicker
restoration times.
• Main diameter pipes need to be larger in size
than their rider main to assist in providing a
quicker restoration of service.
• Water valves need to be located on the main and
not just on the rider. Buried valves are of no
benefit. Valves in the road are a potential health
and safety issue although traffic volumes in the
district were generally low.
Wastewater Learnings
• Sand as backfill for sewer works did not perform
well, a heavier more granular material should be
used.
• Asking residents not to use toilets made CCTV
work easier. It would have been beneficial to
prolong the period of no toilet use.
• Need to develop and have a plan to co-ordinate
mains cleaning to reduce the number of sites
revisited. A lot of mains needed to be re-cleaned
when laterals come back into service as more silt
was flushed into them.
• Early work is necessary after an event to prevent
silt from broken laterals (at significantly damaged
properties) entering the system. It was difficult to
determine what properties would not be reoccu-
pied.
• Marking lateral locations with Council pegs would
have helped identify them.
• There was a problem using penetrating radar as
it was not accurate enough. The merits of using
other unproven techniques during an earthquake
response therefore needs to be seriously consid-
ered.
• It is necessary to ensure that there are hard
copies of plans available as back-ups. Services
had moved due to ground shift and were not
always the same location as shown on the plan.
• Having access to laterals and mains on the road
and not in back gardens makes access easier
and allows sucker trucks to be utilised.
• Sending manhole lifting crews through first and
marking/spraying the lids of manholes that
require cleaning, worked well.
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Agreements
• Having the Council pay for materials and deliver-
ing them direct to contractors worked very well.
• Having water staff make sure the contractors
knew what needed to be done worked very well.
It was felt that one Water Unit staff member to 3
gangs was a good ratio.
• Water Unit management of contractors worked
really well, it meant that staff with local knowledge
could remain fresher and continue to be involved
for longer.
• Outside contractors managed themselves and
the response could not have been achieved
without their contribution.
• Difficult to secure good resource, not enough staff
and too much work. On the other hand, Council
had more offers of help than they could take up
but it was difficult to determine which resources
were capable and competent. Would have been
beneficial to have a Resource Manager to control
and manage the quality of contractors / gangs.
• Needed to know the cost of emergency works to
enable better asset management decisions to be
made. Step back to assess the pros and cons of
different options (including total cost) before
proceeding.
• Maintain a list of equipment held by each poten-
tial supplier. This would allow access to quicker
sourcing and relevant information to determine
feasibility of certain jobs and the costs involved.
• There was difficulty in providing toilets for the
disabled and elderly. Wooden platforms were
produced to be used with portapotties. There
needs to be documented arrangements for
sourcing and distribution alternative toilet facili-
ties.
Communication
• Leaflet deliveries informing the public of what was
taking place worked well.
• Ad hock break times were very useful in sharing
informal ideas between parties and allowing
crews to share and pick up lessons learnt –
meant certain mistakes were not repeated.
• Aerial reconnaissance worked well, helped to
speed up communicate and develop the bigger
picture. This reduced the amount of rumours and
misinformation concerning the severity of dam-
age.
• Need to ensure strong emergency relationships
with other utilities in the area such as electricity.
• Ensure a succession plan is in place for roles that
are essential during an event, such as communi-
cations officer who was absent from WDC when
the event occurred.
• Door knocking by contractors worked well but
was time consuming. It would have been better to
have a dedicated council staff member undertak-
ing this role.
• The water unit need a dedicated emergency radio
channel separate from Civil Defence. The
channel was shared by all council units and some
contractors. It is recommended to have a dedi-
cated Civil Defence spectrum and then separate
channels for each function.
• Need to ensure that all council and contractor
vehicles have radios. Those using the radios
need to be provided with adequate training.
• The utility managers had too many tasks to do at
certain times but team leaders were not provided
with adequate scope or authority to lighten the
load. Potentially zone managers could lighten the
load on key individuals.
• Ensure only one point of entry exists for service
requests for the call center, EOC and Water Unit
combined. Two parallel systems were in play
resulting in no central point for faults / breaks.
• Public phone calls should not be transferred to
EOC for specific answers – this ties up vital
phone lines and is too time consuming. A more
robust call handling process would have helped
to resolve these issues. Need to involve Cus-
tomer Services in the development of the job
management process.
• It was useful to take down the public’s details and
then call them back later to ensure their issue
had been resolved. Software may be able to
assist further with this.
• Better early communication is needed between
the Water Unit and Roading Manager. It was felt
roads needed to be closed earlier in the response
to protect the health and safety of workers and
this was not responded to quickly enough.
• Improved communication was needed with the
Planning and Intelligence team in the CDEM
EOC.
• The EOC structure was not well understood
across the Council, there is a need to provide
better training and information to all personnel
involved (regarding both the structure and the
processes inside).
• Field managers should be assigned one EOC
contact point to limit queries and time required.
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The contact point needs to be a role, not a
person. This is to ensure effective handover
within the EOC.
Staff Arrangements
• Contractors liked returning to the hub for food. If
food and break times weren’t organised many
contractors wouldn’t have stopped for food, which
is a health and safety issue.
• Providing contractors with geographical work
areas worked well, not using existing service
request system meant that contractors could be
given dedicated areas and didn’t have to move
around between jobs. Contractors got satisfaction
in seeing one specific area improve.
• Providing contractors with diversity in work was
important to maintain morale. Worked really well
with the sewer gangs where balance of the good
and bad jobs was given.
• Having a full set of plans was a real benefit.
Contractors were generally happy with the quality
of the Plans (A3). Being able to view the plans
electronically was also very useful. Paper plans
need to be laminated, with copies stored outside
HQ.
• Use of GIS in the EOC received good feedback.
GIS used as an electronic pin board, plotting data
from phone calls, red and green properties. It was
very useful to have access to recent aerials
(within the last year).
• WDC recommends moving towards a web-based
GIS viewer that will allow all staff to access base
network maps and print them.
• Ensure any software used in mapping is not
overly specialised and there is a pool of talent to
call on for assistance to operate the software.
• Not all contractors could break at the specified
time. Would have been good to ensure hot food is
available at all times.
• Time consuming for staff to remove work clothing
so they could come in for food, drive through/
soup kitchen concept. Runners were used to take
food out to gangs working further from the hub.
• Contractors had difficulty obtaining fuel. Large
queues at fuel stations. Dedicated lanes or
stickers for priority service would have been
beneficial. It was found there were very short
queues at stations where petrol had run out but
diesel still existed.
• Contractors had to leave jobs to get fuel when
they could, there would be benefit in a fuel tanker
supplying contractors.
• Universal fuel cards would have added resilience
as not reliant on one supplier.
• Would have been beneficial to have a small
number of gangs attending to reactive jobs,
leaving the majority to focus on dedicated areas.
• Use of GIS in the EOC could have been stream-
lined, linking incoming asset information with
existing attribute data, e.g. rating database. It
would have been good to be able to interrogate
attribute data particularly the valuation number as
this is the only truly individual attribute per
property. Creating basemaps pre-event would
have helped.
• GPS units should be tested pre-event to ensure
they are accurate. Training is required on how to
use these devices properly.
• Review number of vehicles likely to be needed.
Consider emergency hire agreement with rental
company to provide suitable vehicles during an
emergency (4x4 and trucks).
• Ensure planning of spare computers and estab-
lishment of pre-agreements are in place so that
suitable supply is on hand.
• Keep better records of broken assets (photos etc)
to provide an audit trail for insurance purposes.
The photo bank for water was pretty good, less
reliable for wastewater and storm water, needed
particularly for rising mains.
3.14 Impact and Recovery of
the Kaiapoi Water Supply
Network following the
September 4th 2010
Darfield Earthquake
(Knight, S., Giovinazzi, S. & Liu, M. 2012)
This is a summary of a paper presented to the 15th
World Conference on Earthquake Engineering 2012,
Lisbon.
The main points are:
• A back-up diesel generator was essential in
getting the main headworks operational within six
hours of the of the September 4th earthquake.
The headworks enabled potable water to be
circulated into the Kaiapoi township pipe network
and for the process of finding breakages to begin.
• While damage to the water pipe network was
spread throughout Kaiapoi, a significantly higher
number of repairs were required near the Kaipaoi
River.
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• Asbestos Cement (AC) pipes required a com-
paratively larger number of repairs in areas
where no land deformation was recorded,
compared to PVC and PE pipes. The same
comparison can be found in areas of minor or
severe liquefaction relative to the number of AC
pipes in those areas.
• The repair rate for AC pipes was the highest at
3.36 repairs per kilometre.
• PVC pipes were more exposed to minor liquefac-
tion comparative to major or severe liquefaction,
but the majority of repairs were required in areas
that experienced moderate to major liquefaction.
This could suggest general good performance of
PVC pipes when subjected to minor land defor-
mation, with performance becoming more
significantly affected in areas where land defor-
mation was greater.
• The repair rate for PVC was substantially better
than AC pipes at 0.59 repairs per kilometre.
• PE pipes had similar exposure to minor liquefac-
tion but required only one repair in these areas,
and therefore relatively, showed the best perform-
ance in Kaiapoi.
• Information regarding which repairs were being
made and what new breakages were being
discovered was updated daily. This enabled the
plan to be constantly updated, helping utility
managers to understand the overall picture of the
restoration, set intervention priorities and make
decisions regarding where resources should be
directed.
• While managing the emergency, the local Council
did not have an established procedure and/or
available tool for assessing and quantifying repair
needs. Therefore it is recommended that im-
provements be made in enabling Councils to
make the following assessments during a crisis:
– The number of customers without water
– The number of customers with water recon-
nected after each set of repairs
– How different repair strategies could have
speed up the functionality restoration process.
3.15 Damage to Potable Water
Reservoirs in the Darfield
Earthquake
(Davey, R.A. 2010)
This is a summary of a New Zealand Society for
Earthquake Engineering paper on water reservoir
performance following the September 2010 earth-
quake.
The main points are:
• Inspections of 54 water reservoirs were under-
taken. These were concrete, steel and timber
tanks of which five had collapsed and four were
severely damaged.
Concrete
• Most were robustly constructed with attention to
seismic detailing, only two had serious damage.
• One was damaged at the junction of the roof and
the wall because the concrete nib at the top of
the wall could not withstand the inertia load
applied by the roof.
• The other concrete tank suffered from a partial
collapse of the roof due to the buoyancy forces
from the earthquake-generated convection wave.
This caused the slabs to be lifted off supporting
walls and to be fractured when they impacted
down again.
• This highlights the importance of avoiding or
allowing for uplift pressures that are caused by
such convection waves. This lesson is one that
can be investigated further as to why these
practices were not implemented prior to the
earthquake and how improvements could have
reduced the effect on this concrete tank.
Steel
• Six were inspected, four failed at their anchor
bolts.
• The two that didn’t fail were smaller and had a
greater number of large anchor bolts.
• The failures raise a question regarding the criteria
used for the design of the anchor bolts on these
tanks. Further investigation is needed to confirm
this lesson.
Timber
• Four were inspected; one was functional, two
were damaged with leaking present and the
fourth collapsed. Timber tanks rely on a base-
isolation response which did occur in the earth-
quake, however the wall displacements caused
liners to rupture and reservoirs to leak.
• Need to examine how these were built and
whether there is a significant design feature
present which made them fail.
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3.16 Christchurch City Lifelines
– Performance of Concrete
Potable Water Reservoirs
in the February 2011
Christchurch Earthquake
(Billings, I., & Charman, N. 2011)
This is a summary of a 2012 New Zealand Society
for Earthquake Engineering conference paper on
concrete water reservoir performance following the
February 2011 earthquake.
The following are the main points:
• Of 43 Christchurch City Council reservoirs, two
were declared inoperable (Hunstbury No.1 and
McCormacks Bay No.2) in the February earth-
quake. A number of others were also damaged
requiring repair works (the extent of damage was
minor in many cases). The City lost 40% of its
potable water supply following the earthquake.
• Reinstatement works, varying from minor crack
injection and patch repair through to reconstruc-
tion and retrofit, were developed appropriate to
the extent of damage. CCC prioritised reservoir
repair to maximise water supply available for the
2011-2012 summer demand and this required, in
some instances, staging and deferring of rein-
statement works.
• It is estimated that some reservoirs may have
experienced much higher shaking than originally
designed for.
• Damage to Huntsbury No.1 reservoir is believed
to have been caused by movement in an underly-
ing shear zone. This reservoir has now been
replaced by two smaller tanks, one either side of
the estimated extent of the shear zone.
• Particular issues are noted in the paper:
– Roof-to-wall and wall-to-base/foundation
connection vulnerabilities have been identi-
fied. Roof-to-wall dowel connections per-
formed poorly
– Leakage through wall construction joints –
double protection system for water-tightness
is recommended
– A potential deficiency in resistance to sliding
has been identified
– Insufficient freeboard to roofs identified during
seismic analyses of some reservoirs
– Avoid joints in floor slabs. Interconnected
walls, foundations and continuous internal
base-slabs increase overall robustness and
reservoir performance
– Thin walls with single layer reinforcing are not
robust
– Foundation competency is important
• It is likely that a number of reservoirs throughout
New Zealand have similar roof-to-wall and wall-
to-base vulnerabilities.
• Repair and retrofit requirements for all reservoirs
are noted in the papers.
3.17 Seismic Performance of
Christchurch Wastewater
Treatment Plant Oxidation
Bunds
(Christison, M., Young, R., & Gibson, M.,
2012)
This summary is from a paper delivered to the
INGENIUM Conference in June 2012.
The paper describes the geotechnical investigations,
observations and seismic assessment of the
Wastewater Treatment Plant oxidation bunds. It
outlines the repair methodologies adopted and likely
performance in further seismic events.
• A risk based assessment of damage to the bunds
was carried out, taking into consideration the
risks of overtopping of the bund crest, piping
instability and deterioration of pipework and
breach of the bund. Mitigation measures were
then developed for different bund sections to yield
more homogeneous and enhanced resistance to
earthquakes up to the proposed design level.
• The preferred mitigation treatments included
vibro-compaction, mechanically stabilised earth
and compacted fill. It was recognised that
following a design or stronger earthquake, the
bunds may deform, although breach of the bunds
should not occur. Such an approach balances the
functional requirements of the ponds with budget
and other project constraints.
• To mitigate the risk of overtopping between
ponds, approximately 400m of sheet piling was
installed through the worst sections to prevent
further damage in subsequent events.
• There was damage to the piped connections
between the ponds, leading to a reduced capabil-
ity to control flows through the ponds, which
under extreme circumstances this has the
potential for overtopping of the bunds.
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• Discharge of oxidation pond effluent over the
bund crest occurred (due to subsidence to crest
level and/or excessive lateral spreading) resulting
in rapid localised erosion.
• During the repair and redesign phase it was
recognized that all unnecessary penetrations (old
disused buried pipes) through bunds should be
removed to mitigate the risk of pipe failure.
• Ensure any new or existing pipes are enhanced
or designed to accommodate potential bund
movement.
• For the more intermediate / high risk areas vibro-
compaction with geogrids were adopted
• During construction there is an elevated risk of
bund breach, especially if significant.
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4 TRANSPORTATION
4.1 NZTA Highways –
Christchurch Earthquakes
(Stratton, B. 2011)
This November 2011 presentation to the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group summarises NZTA’s
learnings from the earthquakes.
The main points are:
• The primary source of damage to bridges in
Christchurch was liquefaction-induced subsid-
ence and lateral spreading.
• Seismic retrofit undertaken prevented more
critical damage. Seventeen bridges had been
retrofitted at a cost of $2 million.
• NZTA’s previous bridge screening program
assisted in identifying which inspections were a
priority. Key bridges inspected within 5 hours.
Forty-five bridges were inspected over 6 days.
• Unstable rock on Port Hills affected transport
routes. Netting deployed from helicopters was
useful in securing unstable rocks above critical
roads. Where site access was possible, fences
were used to capture falling rocks. Shipping
containers were also used.
• Reliable communication was vitally important to
the recovery operations.
• Current design standards for structures seem to
be appropriate and there are no current plans to
deviate from these standards as a result of the
Christchurch earthquakes.
• There needs to be a coordinated approach when
reinstating utilities as roading often forms the top
layer.
• After an earthquake traffic patterns may change.
Constant monitoring is required to ensure that the
roading system is as efficient as possible.
4.2 Performance of Highway
Structures during the
Darfield and Christchurch
Earthquakes of 4
September 2010 and 22
February 2011
(Wood, J. H., Chapman, H. E., &
Brabhaharan, P. 2010)
This is a summary of a report by Opus to the New
Zealand Transport Agency, February 2012.
The main points are:
• The authors were asked by the New Zealand
Transport Agency to visit bridges in the area
affected by the earthquakes to identify how the
bridges had been impacted. Twenty-seven
bridges were inspected and simple static analy-
ses were carried out. Statistic analyses were
carried out to assess the strength and perform-
ance of the critical components of each of the
bridges. The report contains considerable, bridge-
specific, performance information.
• Liquefaction and lateral spreading were the
principal causes of damage to bridges. Bridges
with abutments in liquefaction-prone soils and
with slender piles were particularly vulnerable.
• Soil/structure interaction is likely to have dissi-
pated energy.
• It seems certain that the retrofitted Chaneys
Road, Port Hills Road and Hortane Valley
Overpass bridges benefitted from the linkage
bars and shear keys that were installed between
2003 and 2004.
• There are no indications that current design
standards need to be revised except for reinforc-
ing the importance of considering liquefaction and
lateral spreading.
• Quality detailing and maintenance are critical to
bridge performance.
• Consideration needs to be given to providing
robust inter-span linkages on some bridges.
• Detailed monitoring and investigation into the
bridges to detect existing and on-going damage
would be beneficial.
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4.3 February 22nd 2011
Earthquake State Highway
Bridges Preliminary
Condition Report, Regions
11&12 – Christchurch
(Opus New Zealand. 2012)
This is a summary of a preliminary report on bridge
condition by Opus to the New Zealand Transport
Agency, February 2012.
The main points are:
• Contractors commenced drive-over inspections of
the State Highway network (in accordance with
pre-arranged contingency plan) immediately after
the earthquake.
• Most of the damage was along SH 74.
• Cell phone reception was intermittent in the
immediate post-earthquake period. Most of the
information was conveyed via radio.
Three bridges were identified for closure or restricted
use:
Anzac Drive Bridge
• The bridge sustained considerable damage.
There was significant rotation of the abutments
and minor rotation of the piers due to the lateral
spreading of the approaches. Capping / spalling
of the pier capping beams and pier columns was
also observed.
Horotane Valley Overpasses
• Differential settlement of the twin structures that
form the substructure was observed. Both
structures are supported by pad-footings.
SH73 Heathcote River (Opawa) Bridge
• The extent of damage was not clear in this
preliminary review. Speed restriction and monitor-
ing were recommended.
• Bridges were also identified for further investiga-
tion and analysis:
– SH1S – Chaneys Road Overpass: Liquefac-
tion could result in possible displacement and
tilting of the piers
– SH74 – Styx Railway Overbridge No. 1: Shear
failure of pier columns
– SH74 – Heathcote River Bridge: Pier column
base plastic hinging/shear failure
– SH74 – Railway Overbridge: Pier base and
top plastic hinging/shear failure
– SH74 – Port Hills Road Underpass 1 & 2: Pier
base/footing plastic hinging/shear failure.
Excavation to top of selected pier bases will
be required
– SH74 – Horotane Valley Overpass 1 & 2: Pier
base/footing plastic hinging/shear failure.
Excavation to top of selected pier bases will
be required
– SH74 – Tunnel Admin Bridge. Unseating of
spans/shear failure of pier columns.
4.4 Performance of Bridges
During the 2010 Darfield
Earthquake
(Wotherspoon, L. M., Palermo, A., Heux, M. L.,
Brunea, M., & Anagnostopoulou, M., 2012)
This summarises a paper that appeared in Bridge
Maintenance, Safety Management, Resilience and
Sustainability, Biondini & Frangopol (Eds), 2012.
The main points are:
• “Highway bridges generally performed well, with
only one case of closure for more than a day
where the approach subsided and cracked”
• Pedestrian bridges suffered higher rates of
severe structural damage due to their lower
design requirements. The lateral spreading close
to riverbanks caused much of the damage,
resulting in replacement rather than repairs.
• Bridges near the epicentre suffered no damage at
locations where no liquefaction was observed.
• The majority of damage took place near the coast
where the water table is higher and the soil is
more susceptible to liquefaction. All of the
pedestrian bridges that were damaged were in
this area.
• A short unreinforced masonry bridge failed due to
large longitudinal compression force from the
spreading of the river banks. As it was unable to
resist the pressures from the riverbanks, the arch
failed in a three hinge mechanism.
• Both approaches to the Bridge St Bridge located
in South Brighton, a three span superstructure
constructed from precast concrete I-beams with
elastomeric bearing and single column bents with
hammerhead bent caps, suffered from severe
lateral spreading forcing the bottom of the
abutment to back-rotate 5 degrees towards the
midstream. Despite this, much of the rotation was
accommodated by the elastomeric bearing pad,
which deformed to a stream of approximately
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30%, resulting in very little rotation to the super-
structure and very minor damage (only damage
was at the south end expansion joint). The pier
columns did also exhibit flexural cracking just
below the low tide mark, which does not indicate
any severe damage but not provide an opportu-
nity for erosion during high tide.
• It would appear NZTA retrofit programme since
Risks and Realities has been very successful.
One of the first steps was to install inter-span
linkages and shear keys to prevent unseating.
These brackets worked well on the Port Hills
overpass on SH 74 and Horotane Valley over-
pass, 150m from the Port Hills Bridge.
• One of the key Christchurch lifeline bridges on
Ferrymead Road was expected to suffer from
liquefaction and lateral spreading after Septem-
ber, but the new retrofitted abutments accommo-
dated the lateral spreading and the bridge
performed well.
4.5 Overview of Bridge
Performance during the
2011 Christchurch
Earthquake
(Palermo, A., Kivell, A., Wotherspoon, L.,
Hogan, L., Yashinsky, M., Bruneau, M.,
et al. 2012)
This summarises a paper that appeared in Bridge
Maintenance, Safety Management, Resilience and
Sustainability, Biondini & Frangopol (Eds), 2012.
The main points are:
• Monolithic construction and axial strength of older
designed bridges meant that they were able to
resist axial demands placed on them.
Antigua Street Footbridge
• Cross bracing members on the Antigua Street
footbridge failed due to the hogging used.
• The shear failure of the concrete wingwalls
caused the supports to the timber footbridge
beams to fail. These supports had very little
anchorage into the concrete wingwalls and would
not have required much momentum to fail.
Bridge of Remembrance
• Damage was due to settlement of the approach
fill, lateral spreading soil pressures resulting in
deflection and rotation of the wingwalls and
possibly the abutments.
Moorhouse Overbridge
• Insertion of steel rod linkages in the deck at the
expansion joint at only one side of the bridge
reduced irregularity in the structure’s transverse
response.
• This structure also had widely space transverse
reinforcement, making it susceptible to shear
failure.
Ferrymead Bridge
• The bridge sustained damage due to lateral
spreading.
Bridge Street Bridge
• The flow of soil (from liquefaction) against the
wingwall, abutment and through the piles resulted
in abutment back-rotation due to the restraint
provided at the top of the abutments by the
superstructure.
• The crack patterns observed on the piles indicate
that the piles subjected to bi-directional bending
during the earthquake due to the rotation of the
abutments and the transverse translation.
Gayhurst Bridge
• Lateral spreading exerted a lateral force on the
pier base, causing a large moment at the stiff pier
deck interface, inducing cracking of the pier.
Pages Road Bridge
• Because of the bridge’s robust design, the overall
performance of the bridge was good.
In Summary
• Few state highway bridges were severely
damaged during either the Darfield or
Christchurch events. This is because of the
recent seismic retrofit programme which aimed to
reduce the seismic risk. Of the more successful
of these was the installation of tie-rods and steel
brackets acting as the transverse shear key
between pier to deck and deck to abutments.
• Integral cast in place bridge method appeared to
work well on both the Port Hills Overbridge and
the Horotane Overbridge.
• On these bridges 60% of the bolts that attached
the soffit of the precast concrete beams to the
abutment shear extension had sheared off. If
these pans had not been tied together and the
seats not extended it is quite likely the spans
would have collapsed.
• Pipes were damaged due to different settlements
between the bridges and the surrounding soil.
This indicated the pipe connections were not
appropriately designed to accommodate deck to
pipe or abutment to pipe relative displacements.
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4.6 Lateral Spreading
Interaction with Bridges
during the Canterbury
Earthquakes
(Camnasio, E., Heux, M. L., Palermo, A., &
Wotherspoon, L. 2012)
This summarises a paper that appeared in Bridge
Maintenance, Safety Management, Resilience and
Sustainability, Biondini & Frangopol (Eds), 2012.
• The paper comments on the effects that lateral
spreading can have on bridges in terms of
abutment rotation and plastic hinging of the piles.
Two significant case studies relating to Pages
Road Bridge and ANZAC Drive Bridge are
included, and a further case study relating to the
Dallington Pedestrian Bridge is presented as an
example of the global performance of a bridge
subjected to lateral spreading.
• The paper concludes that the compressive force
caused by the soil spreading and settlement
placed a high displacement demand at the
abutments and a large force demand at deck
level, often leading to rotation of the abutments
and pile foundation systems and to development
of plastic hinges at pier deck connection.
• Services and third party structures near bridges
were also damaged, with the ground at the
approaches shifting downwards and leaving
bridges raised above the surroundings.
• In order to model numerically the interaction
between the soil and the structure during lique-
faction, a three-layer soil model has been
adopted.  Displacement push-over analyses were
carried out on pile-abutment sub-assemblies and
on a global bridge structure, chosen among the
damaged bridges in Christchurch.  The results
provided a better understanding of the damage
that likely occurred to the piles below the ground
surface at Pages Road and ANZAC Drive
Bridges.
• The analyses showed that plastic hinging usually
develops at the interfaces between liquefied and
non-liquefied layers or at pile-abutment connec-
tion.
• A global analysis of the Dallington Pedestrian
Bridge was undertaken.   The analysis compared
well with the observations made at the site and
led to the provision of recommendations for the
selection of certain parameters required when
determining the lateral force that acts on a bridge
due to lateral spreading.
4.7 Seismic Performance of
Concrete Bridges during
Canterbury Earthquakes
(Palermo, A., Wotherspoon, L., Hogan, L.,
Heux, M. L., & Camnasio, E. 2011)
This is a summary of a paper that appeared in
Structural Concrete, April 2011.
The main points are:
• Large demands were placed on pile foundations
of bridges
• Settlement and lateral spreading of approaches
caused serviceability and operation issues.
• Monolithic structures are stiff and sturdy and
performed well.
• No significant damage occurred at retrofitted
bridges where tie rods and steel brackets acting
as the transverse shear keys at the pier–deck
and deck–abutment junctions respectively had
been installed.
• Pipe connections were not appropriately de-
signed to accommodate deck-to-pipe, or abut-
ment-to-pipe relative displacements.
• The main issues arose with stiff pipes, such as
sewage and water pipes, as they are fully fixed to
the deck and usually run through the abutments.
On the other hand, the flexibility of power and/or
telephone cables was able to accommodate
larger displacement demands.
4.8 Preliminary Findings on
Performance of Bridges in
the 2010 Darfield
Earthquake
(Palermo, A., Heux, M. L., Bruneau, M.,
Anagnostopoulou, M., Wotherspoon, L., &
Hogan, L. 2010)
This is a summary of a paper from the December
2010 Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earth-
quake Engineering, Vol 43, No. 4.
The main points are:
• Bridges performed well overall because:
– They have small to moderate length spans;
such spans are recognised to generally
exhibit a more sturdy seismic response due
largely to their symmetry and limited reactive
mass.
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– Bridges were generally designed to resist
forces substantially larger than the demands
imparted by this particular earthquake.
• Pedestrian bridges were affected because they
could not resist the high demands induced by
lateral spreading of the riverbanks due to soil
liquefaction.
• Fourteen of the fifteen bridges that were dam-
aged were in liquefaction affected areas.
• Lateral spreading is the primary action on bridges
leading to damage.
• Bearing damage: a different damage type was
the deformation of rubber isolation bearing pads
due to large lateral movement between the deck
and the abutment/pier, e.g. South Brighton
Bridge.
• External piers on the flood zone suffered more
cracks than those in the current normal river flow.
This is caused by the river scouring increasing
the height and therefore reducing the stiffness of
the central piers, inducing more load on the
shorter and stiffer external piers.
• The current design of abutments reduced failure
significantly. Those that failed were built under
the old design codes. In lateral spreading banks
abutments are to be made with a shallow beam
with a small number of deep piles. Those that
failed had deep abutments or closely-spaced
abutment piles.
• Many new bridges are built with tie-rods between
the deck and the abutment. In two cases these
failed significantly. The first was due to the
tension activated response on the bridge that
caused the coupling beam to experience signifi-
cant concrete spalling. In this case the tie rods
were fully activated. In the second instance the
tie rods were activated by the longitudinal push
action of the soil. This caused a five degree
rotation of the abutment and a gap to form
between the tie-rod bearing plate and the cou-
pling beam.
• Seven out of eight road bridges were closed due
to damage. This was due to lateral spreading
which caused the slope to move across and
downwards towards the river.
• In some cases the bridge approach spans
partially or totally failed. There were examples
where the liquefaction of the site surrounding the
bridge settled by a few inches.
• Global lateral torsional buckling, plastic hinging at
mid-span, longitudinal rocking of towers (and
consequential opening-up of existing hinges that
consisted of in-contact horizontal wood splices)
and plastic hinging near abutments all occurred
on pedestrian bridges because of lateral spread-
ing. The horizontal inward movement of
riverbanks induced an additional and unexpected
longitudinal compressive force through the super-
structure, resulting in the above events.
• Pedestrian bridges that were near collapse did
not have any form of lateral isolation between the
superstructure and the abutments / piers, result-
ing in major damage between these and the
bridge deck.
• Significant lateral spreading occurred on two
pedestrian bridges damaging the abutments. Of
all the pedestrian bridges these were the only two
with a concrete main superstructure element.
• Porritt Park pedestrian bridge experienced large
rotation and translation on the south abutment.
This abutment sits on six small piles and it is
likely that these piles did not extend very deep.
As such, they provided minimal lateral stiffness to
the system and exacerbated the problem through
increasing the surface area the soil wedge
interacted with.
• When the riverbanks suffered from lateral
spreading the bridge structure itself acted as a
prop across the river. This compressive strut in
effect provided resistance to lateral spreading
and altered the soil cracking pattern. In some
cases the longitudinal compressive force transfer-
ring through the bridge was greater than the axial
capacity of the deck or other structural compo-
nents and lead to failure of the bridge structures.
• The effect of the above on the soil was that the
spreading of the slope around the abutment lead
to soil gapping from differential movement,
passive soil wedge failure, and large cracks
forming on the approach running parallel to the
longitudinal bridge axis.
• No bridge that was retrofitted under the
Transfund NZ seismic retrofitting program was
structurally damaged.
• Retrofitting was carried out on the Dallington
pedestrian bridge by Orion as it carried a cable
across the Avon River. Raked wing piles were
placed on the abutment and driven down into the
stronger soil. Retrofitting was also carried out on
the approach to the bridge to reduce the level of
deformation that the 66kV cables would be
placed under during an earthquake.
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4.9 Lessons Learnt from 2011
Christchurch Earthquakes:
Analysis and Assessment
of Bridges
(Palermo, A., Wotherspoon, L., Wood, J.,
Chapman, H., Scott, A., Hogan, L.,
et al. 2011)
This is a summary of a paper from the December
2011 Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earth-
quake Engineering, Vol 44, No. 4.
The main points are:
• Pipelines crossing bridges were damaged
predominantly where there was soil-bridge
interaction in areas of lateral spreading. Pipe
connections were not appropriately designed to
accommodate deck-to-pipe, or abutment-to-pipe
relative displacements. Design guidelines for
abutment/pile liquefaction/lateral spreading
should be more widely implemented in order to
reduce this type of damage.
• The monolithic construction and axial strength of
bridges meant older designs were able to resist
the axial demands placed on the structure due to
lateral spreading, even though they were not
specifically designed for these loads.
• Even modest structures (like the Dallington
pedestrian bridge) can have strategic importance
if they carry lifeline utility services, therefore
consideration must be given to the priority of
these structures and how they may be designed
appropriately.
• There was extensive damage to services at
bridge abutments where stiff service assets
existed (e.g. like wastewater pipes). Flexible
services like telecommunications were less
susceptible (but still sustained damage in some
cases).
• Broken pipelines at bridges caused secondary
damage (e.g. discharging raw sewage into
waterways).
• Bridge damage caused significant traffic disrup-
tion; therefore emergency management plans
must include contingencies for these scenarios.
• Previous works to seismically strengthen bridges
had been largely successful.
• The seismic strengthening work that started in
2000 was effective in reducing the scale of the
damage. At the time of the earthquakes strength-
ening had been completed on seven bridges.
4.10 Observed and Predicted
Bridge Damage Following
the Recent Canterbury
Earthquakes: Toward the
Calibration and Refinement
of Damage and Loss
Estimation Tools
(Brando, M., Lin, S. L., Giovinazzi, S., &
Palermo, A. 2012)
This summarises a paper that appeared in Bridge
Maintenance, Safety Management, Resilience and
Sustainability, Biondini & Frangopol (Eds), 2012.
The main points are:
• “In spite of the expected damage threshold level
being much lower than the estimated bridge
response accelerations of the earthquakes, only
a few bridges suffered significant visible structural
damage as a result of ground shaking.”
• As a result of the damage sustained to bridges
throughout Christchurch there was significant
economic loss and social impacts which occurred
as a result of temporary or medium term clo-
sures. Given the size of the event the perform-
ance of the bridges was satisfactory in terms of
the magnitude of the damage sustained, but this
must be weighed against the loss sustained in
the community. This is where the use of tools
such as earthquake loss estimation can be
effectively used in the emergency response and
planning.
• As a result of lessons learnt from the Canterbury
earthquakes, it is essential that the use of
available ELE tools and platforms (such as
RiskScape Platform in NZ and MAEviz in the US)
become part of normal practice for mitigating and
managing earthquake risk.
• “The preliminary study of the loss assessment on
Christchurch bridges using the 22nd February
2011 Christchurch earthquake scenario, confirms
the viability of existing ELE components and
procedures to be implemented in New Zealand
bridge infrastructure”
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4.11 Performance of Bridges in
Liquefied Deposits during
the 2010-2011
Christchurch (New
Zealand) Earthquakes
(Cubrinovski, M., Haskell, J., Winkley, A.,
Robinson, K., & Wotherspoon, L. 2013)
This summarises a paper that appeared in the ASCE
Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities,
Special Issue 2013.
The main points are:
• Short span bridges on pile foundations have very
stiff superstructure (deck) which led to a charac-
teristic deformation mechanism for all bridges
involving lateral spreading – deck pinning –
abutment back rotation with consequent damage
to the abutment piles and slumping of the
approaches.
• Despite experiencing higher ground force
acceleration and being closer to the fault than
many other bridges which sustained significant
damage during the February earthquake, bridges
along the Heathcote River sustained less dam-
age in comparison. This may be for two reasons.
First the lateral spreading displacements along
the Heathcote River were smaller than other
rivers and secondly the bridges on the Heathcote
River have shorter spans/lengths.
South Brighton Bridge
• The South Brighton Bridge is a three span
design, constructed from reinforced concrete. The
superstructure consists of cast in situ reinforced
concrete deck on precast “I” beams. The bridge is
supported through elastomeric bearing on two
octagonal ‘hammerhead’ RC piers and seat-type
RC abutments. The bridge sits on 44 precast
concrete piles, ten beneath each abutment and
twelve beneath each pier. The bridge is situated
in the wetlands area where thickness of recent
soil is around 40m. Each approach sits on
uncontrolled fill material. The bridge has been
built on a 25 degree skew to the river bank.
• Substantial lateral spreading was experienced at
the site during both September and February
earthquakes. Large ground distortion and
slumping was evident at both of the bridges’
approaches, with large vertical offset between the
pile supported deck and embankment ap-
proaches. In conjunction with the stiffness of the
superstructure, the skewed design of the bridge
constrained the movement of the approaches
resulting in permanent horizontal displacement of
the approaches in opposite directions and lateral
offsetting between the deck and approaches of
approximately 20cm. The significant offsets
between the approaches and bridge deck caused
the water main pipes running beneath the deck to
rupture.
• The damage observed at the South Brighton
Bridge was typical for all bridges that were
affected by lateral spreading. The rigid beam
deck superstructure practically prevented any
displacement in the longitudinal direction of the
bridge which resulted in deck-pinning and
consequent back-rotation of the abutments about
the beam-abutment point of collision, because
the foundation piles could not resist the spreading
movement of the foundation soils towards the
river.
• The back-rotation motion of abutments on the
South Brighton Bridge caused damage to the top
of the abutment piles and as a result these piles
have been laterally displaced towards the river.
The displacement of these piles in conjunction
with the rotation constraints imposed by the rigid
pile-abutment connection caused the bending of
the piles which resulted in tensile cracks on the
river side and the concrete crushing / spalling on
the land side of the piles.
• As there was no serious damage to the South
Brighton Bridge superstructure (aside from some
dislocated bearings), temporary repairs were able
to be made offsets between the deck and
approaches were able to be refilled and the
bridge was quickly back in service.
Anzac Bridge
• The Anzac Bridge is a 48 meter three span bridge
with a roundabout located at the northern ap-
proach. The superstructure is a precast concrete
hollow-core (double) deck with precast concrete
beams and is supported by situ concrete piers
and abutments. The piers sit on reinforced
concrete piles, 1.5m diameter and 20m long with
8 mm permanent steel casing. Each abutment is
supported by 16 “H” piles with 1.5m spacing. The
soil at the south end is about 2m sandy soil,
uniform fine to medium dense sand up to 12m
and slightly coarser / denser sand thereafter.
• Massive liquefaction ejecta and substantial lateral
spreading was evident in the area of the Anzac
Bridge during the February earthquake. Complex
lateral spreading was observed at the roundabout
on the northern approach.
• The substantial lateral spreading at the site
caused deck-pinning and back-rotation of the
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abutments on the Anzac Bridge. The effect had
permanent lateral displacement of three
elements:
1. Lateral displacement at the bottom of the
abutment (top of the H-piles) due to the back-
rotation of the abutment
2. Lateral offset of the precast concrete under-
pass
3. Lateral offset of the surrounding soil at the
interface between the paved track and
reinforced concrete underpass
• The pedestrian underpass at the Anzac Bridge
site is built on independent 1.2 m in diameter
reinforced 6 meter piles. Due to their limited
length the piles “practically floated in the liquefied
soil”.
• The spreading-induced damage at the bridge
caused a large offset between the deck and the
approaches (infill was completed in the repairs).
The compression deformation of the pavement at
the approach / deck interface was also spread-
ing-induced, resulting in the back-rotation of the
abutments. There was visible cracking of the
interior beam-pier connection and concrete
spalling due to excessive compression on the
exterior beam-pier connection. Despite the
damage the bridge remained in service after each
earthquake and was a vital link (including being
used by heavy vehicles).
Dallington (Gayhurst) Bridge
• This bridge has a continuous reinforced concrete
deck, reinforced concrete piers and reinforced
concrete abutment walls with wing walls. The
bridge is 26.8 meters long with three spans
without any expansion joints. The piers and
abutments are supported on reinforced 350 mm x
10.4m piles. Seven piles at 4D spacing are used
beneath the piers, while six piles at 6D spacing
support each abutment. The north approach has
2.5m of brown sandy silt and silt with peat, a grey
fine sand reaches up to a depth of 15m, sandy
silt is found between 15 and 20 meters, and from
then onwards is fine sand. The bearing stratum
for the piles is in the underlying dense sand
between 13 and 16 meters deep.
• The north approach to the Dallington Bridge
shows substantial damage, as that side of the
river experienced much higher lateral spreading
displacement (between 0.6 and 0.75m). The large
settlement and slumping of the northern ap-
proach resulted in subsidence reaching about 1
meter. Conversely the southern approach
showed neither significant damage nor vertical
offset at the bridges interface where spreading
displacement of the cut bank was less than 5cm.
• The stiff deck of the Dallington Bridge resisted the
spreading of the banks resulting in back-rotation
of the abutment walls. An effect of the lateral
movement of the abutment wall towards the river
was the buckling of the water pipes running
beneath the deck.
• Much higher penetration resistance at 13-16
meters deep was measured at the south side of
the bridge, which is consistent with the observed
absence of any significant land damage or signs
of lateral spreading at the south approach of the
bridge.
Summary and Conclusion
• Except for a relatively thin crust (1-2m thickness)
the foundation soils at the three bridge sites
completely liquefied up to 8-9 m or even 12 m.
The liquefaction was accompanied by substantial
lateral spreading that resulted in permanent
horizontal displacements of the unconstrained
river banks. The bridges experienced extreme
seismic activity including substantial liquefaction
in the foundation soils accompanied by very large
kinematic loads due to spreading and inertial
loads due to strong ground shaking.
• The key factor in the development of the charac-
teristic deformation mechanism of the bridges
was the stiff and strong superstructure in the
longitudinal direction.
• Pronounced slumping of the approaches oc-
curred due to liquefaction in the underlying soil
that resulted in large settlement and vertical
offsets between the approaches and the pile-
supported deck of the bridge.
• There was limited, but no serious damage to the
bridge superstructures. After temporary repair
and infill at the approaches, all three bridges
were back in service and operational immediately
after every earthquake event. Overall, the
performance of more recently constructed
bridges allowing movement of the superstructure
relative to the piers/abutments and older integral
(jointless) bridges was similar. The same defor-
mation pattern developed for both types of
bridges though the differences in the kinematic
constraints were reflected in the amount of
permanent tilt of the abutments and consequent
superstructure damage. The skew in the bridge
geometry also contributed to permanent lateral
offsets between the approaches/abutment and
the bridge deck.
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4.12 Forced Vibration Testing
of Bridge Damaged in the
2010 Darfield Earthquake
(Hogan, L. S., Wotherspoon, L. M.,
Beskhyroun, S., & Ingham, J. M. 2012)
This summarises a paper that appeared in Bridge
Maintenance, Safety Management, Resilience and
Sustainability, Biondini & Frangopol (Eds), 2012.
The main points are:
• The Davis Road Bridge is a single span bridge
consisting of six double hollow core precast
concrete beams with six square precast concrete
piles and a 2.0 meter long friction slab at each
abutment.
• During the earthquake, lateral spreading caused
the western approach to the Davis Road Bridge
to subside approximately 0.5 m. The subsidence
of the approach effectively removed the stiffness
provided by the abutment and provided a unique
opportunity to directly measure the influence of
this resistance on the system.
• The span was subjected to shaking along both
axes from a large eccentric mass shaker and a
benchmark system identification was made of the
bridge in the damaged state. Soil was then
recompacted, and the road repaved. Once the
approach was reinstated, another round of
shaking was performed, and differences in mode
shapes and natural periods were compared
between the damaged and reinstated states.
• Comparing mode shapes from the two different
approach states, both exhibit similar responses.
The mode shape of the bridge with both ap-
proaches intact is slightly more dominated by the
translation response as can be seen by the larger
modal amplitude a mid-span and the small
difference in modal amplitude between the two
abutments. The natural period of the bridge with
both approaches intact is 4% lower than the
bridge with approach soil removed.
• The piles supporting the north-western abutment
have a longer unsupported length due to lateral
spreading and therefore exhibit a more flexible
response. While this flexibility would be reduced
with the addition of the approach soil due to the
contribution of the friction slab, this additional
stiffness was counteracted by the increase in gap
depth due to shaking from the Christchurch
earthquake.
• Comparing mode shapes from both the bridge
with and without the north-western approach, the
modal response of the bridge with the approach
fill is much more uniform. This is as a result of the
passive resistance of the abutment and frictional
resistance of friction slab providing the dominant
stiffness contribution in this direction.
• The change in transverse response was relatively
small due to the increase in unsupported pile
length during testing of the bridge with both
approaches intact. This increased pile length was
due to further lateral spreading from the
Christchurch earthquake and subsequent
aftershocks which occurred between tests.
• Overall the longitudinal response was altered by
15% between the approach free and both
approaches intact states. Mode shapes were
altered based upon the level of passive resist-
ance engaged at the abutment.
4.13 Christchurch, New Zealand
Earthquake Sequence of
Mw 7.1 September 04,
2010, Mw 6.3 February 22,
2011, Mw 6.0 June 13,
2011: Lifeline Performance
– Roads and Bridges
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 11 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter
11 is on roads and bridges.
The main points are:
• Many of the approximately 800 bridges in
Christchurch were subject to ground shaking
higher than design level in the February 2011
earthquake, but only a small number were
significantly damaged.
• Most damage to bridges occurred at the abut-
ments due to liquefaction and lateral spreading.
Liquefaction significantly contributed to the
damage observed by the majority of bridges that
failed near rivers.
• At almost all damaged bridges with pipes at-
tached, the pipes were broken.
• Liquefaction and other forms of ground deforma-
tion caused widespread damage to roads.
• After the earthquake, traffic patterns on the city
road and highway systems in the Christchurch
and vicinity areas changed significantly with more
congestion observed.
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• Tunnels serving Lyttleton suffered little damage.
• Usage restrictions were imposed on some
bridges and the road tunnel.
• Temporary tie-back measures were used in at
least one instance to arrest further lateral move-
ment of bridge piles.
Moorhouse Overbridge
• The columns have a hexagonal cross-section and
are slightly tapered and flare at the top. The
column has 1-1/8 inch diameter smooth longitudi-
nal rebars and smooth 5/8 inch transverse ties at
12 inch spacing. The Moorhouse Avenue Bridge
suffered significant damage. The bridge has
expansion joints at column bents 4 and 7 from
the west abutment of the bridge. The presence of
the expansion joint reduces the depth of the
column cross-section to half of that in the other
columns. Thus, the columns at the expansion
joint locations have a significantly smaller
stiffness as compared to the other columns of the
bridge. During the February 2011 earthquake, the
columns at the expansion joint locations suffered
significant damage of shear failure at the column
base and buckling of the longitudinal rebar.
Evidence of liquefaction failure of the foundation
soil was observed at the bridge site. After the
earthquake, temporary repair measure of bracing
of the damaged column bents at the expansion
joints taken.
Boathouse Bridge
• This single span pedestrian bridge had damage
to the abutments at both ends (severe shear
cracks due to lateral spreading movement of the
river bank). The approaching pavement buckled
due to pounding movement of the bridge’s deck
superstructure.
Fitzgerald Avenue Bridge
• A 2-span girder on wall pier bridge that had been
retrofitted with steel seat width extender brackets
at the abutments and wall piers suffered severe
damage due to lateral spread movement of the
river embankment soil.
Port Hills Overbridge SH 74
• This 6-span slab voided single column bent
concrete bridge had been retrofitted with span tie-
links and seat width extension brackets, lateral
restrainers and short column collars to mitigate
the short column effect for the columns next to
the abutments. The bridge suffered sustained
flexural crack and spalling of concrete on the
middle column as well as buckling of the longitu-
dinal rebar at the base.
Horotane Velly Road Overbridge SH 74
• This 3-span T-girder concrete bridge with retrofit-
ted span tie-links and shear keys with seat width
extension suffered from cracks at the abutments
and many bolts of the seat width extension
brackets were sheared off.
The above is a sample. The full chapter includes
comments on other Christchurch bridges.
4.14 Christchurch Pavement
Resilience Investigation
(Pidwerbesky, B., & Waters, J. 2012)
This summary is from a paper delivered to the
INGENIUM Conference in June 2012.
The following are the main points:
• Most pavements performed well. Most damage
was due to subsurface movement.
• The most resilient pavements in seismic events,
considering factors such as level of service after
the event(s), survivability of the pavement and
economics of repair, are thin-surfaced unbound
granular and foamed bitumen stabilized pave-
ments.
• The aggregate in unbound granular pavements
could be contaminated with up to 30% liquefac-
tion material without adversely affecting its
performance.
• A thicker, stiff structural asphalt and concrete
pavement could, in theory, constrain the upward
movement of liquefaction material but there is no
evidence that thickness makes a difference in
practice, and would be more expensive to repair.
Such pavements would not withstand lateral
movement. Roads constructed in this way would
be expensive to repair.
• The only means of repairing asphalt bulges (due
to liquefaction) is to remove the asphalt and the
underlying material, and replace with new
construction.
• The selected surfacing treatment should be as
per normal using normal surfacing treatment
selection criteria, but the rebuild designs need
better adhesion of the surfacing to the pavement.
• Pavements designs must be sustainable, maxim-
ising the utilisation of recycled materials in the
pavement construction including the pavement
materials themselves. Preventing contamination
of subsurface layers (e.g. by use of geotextiles)
would reduce cost of repair (as materials could
be reused).
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• Where possible contaminated materials should
be modified in situ (to avoid trucking of large
volumes of aggregate causing further damage to
roads). Coal tar materials should be re-laid on the
top of pavement fabric where full reconstruction is
undertaken.
• A life cycle cost analysis should be carried out to
ensure that the lowest cost engineering solution
is used. The residual lives and expected lives will
be critical components of these calculations and
must be based on the tables developed for the
purpose.
4.15 Christchurch Earthquake
Lessons Learnt: KiwiRail
Internal Debrief
This summary is from an internal review following the
February 2011 earthquake. The author has approved
release of this summary but has requested that the
source document be withheld.
Lessons for KiwiRail noted in the review include:
• The need to establish relationships with helicop-
ter services. Immediately post-event, helicopters
are potentially helpful to determine the status of
trains if cell phone and radio network coverage is
lost. It would be useful to have seismic sensors
automatically notify KiwiRail Train Control of the
size of the event.
• The need to have in place procedures for sending
staff to remote locations, protocols for complete
loss of communication (where to meet etc) and
control centre bringing together different KiwiRail
groups (it would have been useful to have a
combined control centre with KiwiRail Network,
Freight, Mechanical and Passenger Services to
coordinate activities).
• Administration support should be resourced
separately from those managing the emergency.
Water, food and Civil Defence equipment should
be stored at the control centre.
• Need to establish relationships with Civil Defence
before an emergency occurs. A designated rail
representative should be included in local CDEM
once activated.
• Direct contact with Environment Canterbury
facilitated resource consent issues relating to
emergency sourcing of gravel and ballast.
• Establish a list of approved building inspection
consultants in locations close to KR buildings and
depots who could be called upon to carry out
certified building inspections.
• Fuel is crucial in the response and recovery.
Consider planning for emergency fuel (diesel and
petrol) in event of emergency.
• Diary all major discussions, decision and mile-
stones at the local level to provide audit trail and
evidence of actions taken.
• Emergency contact lists need to be kept up to
date and made available both locally and to HR.
• Coordination of resources is critical to determine
the best outcome and manage fatigue (although
there were many offers of assistance, they were
not immediately required).
• There was a perception that outsiders did not
understand what was going on, and as life had
changed for many this created high on-going
stress levels for some.
• There was a perception that people had become
more “tunnel visioned” (as a coping mechanism)
and perhaps were not so aware of peripheral
issues – hence an increase in risk.
• Some performance indicators showed a decline
in performance in the second quarter after the
main quake (between 1 and 4 months after).
Provision of external resources in the medium
term would have allowed those affected to take a
break from the situation.
4.16 Business Continuity
Christchurch Earthquakes
– Christchurch Airport
(Robertson, F. 2011)
This November 2011 presentation to the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group summarises Chorus’s
learnings from the Christchurch earthquakes.
The main points are:
• Constant training is necessary to ensure an
adequate response.
• Recommend “Go Bag” with emergency re-
sources, equipment designated to the position
not the person, backups for each position
• Constantly update the contact key (for key
personnel in particular).
• Debrief soon after the event so the important
points are still at the forefront of people’s minds.
• Even when the airport is open and operating, do
not rush to declare the crisis state over.
• Do not underestimate the effect of trauma on staff.
• Set priorities early in the response.
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• Develop categories for different levels of re-
sponse for future events.
• The 4 R’s (Readiness, Response, Recovery, and
Review) were an essential framework.
• Expect the unexpected.
4.17 Christchurch, New Zealand
Earthquake Sequence of
Mw 7.1 September 04,
2010, Mw 6.3 February 22,
2011, Mw 6.0 June 13,
2011: Lifeline Performance
– Lyttelton Port
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 9 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter 9
is on Lyttelton Port.
The main points are:
Experience
• The port suffered significant damage in the
earthquakes but critical services resumed very
quickly, reflecting preparatory mitigation meas-
ures and quick remediation.
• Damage resulted primarily from deep seated
slides in loose hydraulic or dumped fills overlying
silty bay muds. The slide movements damaged
the wharf structures.
• Despite the earthquake damage, the port has
experienced a significant increase in container
volumes. This is partly due to local industries
growing (e.g. dairy), but also to additional goods
being brought in to help rebuild Christchurch.
• The loss of Z Berth and the cool storage has had
a significant impact on the local fishing industry.
This has resulted in loss of business for the port
and for other local businesses. Replacement
facilities are planned at the port.
• Oil piping and tanks were undamaged in the
earthquakes. Most of the pipes were above
ground, had little or no anchorage and had been
designed so that there was flexibility in the bends.
Response and Advice
• Pre-planning after the first event for port improve-
ments facilitated access to machinery including
large cranes for use in restoration after the
second earthquake.
• Having a process for emergency consents allowed
the port to move quickly in applying for consent to
reclaim land to restore the ports functionality. Hard
debris from damage within Christchurch city has
proved useful in achieving this.
• Ballasted shipping containers proved useful in
protecting against rockfall.
4.18 Christchurch, New Zealand
Earthquake Sequence of
Mw 7.1 September 04,
2010, Mw 6.3 February 22,
2011, Mw 6.0 June 13,
2011: Lifeline Performance
– Railway System
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 12 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter
12 is on the railway system.
The main points are:
• The driver of a locomotive at the time that the
February earthquake took place said that the
front wheels “seemed to lose traction”. He applied
the emergency brake which brought the locomo-
tive to a stop.
• Wrinkles in the tracks occurred after being
repaired, suggesting the effects of post-earth-
quake fault creep. Considerable track re-
ballasting was needed following after-shocks.
• Six bridges were extensively damaged. Most of
the damage was due to settlement and lateral
spreading of liquefied ground.
• No derailments occurred.
• The location of aftershocks was monitored to
assess possible risks to bridges. This facilitated
quick deployment of bridge inspectors and repair
crews.
4.19 The Response of the NZ
Transport Sector to the
Canterbury Earthquakes
(Brunsdon, D. 2011a)
This summary is from a paper delivered to the
Australian Trusted Information Sharing Network
Transport Sector Group Forum in November 2011.
Page 61Transportation
The following are the main points and learnings from
the presentation:
• A Transport Response Plan sets out national
operational arrangements to aid the rapid,
coordinated and effective response of transport to
significant emergencies. The Transport Response
Team, chaired by the Ministry of Transport,
facilitates information flows and provides advice
on response matters.
• A good level of co-operation was noted within the
petroleum industry. It was helpful that fuel stocks
were high in Lyttelton and Timaru.
• Interdependencies: Telecommunications need
electricity. Many generators were used, requiring
continuous fuel supply. Road access difficulties
significantly impeded fuel delivery.
• Many key facilities were within the CBD red zone;
its closure caused issues. These included the
electricity distribution control room, Telecom’s
main facility and the broadcasting hub building.
There were many rooftops where cell sites were
located.
• The port was significantly damaged but was able
to continue operation.
• The main highways were largely unaffected.
However local roads were extensively damaged.
Key Learnings
• Criticality of access and power:
– Fortunate that there was only limited disrup-
tion to regional access (this would not be the
case for most other parts of NZ)
– Electricity transmission and distribution
providers maintained supply to most areas
• The importance of progressive mitigation pro-
grammes:
– Network-wide planning for redundancy
– Specific asset restraint
•  The importance of relationships and
connectedness:
– Regionally: through engineering lifelines
groups and civil defence emergency manage-
ment groups
– Nationally: via the National Engineering
Lifelines Committee and the transport emer-
gency management cluster. Government’s
Domestic and External Security Coordination
arrangements also address national issues
•  The value of having a strong resilience culture
within key organisations:
– Technical / Management: looking for mitiga-
tion and preparedness opportunities
– Governance: supporting resilience invest-
ments
– Balancing planned and adaptive capabilities
Three Aspects of Infrastructure
Resilience
• Robust physical assets with key network routes
and facilities having appropriate redundancy.
• Effective co-ordination arrangements (pre- and
post-event); and
• Realistic end-user expectations and appropriate
measures of back-up arrangements.
The Resilient Organisations Research Programme
has identified crucial factors for both resilience and
recovery. These are:
• Integrative and alert situation awareness
• Grounded and inspiring leadership
• Structured and responsive decision making
• Disciplined and innovative culture.
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5 LIQUID FUELS & GAS
5.1 Christchurch, New Zealand
Earthquake Sequence of
Mw 7.1 September 04, 2010,
Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011,
Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:
Lifeline Performance – Gas
and Liquid Fuels
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 8 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter 8
is on LPG and liquid fuels.
The main points are:
Gas (LPG)
Experience
• Durable pipelines and gas services, coupled with
careful preparations served Christchurch well.
Features included diesel generators at feeders
and dispersion of feeders throughout the system.
Planning for rapid shut down and restoration of
services included arrangements with independent
contractors for emergencies.
• Gas to the CBD was completely shut-off after the
February earthquake. This had to be done
manually. Because traffic was a hindrance,
bicycles were used in many instances to negoti-
ate traffic and gain access to valve locations.
• There was no damage to any of the MDPE mains
in the system, including in areas where liquefac-
tion was experienced.
• The Christchurch gas network illustrates several
interdependencies among lifeline systems, such
as water to operate the gas vaporizers and for
fire suppression, electricity for water heating, and
cell phone service to enhance communication
among crews restoring the system.
• Difficulties were experienced with hand-held
radios. There was topographical interference with
some radio transmissions. Most cell phone
service was restored by the following day, and
cell phone communication was used extensively
among the crews during restoration of service.
Response and Advice
• To protect against gas leakage, all Rockgas
pipelines supplying damaged portions of the CBD
were cut and capped.
• No services were energized until the customers
were contacted.
• When re-pressurization for the gas lines com-
menced, a 1 hour test was run to ensure the
pressure could be held. The process worked as
follows:
– Isolate pipeline sections
– Shut all customer services
– Put a gauge on one service
– Ensure the system is holding pressure before
accepting.
The process was repeated across the entire network
• Loss of water interrupted operation of the hot
water vaporizers, but residual pressure was
available in storage tanks enabling gas to flow.
Refuelling storage tanks was suspended until
water was restored to operate the sprinkler
system for fire suppression.
• One of the risks identified as part of the post-
earthquake recovery of the area was the potential
for damage to gas meters due to demolition of
buildings. Procedures should be set up to handle
this risk.
• Backup generators need to be tested regularly to
ensure they are in working order.
Liquid Fuels
• There was no damage at any of the liquid fuel
tanks, which are at-grade steel and have seismic
designs. They all have steel roofs (i.e. no floating
roofs) and most tanks were near empty (under
20%) at the time of the largest earthquake.
• The 4 inch pipeline over the Port Hills was dented
by rockfall but did not leak.
• Canopies at several service stations were badly
damaged.
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5.2 Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd
– Christchurch Earthquake
Response
(Rea, J. 2011)
This November 2011 presentation to the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group summarises Mobil’s
learnings from the February 2011 earthquake.
The main points are:
• Response is based around the PEAR principle;
People, Environment, Assets and Reputation.
• Key issues include allocating petroleum supply to
meet key user needs (in cooperation with
CDEM), managing public expectations (queuing
can raise difficult situations in forecourts) and
containing petroleum to eliminate environmental
hazards.
• Commitment to fibreglass service station tanks
worked out as all assets retained integrity despite
the severe and continuing earthquake activity.
• There is a need to ensure effective and robust
back up for essential supplies – power, water, gas
and road infrastructure.
• Consideration needed to liquefaction effect on
equipment in future design work.
• Continuous improvement should feature prompt
sharing of lessons both within the organisation
and between lifeline utilities, assignment of
responsibilities for improvement actions, regular
follow-up on processes with improvement
actions, and regular tests for Business Continuity
Planning and Enterprise Resource Planning.
• Good relationships with regulators, MCDEM,
lifeline utilities and other critical contractors
proved useful.
5.3 Observations by BP after
Canterbury Quakes
(Harrison, K. 2012)
This summary of observations and lessons arising
from the Canterbury earthquakes, from BP’s per-
spective was drawn from personal correspondence
(email, 13 July 2012) and is included with permission
of the author.
The main points are:
• All parts of the supply chain need to be restored
for sustainable “return to normal” operations.
Restoration of supply chain components may
occur out of sequence or be held up due to any
part of the supply chain being broken or unavail-
able.
• Building relationships with key infrastructure
providers and Civil Defence facilitates effective
response. CDEM needs to be proactive in
granting access to roading routes where danger-
ous goods vehicles are normally restricted or
prohibited.
• Expect panic buying of fuel after a natural
disaster and expect fuel shortages if the supply
chain relies on supply from other ports for any
length of time.
• Don’t underestimate that people will put in heroic
efforts during a response at their own risk. Fresh
personnel need to be deployed as soon as
possible to allow staff to deal with personal
circumstances (this also goes for incident
response teams). Provide on-going support to
staff and opportunities for breaks.
• Personal preparation at home and work needs
greater emphasis.
• The little things count, e.g. providing coffee
before fuel was a morale booster in the eastern
suburbs. Coffee was made available where
possible at service stations where fuel systems
were out of commission. This was appreciated by
communities which had no other access to hot
food and drink.
• The downstream components of the oil industry
did not operate as an entity, although this did not
seem to impede communications or restoration of
services. The previous conversations about the
need for an oil sector coordinating entity need to
be reviewed to see if this is really required.
• Consideration into how to translate these lessons
to other more geographically challenging loca-
tions (such as Wellington) needs to be consid-
ered.
5.4 LPG Infrastructure in the
Christchurch Earthquakes
This summary is from a presentation to the 2011
National Lifelines Forum, prepared by RockGas
following the February 2011 earthquake. The author
has approved release of this summary but has
requested that the source document be withheld.
The main points are:
Rockgas supplies LPG in Christchurch, by cylinders,
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bulk tanks and a reticulated network. This summary
relates mainly to the February 2011 earthquake.
• Main feeder plant had a minor gas leak and was
therefore isolated. PE pipe performed very well.
Tank installations also performed well.
• CDEM requested that supply to the CBD be
discontinued. Decision taken to shut down entire
reticulated network.
• Cellular phones and electricity supply failed.
Back-up communications with contractor didn’t
work well (previous testing not thorough enough).
• Assistance obtained from out-of-town company
sources.
• No standard arrangements appear to exist for
relaxation of HSNO certification for temporary
cylinder supplies in emergency conditions.
• Building demolitions proceeded without gas
isolations, reflecting a lack of awareness of
presence of piped gas in South Island. Last
minute isolation requests were problematic –
demolition crews become aware of presence of
LPG only once work had begun or immediately
prior in more than one occasion. These requests
need to happen in a timelier manner.
• A critical customer list was developed immedi-
ately after the earthquake.
• HSE issues with staff and contractors required
management.
• Gas demand dropped off – not yet fully recov-
ered.
• Re-livening plan drawn up and risk analysis
completed. Re-livening commenced from north-
west side of the city.
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6 HOSPITALS
6.1 Assessing the Post-
Earthquake Functionality of
the Hospital System
Following the Canterbury
Earthquake Sequence in NZ
(Giovinazzi, S., Mitrani-Reiser, J., Kirsch, T.,
Jacques, C., McIntosh, J., & Wilson, T. 2012)
This 2012 paper, prepared with funding from the
Natural Hazards Research Platform, summarises
earthquake impacts on the main Christchurch hospital.
The main points are:
• Preliminary results show how non-structural
damage to health facilities and loss/reduced
functionality of the city lifelines was far more
disruptive to the provision of healthcare than the
minor structural damage to buildings. The
earthquake-induced impacts on health facilities
and the loss of functionality of city lifelines
reduced the capacity of the healthcare network to
operate and further strained a health care system
already under pressure.
• The ability to cope with the damage was due to
the ingenuity and hard work of maintenance and
clinical staff.
• The Canterbury healthcare system has exhibited
high adaptive capacity and the strong integration
with the wider New Zealand healthcare system
has enabled a high standard of healthcare to be
maintained.
• Hospital planning activities should focus on
identifying non-structural and functional
vulnerabilities within all critical service areas and
mitigating their possible impact with engineering
interventions, redundancy systems or alternative
resources.
6.2 Impact of the 22nd
February 2011 Earthquake
on Christchurch Hospital
(McIntosh, J., Jacques, C., Mitrani-Reiser, J.,
Kirsch, T., Giovinazzi, S., & Wilson, T. 2012)
This is a summary of a 2012 New Zealand Society for
Earthquake Engineering conference paper on hospital
impacts following the February 2011 earthquake.
The following are the main points:
• Minimal disruption occurred due to structural
damage at Christchurch Hospital buildings.
Damage was minimized through regular building
shapes (with no abrupt discontinuities or large
overhangs), separation joints, CWH base isola-
tion, and seismic upgrade of older buildings.
• the effects of damage to non-structural building
components and equipment, as well as break-
downs in public services (lifelines), transportation,
re-supply, and other organizational aspects, were
far more disruptive to the functioning of
Christchurch Hospital than the minor structural
damage observed in buildings and facilities. The
non-structural damage included the failures of
many components: windows, non-load bearing
ceilings, partition walls, floor coverings, medical
equipment, and building contents.
• Suspended ceiling tiles (particularly plaster tiles
with tongue and groove joints) caused falling
hazard. Tiles were originally diagonally braced to
the wall but at some stage bracing was replaced
by less effective vertical tiles.
• Non-structural components such as wallboard
partitions suffered damage. This caused disrup-
tion during repair (no loss of functionality).
• Minor disruption occurred due to elevator shut-
down (seismic trip switches).
• Pumps and chillers jumped off their mounts
(despite being installed in accordance with
seismic mounting standards NZS4219:2007).
Chiller piping collapsed.
• Damage to internal and external roof coverings
and roof top water tanks on Riverside building
caused water ingress and subsequent evacuation
of 2 floors. Evacuation took 35 minutes due to
lack of horizontal egress.
• Loss of power was a major obstacle. Some back-
up generators were damaged or malfunctioned.
In addition, shortages to the main low-voltage
switchboard caused small fires, damaging the
main electrical panel and further complicating the
power restoration efforts.
• Damage to water systems was a major problem.
Fire sprinklers could not be pressurised for up to
a week and emergency water supplies were
insufficient and not potable (silt in boreholes). To
prevent this situation from occurring in any future
disasters, a half million-litre capacity tank system
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has been installed to provide emergency water
for crucial systems, including the fire sprinklers.
• Building suction was damaged but this was
repaired within 30 minutes.
• Laundry was done off-site.
• There was no loss or shortage of lab supplies,
radiological supplies, or other diagnostic supplies.
The pharmacy had adequate supplies.
• Due to the lack of horizontal egress and the
presence of only a single stairwell, the decision
was made to permanently change the use of
those floors from clinical wards to administrative
space.
• All the regional hospitals participated in the
redistribution of capacity from damaged
healthcare facilities in Christchurch in the form of
accepting transferred elderly care and/or mater-
nity patients in the days after the earthquake.
6.3 Response of Regional
Health Care System to the
22nd February, 2011,
Christchurch Earthquake,
NZ
(Mitrani-Reiser, J., Kirsch, T., Jacques, C.,
Giovinazzi, S., McIntosh, J., & Wilson, T. 2012)
This 2011 paper, prepared with funding from the
Natural Hazards Research Platform, summarizes
earthquake impacts on the main Christchurch
hospital.
The main points are:
• Rectangular buildings predominate at the hospi-
tal, with no L- or T- shaped structures, no abrupt
discontinuities along building heights, and no
large overhangs. These features, along with the
presence of separation joints in most buildings
and base isolation of the CWH, likely mitigated
structural damage.
• Older buildings that had been seismically up-
graded suffered only cosmetic damage.
• Many other factors affect hospital functionality,
such as lifelines, transportation and support
agencies. Damaged non-structural components
of a hospital system are typically the most
disruptive factor following an earthquake as well
as organisational issues.
• The failures of suspended ceilings, particularly
the plaster tiles constructed with tongue-and-
groove joints, proved to be one of the most
disruptive non-structural failures. Removal of
original diagonal ties on tiles also contributed to
the damage.
• Non-load bearing wallboard partitions were also
heavily damaged throughout the hospital.
• Most disruption arose during the repair phase.
• Staircase damage (due to rigid connections to
floors) caused disruption.
• Seismic switches on elevators meant they were
out of action for a period.
• Rooftop pumps and chillers fell off their mounts.
Water tank failure caused evacuation of two
floors with no horizontal egress – evacuation was
via damaged stairwells with no lights.
• Despite regular testing, some backup generators
failed or were damaged. Some filters clogged
because of silt in tanks (disturbed by earth-
quake).
• Emergency water supply was tested – wells had
silt in them (from earthquake) and initially could
not be pumped easily. Well water was also not
potable. The fire system could not be pressurised
either.
• Supplies and non-clinical services were mostly
undamaged. The kitchen, laundry, pharmacy, lab
all remained functional (some services were
transferred to other sites as required, e.g. laundry
due to lack of water).
• Hospitals around New Zealand assisted by taking
patients and providing staff.
• Hospital planning activities should focus on
identifying non-structural and functional
vulnerabilities within all critical service areas and
mitigating their possible impact with engineering
interventions, redundancy systems or alternative
resources.
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7 SOLID WASTE
7.1 Christchurch, New Zealand
Earthquake Sequence of
Mw 7.1 September 04, 2010,
Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011,
Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:
Lifeline Performance –
Debris Management
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 18 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter
18 is on debris management.
The main points are:
• Post-disaster debris and rubbish normally
includes hazardous material and therefore
normally requires special disposal processes.
• Some materials can be reused.  It is therefore
important to have procedures in place to maxi-
mize the efficient reuse of resources.
• Sensitive procedures are needed relating to
handling material, buildings and vehicles where
fatalities have occurred.
• Heritage items need to be identified and pro-
tected – this means also having somewhere to
store them.
• Contractors were screened and approved by the
National CDEM Controller prior to performing
demolition and removal of debris. Only contrac-
tors approved to handle hazardous materials
were allowed to remove and dispose of such
materials. All contractors were required to
operate in accordance with legal requirements
and industry standards.
• Waste and debris management in a post-disaster
situation is critical in terms of supporting lifeline
and general recovery. A coordinated effort is
required to ensure timely restoration of services
and clean-up, thereby aiding rebuilding and to
return to normalcy.
7.2 Disaster Waste
Management: A Systems
Approach
(Brown, C. 2012)
This is a summary of a PhD thesis submitted to the
University of Canterbury in 2012.
The main points are:
• Waste needs to be included in Civil Defence and
Emergency Planning. In particular, it is recom-
mended that waste management utility operators
are included as Lifeline Utilities under the CDEM
Act.
• Urban Search and Rescue should consider
training construction personnel to assist in search
and rescue activities.
• More pro-active public consultation regarding
waste related issues would be beneficial.
• The majority of waste management activities
during the response and recovery have been
privately funded. Consideration of public funding
of waste management during the response
phases should be considered – particularly where
waste is blocking access ways, posing a public
health hazard or a social nuisance.
• Greater clarification is needed in terms of cost
share for demolition works between EQC and
private insurers (and the Crown where land areas
have been purchased by the Crown).
• Under the current private funding mechanism for
demolition, opportunities for resource efficiency
and prioritised planning were not fully utilised.
The central city demolition programme managed
by CERA allowed for some planning, however,
private property owners commanded most of the
resources and thus dictated the programme of
works, arguably slowing the opening of the
central city. Centralised coordination of such a
large number of projects in such a confined area
was needed, at the very least, to manage traffic
and health and safety issues.
• If a centralised management approach to demoli-
tion is taken then consideration of appropriate
procurement strategies for contractors and debris
disposal facility services is needed. The author
recommends time and cost contracts in a re-
source-constrained environment. Also, considera-
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tion needs to be given to the timing of renegotia-
tion of contracts let during the response phase.
• Where additional waste management facilities
are required to handle the increased volumes of
waste, the author recommends that these be run
publically or, at the very least, as a private-public
partnership. This is so that the risk can be
appropriately shared in this highly uncertain
environment.
• Authorities should carefully consider whether new
disposal / waste management facilities are
required before consenting new operations
(particularly privately run operations). Bonds
under the RMA should be considered to protect
against potential environmental damage.
• Guidance needs to be provided on how the RMA
(given the discretionary nature of the legislation)
should be applied in a disaster situation. A
decision-making framework is recommended to
protect the environment (physical, economic and
social) and decision makers.
• The feasibility of recycling post-disaster should
be considered. This particularly relates to whether
on-site or off-site separation is preferable. Off-site
separation may be more cost effective given the
reduced time for demolition compared to on-site
separation, and the greater health and safety
risks associated with on-site separation arising
from on-going aftershocks.
• Asbestos was a major health and safety concern
for the public. Better consultation should be
carried out in the future regarding asbestos-
related risks and mitigation measures.
• Currently there are very few regulatory mecha-
nisms by which demolition and debris manage-
ment activities can be monitored. This makes
management of risks difficult. Consideration into
this is required.
7.3 Canterbury Earthquakes –
Waste Sector Response
(Brown, C. 2011)
This summary is from a presentation to the 2011
National Lifelines Forum.
The main points are:
• Municipal waste service providers should be
included as a Lifeline Utilities under the CDEM
Act.
• Need to have plans in place for managing
bottlenecks (one waste site in particular became
critical to waste disopsal).
• Need to have plans in place to store material that
may relate to investigations after the event.
• Need to be aware that putrescibles will rot when
forgotten (there were putrescible wastes rotting in
the city centre while the cordon was up).
• If it is likely that liquefaction silt could arise in an
earthquake, need to have adequate plans for a
disposal site.
7.4 Liquefaction Ejecta Clean-
up in Christchurch during
the 2010-2011 Earthquake
Sequence
(Villemure, M., Wilson, T. M., Bristow, D.,
Gallagher, M., Giovinazzi, S., & Brown, C.
2012)
This is a summary of a 2012 New Zealand Society
for Earthquake Engineering conference paper on
liquefaction ejecta cleanup following the February
2011 earthquake.
The main points are:
• Liquefaction ejecta caused significant damage /
disruption (by blockage) to storm water and
wastewater infrastructure. Ejecta also disrupted
road networks. Ejecta were also a potential
health hazard due to mild wastewater contamina-
tion and from dust nuisance. Ejecta, in general,
was disruptive to people living in affected areas.
Thus, speedy removal was essential.
• Planning for community collection of natural
disaster debris needs to undertaken.
• Strategies for managing large numbers of
volunteers (food, H&S, equipment, works alloca-
tions etc.) need to be developed. The response
could have been more rapid and efficient if there
had been better provisions for managing volun-
teers in CDEM plans. Strategies for integrating
contracting and volunteer services (including
reconnaissance and work planning) need to be
developed. Project managers were needed to
coordinate volunteers.
• Clean-up managers noted the importance of a
clear strategy which was underpinned by clear
communication and coordination between
council, contractors, volunteers, the public and
other stakeholders, such as Civil Defence and
lifelines.
• All organisations stated that local knowledge,
trust, contacts and existing informal relationships
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significantly enhanced the effectiveness of the
clean-up management (notable improvement
between September 2010 and February 2011).
• Coordination was significantly enhanced when a
job dispatch and mobile workforce management
system were in place.
• CIMS was used effectively to communicate
between the different clean-up organisations and
with the public. Social media (in particular
Facebook) was also very effective.
• Light and heavy earth moving equipment is
needed for large-scale removal of deposits. Fine
ejecta sediment is ideally collected when slightly
moist. Pre-selected disposal sites facilitate
effective debris removal.
• Public communication is key. Volunteerism lifts
community spirits and should be encouraged.
• The lessons from liquefaction may be applicable
to other events where clean-up is required, such
as volcanic ash.
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8 MULTI-SECTOR REPORTS
8.1 Geotechnical
Reconnaissance of the
2010 Darfield (Canterbury)
Earthquake
(Cubrinovski M. G. 2010)
This is a summary of a paper from the December
2010 Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earth-
quake Engineering, Vol 43, No. 4. It contains much
information on the nature of the September 2010
earthquake and its impacts on the building stock. It
also contains information on infrastructure, summa-
rised below.
The main infrastructure-related points are:
Stopbanks
• Overall, the stopbanks along the Waimakariri
River performed well during the earthquake, with
only ~4 km out of ~17 km of stopbanks requiring
repair. Longitudinal cracks were very quickly
repaired.
• The stopbanks confining the Kaiapoi River
suffered damage at various locations. These
embankments, measuring about 2.5 m high and
2.7 m wide, have slopes of approximately 2H:1V
on the riverside and 3H:1V on the landside at the
point where the reconnaissance was undertaken.
They remained serviceable despite incipient
liquefaction in the abutments and settlement and
cracking of the approach on the eastern side.
• The stopbank along the south bank of the Kaiapoi
River also experienced extensive lateral cracking.
Bromley Sewage Treatment Plant
• The middle third of the Pond 1/2 A embankment
sustained the most severe failure throughout the
pond system over a length of around 45 cm. At
this location there were multiple deep longitudinal
cracks along the embankment.
• Each of the three pipelines became dislocated in
the gap between a weir structure extending into
an oxidation pond and the embankment, allowing
water to flow directly into the pipelines at the
gaps formed in the pipe separations. Further-
more, sink-holes were formed on the embank-
ment berms and in the middle of Dyers Road
indicating that the pipes had separated beneath
the embankment fill.
• The distortion of the embankment is indicative of
bearing failure of the embankment as it has
settled and spread into the liquefied sub-soils,
with large tension cracks forming through the fill
used to form the embankments and pulling apart
of concrete pipelines as the fill has spread.
• Because of the slumping of the pond banks,
engineers decided to drop the pond water levels
and reduce the hydraulic pressures on the
embankments. Sheet piles were driven into the
Pond 3/6 embankment to stabilize it and arrest
further movement.
Bridges
• At road bridge locations where lateral spreading,
or incipient lateral spreading, was observed in the
abutments, the tendency for the abutments to
converge (move inwards towards the centre of
the span) appears to have been resisted by
bridge decks, though there were typically signs of
lateral spreading of the approach embankments
perpendicular to the roadway.
• South Brighton (Bridge Street) Bridge: This
bridge has an approximately 70 m span with a
centre pier and seat type abutments and a slight
skew. The bridge was damaged and closed due
to differential settlement at the east abutment.
The abutment wall is supported by several rows
of 14 inch octagonal precast, pre-stressed
concrete piles including a row of batter piles.
Incipient lateral spreading of the bridge abutment,
lateral spreading along the banks of the river and
closure of the gap at the bridge seat were
observed at the west abutment. The west
abutment also appeared to have back-rotated
slightly, possibly due to the liquefaction induced
settlement of the approach fill and tilting of the
approach slab at the wing wall.
• Avon River bridges (Swanns Road, Gayhurst
Road, Pedestrian Bridge): These are approxi-
mately 30m simple span bridges with integral
abutments. Both road bridges had cracking in the
roadway on the approaches, and at Swanns
Road there was lateral spreading of the approach
fill, incipient lateral spreading at the abutments
and cracking at the abutment and retaining wall.
• Kaiapoi River bridges: Damage was similar to
the Avon Rover bridges. Buckling occurred of the
lightweight deck of this pedestrian bridge as a
result of lateral spreading.
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• Waimakariri River Bridges (Chaneys Overpass,
Highway 1 River Crossings): Chaneys is a three
span bridge of 80m with what appeared to be
seat-type abutments retrofitted with cable
restrainers. Cracking and incipient lateral spread-
ing was observed at the northern transition
between the approach embankment and the
abutment at Chaneys overpass. There was no
apparent damage to the bridge structure or its
foundation despite ample evidence of liquefaction
beneath the bridge.
• Kainga Road Bridge: mixed girder-slab rein-
forced concrete bridge. Movement of the north-
east abutment wing wall resulted in damage to an
18cm diameter sewage pipe that was rigidly
connected along the bridge span. The ruptured
pipe continued to discharge untreated sewage
into the river for at least 12 days after the earth-
quake.
Directly below the bridge a pipe of similar diam-
eter suffered no damage, and it was concluded
that its support to the abutment wall was filled
with a flexible foam.
• Railroad bridges are primarily of steel construc-
tion. One railroad bridge was damaged and
service was impacted from bent rails at the fault
trace and as a result of slumping ground in some
locations.
Port
•  Port facilities were operational within hours after
the earthquake and no scheduled shipments
were missed. The two main piers and a portion of
the coal terminal were operational by 4 Septem-
ber.
• The port has three container cranes that were still
performing following the earthquake. The crane
rails are closely enough spaced that both rails fit
on the wharf deck. Having both rails on the deck
appears to have avoided differential movement of
the rails and contributed to this good perform-
ance.
• As a result of liquefaction and lateral spreading,
four tanks at the bitumen plant (at the oil berth)
and some supporting piping suffered movement
and damage. Tanks three and four were experi-
enced movement that resulted in pullout of nearly
all perimeter anchor bolts at their base. No
structural damage was observed. Flexible
connections survived the strong shaking with only
minor leakage.
Water and Wastewater
• Damage to the CCC’s system was predominantly
to the water and wastewater mains, as a result of
ground movement and floating of manholes.
• A major problem with sewer lines was influx of
liquefied sand and water through breaks in the
line.
• All new pump stations are designed to have
flexible joints and performed well. At older
stations, one pipe with a rigid connection was
sheared (at Halswell) and one water pump was
lost.
• WDC officials wondered if they could have
restored water service sooner by using more
temporary above-ground flexible piping, as was
done on the final days of restoration.
Landfill
• Christchurch City Council opened up a cell at the
closed Burwood Landfill facility to accommodate
the increased volume of waste generated by
earthquake response and recovery.
• The Kate Valley landfill is located approximately
85 kilometres from the epicentre. The landfill is a
valley fill with 2.5:1 slide slopes. The lining
configuration consists of an encapsulated
membrane back geosynthetic clay line /
geomembrane system composed of a 0.4 mm
high density polyethylene (HDPE) geomembrane
with 6 mm of dry bentonite adhered to it, overlain
by a 1 mm HDPE liner. No slipping of the waste
body or damage to the lining system was re-
ported by the operator. No damage was reported
to other lined structures such as dairy milking
barn wastewater ponds or lined reservoirs.
8.2 Geotechnical Aspects of
the 22nd February 2011
Christchurch Earthquake
(Cubrinovski M. B. 2011)
This is a summary of a paper from the December
2011 Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earth-
quake Engineering, Vol 44, No. 4.
The main points are:
While much of this paper describes issues relating to
the building stock, it also contains some material on
infrastructure (summarised below).
Bridges
• Settlement and lateral spreading of bridge
approaches occurred particularly relating to
bridges on the Avon River downstream from the
CBD.
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• Land movement caused large stress on abut-
ments of piled structures.
Stop Banks
• Damage to stopbanks was mainly due to lique-
faction of underlying soils causing lateral spread-
ing, slumping, and settlement.
• Longitudinal cracks were more common than
transverse cracks. While not desirable, longitudi-
nal cracks are less problematic than transverse
cracks which can cause significant issues with
respect to structural integrity of stopbanks.
Pipe Networks
• Large ground movements and deformation (in
extension, compression, shear, and combined
modes) including ground distortion, cracks,
fissures and venting sink-holes, resulted from the
severe liquefaction and lateral spreading. These
caused severe damage to underground potable
water, wastewater and stormwater systems.
• Potable water pipes are shallow and pressurized.
4.6% of the pipe segments were damaged, 80%
of those in areas of moderate-severe, or low-
moderate liquefaction.
• The sewerage network was harder hit. 8% of the
system length was out of service and 31% was
operating with limited service three weeks after
the earthquake.
• Loss of grade, joint failures, cracks in pipes and
failure of laterals were the most commonly
observed types of failures.
• Loss of critical facilities such as pump stations
also contributed to the overall poor performance
of the system.
• Buoyancy of concrete vaults at potable water and
wastewater pump stations, compounded by
liquefaction-induced settlement, caused pipeline
breaks at their connections with the vaults.
• Silt and sand from liquefaction washed into the
Bromley sewage treatment plant from broken
wastewater pipelines, causing damage in the
primary settling tanks. Nearly all facilities at the
sewage treatment plant were affected by liquefac-
tion, which caused differential settlement of the
clarifiers, thereby seriously impairing secondary
treatment capabilities.
• Most severe water and wastewater damage was
caused by lateral spreading.
Electricity
• Serious damage occurred to underground
electrical cables due to liquefaction induced
ground movements.
8.3 Learning from
Earthquakes: The Mw 7.1
Darfield (Canterbury), New
Zealand Earthquake of
September 4 2010
(Earthquake Engineering Research Institute,
2010)
This is a summary of the Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute’s (EERI) Special Earthquake
Report on the 2010 earthquake, November 2010.
The main points are:
• Because Christchurch was not considered a high-
risk area it had a passive retrofit policy for its
unreinforced masonry buildings. The damage to
these non-retrofitted URM buildings from moder-
ate shaking is an important lesson for other
regions with large inventories of URM buildings.
• Overall, bridges suffered little damage. This was
due to a complex set of circumstances. Most
have small to moderate spans, which are recog-
nized to exhibit a more sturdy seismic response
because of their symmetry and limited reactive
mass, and most were designed to resist forces
substantially larger than the demands imparted
by this particular earthquake. They also shared a
number of common design features that gave
them high seismic resistance, including a sturdy
monolithic structure, wide wall piers and continu-
ity of the superstructure from abutment to
abutment.
• The biggest wastewater problems related to deep
gravity mains, in many cases 3-4 m below the
ground surface. With ground water only 2 m
deep, trenching was difficult. When wastewater
mains were located in the backyards of private
residences, access and subsequent repairs were
more difficult.
• Gas lines (including the few in liquefaction zones)
were unaffected. The system has 170 km of 65 -
315 mm medium density polyethylene pipelines
with thermal fusion welds.
• Damage to industrial storage racks was observed
at many locations. Such damage, especially with
respect to the food supply, illustrates the impor-
tance of non-structural mitigation for secondary
building systems and contents.
• A curfew was useful in controlling the CBD which
had large amounts of unreinforced masonry
damage and debris in the street.
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8.4 The Value of Lifeline
Seismic Risk Mitigation in
Christchurch
(Fenwick,T. 2012)
This is a summary of a 2012 report for the New
Zealand Lifelines Committee on the value of lifelines
seismic risk mitigation in Christchurch undertaken
since publication of Risks and Realities1 in the mid-
1990s.
The main points are:
• Work following Risks and Realities served
Christchurch well - losses were reduced and
response / recovery facilitated
• Many of the elements that contributed to the
benefits are not costly
• Inter-corporate and inter-personal relationships
proved very valuable in aiding responses
• A range of other studies have found substantial
benefits from seismic and other risk management
• The costs of seismic risk management in
Christchurch have been repaid many times over.
The purpose of the report is to crystallize the experi-
ence and learnings from the recent earthquakes to
foster further, well-targeted, seismic mitigation in
New Zealand. Accordingly, the report:
• Comments on the value of pre-earthquake
Christchurch lifeline engineering work to both the
participating organisations and to the wider
community.
• Suggests the elements that contributed most
strongly to the benefits and that should therefore
feature within the core activities of other lifeline
utilities and groups in earthquake-prone areas.
The report notes that Orion’s electricity distribution
seismic strengthening programme, commenced in
1996 and progressed systematically each year, cost
$6 million and is estimated to have saved $60 to $65
million in direct asset replacement costs and repairs.
The elements that contributed most strongly to the
general benefits, and that should therefore feature in
work programmes, are:
• Asset awareness and risk reduction: identify-
ing points of particular vulnerability. Issues
likely to arise include:
– surveying for site-specific risks, for example
buildings that do not meet AS/NZS1170
loading standards (including where assets are
placed on top of existing structures), and
where liquefaction is possible
– identifying likely fracture points (for example
where cables and pipes enter structures such
as buildings and bridges)
– identifying cases where restraints to restrict
movement of sensitive equipment are
needed.
• Readiness: taking steps to improve organisa-
tional performance in emergencies, such as:
– ensuring fit-for-purpose operating frameworks
for business continuity
– working collaboratively with other lifelines and
relevant agencies on common issues such as
looking for key interdependencies, examining
generator sufficiency and planning for petro-
leum outages, and establishing lifeline utility
coordination arrangements to facilitate
emergency response
– ensuring that engineers and contractors are
available quickly to meet emergency needs
– managing spare parts to promote availability
when unexpected pressures arise.
• Perseverance: maintaining the effort over
time while communicating realistic expecta-
tions.
– Lifeline utilities that have retained a consistent
focus on seismic mitigation have benefitted
most significantly (asset management
planning and similar annual-cycle processes
provide an appropriate setting for much of the
required work).
– Improving end-user knowledge of infrastruc-
ture reliability and encouraging users (particu-
larly organisations with emergency response
roles such as hospitals) to plan for a level of
infrastructure outage in the more extreme
events are also essential.
8.5 Recovery of Lifelines
Following the 22nd
February 2011 Christchurch
Earthquake: Successes and
Issues
(Giovianazzi, S., & Wilson, T. 2012)
This is a summary of a 2012 New Zealand Society
for Earthquake Engineering conference paper on
1 Risks and Realities was the major 1990s Christchurch
infrastructure hazard vulnerability study.
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Lifelines’ immediate research needs following the
February 2011 earthquake. The work was funded
under the Natural Hazards Research Platform.
The following are the main points:
Power
• Analysis of seismic performance of underground
cables and identification of the multiple causes of
the damage to the underground network.
• Assessment of the residual/future functionality of
affected power underground cables seismic
scenario analysis for assessing and comprising
alternative solutions to build permanent capacity
in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch.
• Assessment of earthquake risk to underground
lines versus wind and snow–storm risk to over-
head lines.
• Assessment of cable bridge interactions and
coordinating repair activities with road and bridge.
Telecommunications
• Assessment of residual/future functionality of
stretched copper cabling.
• Improvements to standard procedures to
straighten the cellular network towers out of
plumb due to liquefaction.
• Scenario analysis for assessing and comparing
alternative solutions for replacement of damaged
exchanges.
Highways and Urban Roads
• Assessment and accounting, within repair/
rebuilding designing procedures, for the in-
creased risk of flooding induced by the subsid-
ence phenomena observed following the earth-
quakes.
• Assessment and mitigation of the rock-fall risk on
roads induced by the earthquakes and following
aftershocks.
Water and Wastewater
• Documentation and analysis of the seismic
performance of different buried pipes typologies
(material/age) to identify the less vulnerable
solutions for repairing and rebuilding.
• Identification of techniques and tools to support
repairing/reconstruction activities and to justify
costs of earthquake-resistant solutions.
• Definition of a method and tool for automatically
mapping and assessing earthquake induced
damage to sewage networks, starting from CCTV
footage.
Gas
• Improvements to standards/procedures for
seismic design of liquefied petroleum gas feed
plant.
8.6 Lifelines Performance and
Management Following the
22 February 2011
Christchurch Earthquake,
New Zealand - Highlights of
Resilience
(Giovinazzi, S., Wilson, T., Davis, C.,
Bristow, D., Gallagher, M., Schofield, A.,
et al. 2011)
This is a summary of a paper from the December
2011 Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earth-
quake Engineering, Vol 44, No. 4.
The main points are:
• The strong lifeline culture in New Zealand
promoted by local lifelines groups, National
Engineering Lifelines Committee. Earthquake
Commission and Civil Defence and Emergency
Management reduced the physical and functional
impact of the earthquakes on lifelines systems.
• In urban locations further analysis is needed on
hills that support resident communities, including
investigations into rock falls, boulder rolls and
loess soil failure due to earthquake movement.
Previously these risks had not been seriously
considered as an expected hazard in
Christchurch.
Power
• The national grid was unaffected due to resilience
measures used implemented by Transpower.
Local power in Christchurch was affected for
around 4.5 hours while safety checks were
performed.
• Transmission towers situated in extreme liquefac-
tion zones remained operational.
• The Christchurch earthquake highlighted the
need to implement previously learnt lessons. For
example Transpower learnt in the 1987
Edgecumbe earthquake the need to seismically
restrain heavy equipment in substations, and as a
result of undertaking this before February 22nd in
all of their substations there was very little
damage to the national transmission grid.
• Following the 22nd February earthquake all
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instruments with insulators held by “finger
clamps” will be replaced as this type of clamping
performed poorly during the earthquakes.
• There is a very strong correlation between line
cable failure and liquefaction / lateral spreading.
As part of the maintenance plan there needs to
be a priority to install liquefaction-resilient cables
in areas where extreme liquefaction are ex-
pected. Long cables, such as the one between
the Lancaster and Armagh substations are also
extremely vulnerable to damage and should be
monitored more closely than others.
• Orion’s resilient maintenance programme signifi-
cantly improved the performance of their substa-
tions, in some cases surviving better than
neighbouring buildings. It may be unnecessary to
upgrade a substation to a performance level for
an extreme earthquake where demand for
electricity reduces because surrounding buildings
do not survive. Substations should be upgraded
to the point where they are only slightly stronger
than the neighbouring properties.
• Temporary overhead lines can be used to quickly
re-establish service while proper design and
consultation procedures are undertaken to build a
permanent supply.
• While most major emergency repairs to the local
power supply network were completed in 6
months, it is expected to take years before the
network will be back to pre-earthquake resilient
levels. This demonstrates that while a network
may be fully operational quickly, it takes a long
time to restore the network to the same function-
ality levels.
• The local power network is needed to work
closely with demolition and restoration crews to
ensure that buildings are safely disconnected
from the power network before demolition or
repair activities start.
• Without the earthquake strengthening work
completed by Orion after ‘Risks and Realities’ it is
expected that the repair bill would have been
double and the loss of power would have been
much worse, lasting several more weeks, if not
several months for many customers throughout
the network. “Even so, the power cuts that did
result have been very disruptive.”
Roading
• Congestion remained a problem for months
following the earthquakes despite traffic manage-
ment measures and programmes to speed-up the
removal of liquefaction.
LPG
• The availability of back-up resources was crucial
to relieve lifelines interdependency issues and to
maintain the LPG system functionality despite the
reduced functionality of the electric and water
networks. Diesel engine back-up generators
guaranteed the supply of electric power to the
feeder plants. Buried storage tanks (500 t)
provided several weeks supply for the network in
case of any on-going disruption to the business-
as-usual LPG supply through the Lyttelton port.
Road haulage options for LPG were placed on
standby.
Wastewater
• Christchurch relied heavily on temporary sewage
treatment services which were facilitated by
portable chemical toilets to supplement the
wastewater system.
• HDPE pipes are now being used extensively for
pressure mains as they were found to perform
well following all three earthquakes.
• Health issues were used during hot and windy
conditions, as silt was mobilised by the wind
because of fears that raw sewage had contami-
nated much of the liquefaction ejecta which would
create respiratory health issues and provide a
long-term health risk to the community.
Other
• “The value of resilient design, interdependency
planning, mutual assistance agreements, exten-
sive insurance cover and highly trained and
adaptable human resources are the success
stories that this paper aims to highlight.”
• Mutual aid agreements and contingency meas-
ures by lifeline utilities helped them ensure
prompt availability of resources, materials and
technical expertise during operational repairs.
• There are significant challenges in managing
aging infrastructure, as highlighted by the events.
These components are known to be vulnerable,
but often too expensive to upgrade / replace in
the short-term. These components such as weak
buried pipes / cables played a significant role in
the lifelines performance during the earthquakes.
• The management of the cordon caused frustra-
tion, as strict access protocols made it difficult for
lifelines utilities and their contractors to service
key sites. A police escort for utilities was provided
sporadically upon request.
• Extended closure of the Christchurch CBD
exposed difficulties in re-optimising infrastructure
use.
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8.7 Christchurch, New Zealand
Earthquake Sequence of
Mw 7.1 September 04, 2010,
Mw 6.3 February 22, 2011,
Mw 6.0 June 13, 2011:
Lifeline Performance –
Lifeline Interdependence
(Eidinger, J. & Tang, A.K. Eds. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 15 of the Technical
Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE)
Monograph 40, February 2012 Revision O. Chapter
15 is on debris management.
The main points are:
• The loss of Orion power to cell phone sites, for up
to 12 hours in many cases, led to loss of cell
phone service once the batteries at these sites
ran down. While cell phone providers had
implemented seismic anchoring or battery racks
and equipment and used portable generators,
neither could mobilize a sufficient number of
generators fast enough to prevent phone out-
ages. Cell phone sites were fully functional once
mains power was restored.
• Much of the water system was de-pressurized in
the first day after the September 2010 earth-
quake, due to water pipe damage and broken
wells in several cases. The loss of mains power
to the wells likely had limited impact on the
overall performance of the water system.
• Because road, telecommunications and electricity
were largely functional quite quickly, the main
hindrance to restoration of water and other
services was the time needed to make inspec-
tions and repairs.
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9 RESPONSE COORDINATION
9.1 Review of the Civil Defence
Emergency Management
Response to the 22
February Christchurch
Earthquake
(McLean, I., Oughton, D., Ellis, S.,
Wakelin, B., & Rubin, C. B. 2012)
This is a summary of chapter 4 of the report on the
review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management
response to the February 2011 earthquake (chapter
4 deals with Lifelines).
The main points are:
• Many organizations showed significant improve-
ment in responses to the February 2011 earth-
quake compared with September 2010.
• Restoration of lifelines is more difficult where
organizations use contractors vis-à-vis own staff.
The management and tasking of contractors and
own staff on emergency response must be
embedded and practices.
Water and Wastewater
• It was learnt in the September earthquake that it
was beneficial to zone the city in terms of water
supply so that responses could be targeted to
probable areas of need.
• Having established relationships with contractors
and industry bodies meant that there was a
network of support that could be relied on
following the February earthquake. These
relationships developed prior to the event,
although often informal (and not through CDEM
channels), helped to establish water and
wastewater services.
• It was learnt that there were disadvantages to
using portaloo waste disposal systems due to
possible health risks, lack of security and reluc-
tance to use them at night. Chemical toilets were
preferred.
• There is a need to develop shut-down and
containment procedures for sites containing
dangerous chemicals as part of CDEM planning.
• Chlorination of potable water was required. This
task was undertaken by a team from a local
authority from another part of New Zealand.
• In order to maximise effective use of the repair
gangs the delivery of equipment and materials
was reversed in that suppliers delivered these
directly to the requirements of the gangs on site.
This was possible due to the pre-developed
relationships between the City Council and
contractors.
• The ability to generate damage maps (amongst
others) is important for communication to the
EOC and the public and needs to be an embed-
ded capability for EOCs.
The Review notes the following issues that could
have been done better:
• More business continuity planning could have
been done in advance.
• Communications with households where supplies
were disrupted were inadequate.
• Better damage maps could have been prepared.
• Aspects of the provision of alternative sanitation
could have been improved. This includes provid-
ing adequate advice on alternative sanitation
while portaloos or chemical toilets are being
obtained.
• Better communication with the CRC through the
Lifelines Utility Coordinator was needed.
• Consideration should be given to establishing
reconnaissance teams with their own communi-
cations to gather data for multiple lifelines in the
same visit, for example, road, water and waste
water.
Solid Waste
• There must be pre-planning undertaken for the
disposal of non-toxic solid waste, putrescent
waste from rotting food, liquefaction silt, demoli-
tion material and solid waste from toilet arrange-
ments. This should be done as part of Lifeline
plans.
Electricity
• Orion is a commercial company that has inte-
grated risk management in its normal operations.
• Orion had carried out analysis of weak points on
the network prior to the 4 September 2010
earthquake and again before the 22 February
2011 event. Mitigation measures costing $6
million are expected to have saved them around
$60 million.
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• Flexible supply design with extensive intercon-
nections assisted restoration by providing routing
options.
• Orion had the internal organisation and emer-
gency procedures as well as the in-house
capability to respond effectively.
• Orion had the relationships with outside organisa-
tions and suppliers to be able to obtain additional
staff and resources quickly, including through
mutual aid agreements.
• Organisational culture and leadership are
important. Ascertaining staff status after the
earthquake, feeding staff and contractors, seeing
to medical care needs, management of the staff
workload and ensuring timely relief were impor-
tant factors.
• The main Orion Operation centre was inside the
cordon. Cordon management was inconsistent
and inflexible for staff who had to work within the
cordon with frequent changes to access arrange-
ments.
• Contact with the relevant decision makers within
Orion and the CRC was confusing with difficulty
in contacting the correct person to address
issues.
• Overall demolition management could be im-
proved. Protociols need to recognize electricity
safety and supply issues.
• The key to the resilience of Orion’s services was
that it understood its assets and their
vulnerabilities.
Telecommunications
• Telecom had a recovery and priority plan that
helped them respond to the February earthquake.
This included establishing an alternative operat-
ing centre in Linwood to provide an alternative to
the main exchange that was inside the cordon.
• There was no pre-plan for access through the
cordon, providing difficulty to Telecom since
ongoing access to their main building was
required. This emphasises the need for pre-
planning for cordon access in emergencies.
• There is a need for a well thought out and
controlled demolition plan and a willingness to
share information on buildings to be demolished,
since they often had sensitive equipment and/or
cables on or under them.
Roads
• Principal roading routes were cleared quickly due
to the relationships that were in place between
CCC and two major contractors; Fulton Hogan
and City Care. Maintenance contracts also
included a clause requiring assistance in the
event of an emergency and a schedule of
payment rates for the work. This enabled work to
commence promptly following the event.
Air
• Systems need to be carefully managed after an
emergency. Personnel may be shocked or have
personal / family issues and may not be operating
with the same level of productivity, alertness and
judgment.
• A need arose to contact other control centres
around the country. The cellphone network was
overloaded / inoperable during the critical phase.
To mitigate this satellite phones have since been
purchased.
• A mistake from September was to resume BAU
too early with consequent staff overload. In
February the crisis management team was kept
in place until a formal planned handover was
appropriate.
• The airport had a well developed and fully
practiced emergency management plan which
worked well.
• The National CDEM plan should include provision
for priority transport of ATC staff from
Christchurch to Auckland to service the alterna-
tive airways traffic control centre. (New Zealand’s
main centre is located in Christchurch.)
• In airport emergency planning consideration
could be given to rapid evaluation of runway
status to enable early emergency operation of
military aircraft.
Rail
• KiwiRail had in place a well defined crisis man-
agement response for emergencies that allowed
BAU and worked due to well-established commu-
nication channels.
• An additional rail control centre is needed outside
of Wellington as there is almost no local control in
the remainder of the country. This would reduce
the vulnerability to loss of this centre if a disaster
were to occur in Wellington.
• KiwiRail should be urged to take part in local
CDEM exercises as well as those at a national
level and through lifeline links.
• The relationship between KiwiRail and Fonterra
proved beneficial in September 2010, when rail
milk tankers were utilized to take water to
Christchurch.
• There was a lack of communication between
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KiwiRail and the Lifeline Utility Coordinator in the
CRC (Christchurch Response Centre) following
the February 2011 earthquake.
Port
• The Lyttleton Port Company (LPC) undertook
extensive pre-planning and modelling of their
infrastructure. The actual behaviour of the
wharves in the earthquake was close to predicted
giving confidence in the structures and the
planning.
• There is a need for closer cooperation and better
communications between LPC and CRC in
emergency planning.
• There is also a need for open, pre-planning and
practiced emergency management communica-
tions and knowledge of responsibilities, particu-
larly between the LPC and NZTA.
• LPC should join in local CDEM planning.
Fuel Supplies
• A water supply was needed at the tank farm as a
fire-fighting precaution (oil is supplied via pipe-
line) and the existing supply arrangements failed.
Now there is a stand-by fire water supply and
pumps in case of further event.
• The ongoing investment in the management of
risk and emergencies by the oil industry and their
emergency response teams helped in the
response to the earthquake.
• There is a need at fuel stations to have standby
electricity.
• The issue of fuel distribution and management
and the procedures to be used during any
restrictions should be addressed at a national
level.
• The integrity of tanks and piping at service
stations has to be checked prior to fuel delivery.
This means there is a need in lifelines response
planning to identify the location of priority sta-
tions.
Lifelines Coordination
• The LUC team in Christchurch was formed
mainly by personnel from one consulting engi-
neering company, who lost access to their offices.
This formation has its advantages in terms of
cohesion, but also risks such as the loss of the
LUC team in the event of a building collapse.
• Pre-established sector coordination responses
worked well such as the relationship between the
Telecommunications Emergency Forum and the
Transport Response team.
• The Lifelines companies that performed the best
were those that already had embedded opera-
tional and maintenance relationships that were
transferred smoothly into emergency mode.
• The contribution by LUC’s from other regions in
both the CRC and NCMC was of significant
benefit. Established personal relationships also
assisted.
• The lack of initial documentation (such as the
availability of contact lists) impeded the initial
setup and it took some time to establish the
necessary document and information manage-
ment and recording systems.
• The principles and practices surrounding lifeline
relationships with EOCs should be reviewed and
publicised with a view to clarifying the roles of
LUC and individual lifelines. This should include
relationships between individual lifeline compa-
nies and EOCs, TLA-owned lifelines and EOCs,
national lifeline companies and the NCMC.
• Nationally based (nationally consistent) training of
LUCs should be undertaken.
• National policies should be developed and
promulgated in respect of fuel allocation and
distribution in an emergency.
• The resilience of infrastructure providers in the
main centres in New Zealand should be evalu-
ated to provide a national picture of vulnerabilities
and a basis for improvement.
9.2 Capturing the Learning
Points from the
Christchurch Earthquakes
2010-2011 –
Accomplishments,
Suggested Improvements
and Transferable
Knowledge
(Wright, S. 2011)
This document describes Christchurch City Council
activities arising from the earthquakes, focussing on
the Emergency Operations Centre immediately
following the February 2011 earthquake. The issues
raised relate to all sectors, but the summary below
describes the many issues that had a bearing on
infrastructure.
The main infrastructure-related points are:
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Coordination
• The need for quick but coordinated response in
the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) and
between agencies is the most important learning.
• Further training for Civil Defence Emergency
Management (CDEM) staff is warranted.
• Effective shift handover information and briefing
information is critical to effective coordination
within and between functional areas.
• A standardised handover template was devel-
oped by some units and worked well. It identified
personnel welfare / availability, key messages,
handover tasks to be completed and anticipated
issues of the next shift.
• During shift handover it is advantageous for
teams to be brought together for a quick debrief
session. This avoids duplication of tasks, ensures
the strategy is set for the next shift and provides
emotional and motivational support for those
going off-duty and those about to start.
• Staff known to need EOC access prior to an
emergency should have a pictured civil defence
identification card that is unequivocally recog-
nised by all agencies involved.
• All agencies involved should meet immediately
after the event to coordinate efforts.
• Planning, Intelligence and operations should be
in close physical proximity and have regular
information sharing debriefs at a management
level.
EOC Structure and Delegations
• Align EOC roles more closely with business-as-
usual roles to minimise confusion amongst
Council staff and maintain normal reporting lines
and delegations during an emergency.
• Floor plan locating functional areas and key
liaison personnel needs to be accessible.
Relationships
• Sharing of information (between agencies) is
critically important and is one of the key learning
points from the earthquakes.
• Agencies involved in emergency management
need to proactively collaborate in order to
document arrangements as to how to work
together during an emergency.
• The importance of an up to date contact list is
noted.
• Pre-planning was helpful as staff had pre-
assigned emergency roles and responsibilities.
• When a national state of emergency is declared,
but the emergency is localised, the National
Controller should consider using the Council’s
own delegations systems.
• Local council legal services should be brought
into the pre-planning stage of emergency opera-
tions so that documentation, templates, protocols
and processes can adhere to both council
protocols and CDEM legislation. This reduced the
need to “break and bend” the rules and minimises
legal risk to the council.
Utilising Human Resourcing and
Rostering
• Memoranda of understanding need to be estab-
lished with other metropolitan cities to ensure the
local council is supported in a major emergency
(e.g. water services, building inspectors).
• Environmental Health Officers offer critical
intelligence during an emergency situation and
should be embedded into EOCs to assist with
water and waste management and subsequent
public health issues.
• There should be just one report per functional
area and this should be electronically filed in a
consistent location.
Standard Operating Procedures
• SOP documents should be developed. These
should outline basic operational information,
methods and systems, standardised naming
conventions for electronic documents and contact
information for each function.
Procurement / Finance
• Robust processes and procedures should be put
in place for procurement of resources.
• Document all expenditure e.g. asset registers and
tracking for Christchurch City Council (CCC)
resources and unsolicited donations, delegation
limits, authorisations.
• Establish an asset register template that can be
used in an emergency so that resources and
donated goods can be inventoried, tracked and
recalled as necessary.
Information Communication Technology
• Cell-phones should be allocated to roles not
people and should stay in the EOC to ensure “on-
duty” personnel can be contacted.
• The SIM cards used by these phones should
guarantee mobile network access.
• Any future EOC site should be equipped with
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wireless technology, fibre distribution and addi-
tional networking.
• The call center needs to be located with the EOC;
its facility and experienced personnel need to be
incorporated into emergency pre-planning.
• It is important to have an up-to-date accessible
Geographic Information System (GIS) to provide
infrastructure maps on the first day of an emer-
gency operation.
Civil Defence Training & Planning
• Key staff who will be involved in civil defence
responses should have role-specific civil defence
training.
• Need for an up to date disaster plan for all units
across the Council.
Physical Layout of EOC
• Having a centralised map/floor plan of the EOC
locating functional areas (e.g. Planning and
Intelligence, Operations etc) and key liaison
personnel is important.
• Evacuation procedures should be clearly identi-
fied.
• A list on the wall should explain each functional
area identifying tasks.
• Security guards must be on-site early on and
need to secure the EOC 24 hours a day.
Media
• It is important to identify an experienced indi-
vidual who can actively front the media, has
media training and standing within the local
community.
• Do not let media into EOC as they can potentially
misuse sensitive information.
9.3 Observations, Lessons and
Experiences from the
Inside
(JasonSmith, G. 2011)
This summary is from a presentation to the 2011
National Lifelines Forum. It describes on-the-ground
experience of the lead Lifeline Utility Controller (LUC)
in the Christchurch Response Centre following the
February 2011 earthquake.
The main points are:
• It is apparent that a large scale event requires
more than one person to perform LUC roles
because of the volume of calls being received,
the time taken to resolve issues and time taken
attending briefings etc.
• Telcos provided additional local cell capacity at
ECC. This made a huge difference including
ability to use mobile internet.
• Unconventional shift times worked for us, they
allowed LUCs to meet the workload and provide
time at home for people to attend their families.
• Organisation within the ECC was dynamic and
difficult to comprehend. New functions were being
added continuously, and others removed or
relocated. More strategic direction was neces-
sary.
• Night shifts within the ECC were problematic.
Directions, goals and systems often seemed to
change overnight. This resulted in lost hours the
following morning attending to system needs.
• Some of the ad-hoc parts of the ECC were
difficult work with - this may have been because
the lack of planning for new functions.
• There is a need for a Demolitions and Site
Clearance Coordinator in each ECC, with
documented roles and role limitations, and
training.
• It was important to keep track of requests that
staff were considering “too hard” to ensure they
didn’t fall through the cracks.
• The CCC IT system was used as the base. It
seemed not to be a very good solution.
• A more reliable central email system is neces-
sary. The normal fixed Lifelines ECC email
addresses could not be used during the re-
sponse, instead multiple email addresses were
utilised.
• It was often very difficult to contact people in
other sections. There was too much reliance on
“who you know” and having their personal cell
phone number. It was often difficult for the phone
owners to get a break when off shift.
• We did not develop a good hand-over system
within the LUC section. Too much reliance was
put on staff continuity, there was insufficient time
to prepare detailed written hand-over notes..
• At the end of the response phase there was no
formal hand-over to the recovery organisation.
• LUC-prepared status reports and updates were
duplicating those received in SITREPS so they
were discontinued. However, LUCs maintained
an overview of the situation.
• LUCs expected involvement in the “what about
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next week” part of the process but this was
virtually zero. Lifelines rapidly became embroiled
in detail especially building demolition.
• The only way to reliably contact people to resolve
issues was to “visit” them frequently, but first it
was necessary to find out who they were and
where to find them.
• The procedures around cordon management
were never satisfactorily resolved once the army
took over from the police.
• Much of the detailed information in SITREPS
could be transmitted via standard GIS layers
rather than transcribed from text to map at each
level. SITREPS could then become a true
summary of the situation.
• Contact numbers should relate to the position,
not the name. This makes contacting the person
on shift much easier.
• The responsibilities and duties of ECC quiet time
/ night shift staff need to be determined in
advance and be clearly understood.
9.4 Lifeline Utility Coordinator
Experiences and Learnings
(Roberts, L. 2011)
This summary is from a presentation to the 2011
National Lifelines Forum.
The main points are:
• Established relationships with national utilities
enabled the provision of good information which
was collated in the NCMC. CRC LUCs were
primarily involved in problem solving for local
utilities.
• National utility arrangements generally worked
well. The local (Christchurch) to national (Welling-
ton) Lifeline Utility Coordination relationship also
worked well.
• There was a great amount of general goodwill
between utilities which was very helpful.
• Because planned communication links and roles
were not always followed, the LUC role becomes
reactive rather than strategic. A need arises to
clarify LUC’s role with the overall EOC response
machinery. Improved training for GECC staff in
lifeline utility coordination and expected interac-
tions with LUC is required.
• Improved / standardised process improvements
are needed. Specific points noted include:
– Lack of standardised forms and procedures
(for handovers, monitoring of actions/re-
quests, priority utility sites, critical fuel cus-
tomers etc).
– Difficulties in handling and processing
information (there was large amount of
information churn).
– Improved spatial reporting from utilities (and
an improved ability to handle such information
when received) would help.
– Plans and procedures for cordon manage-
ment and building assessment need prepara-
tion, and sector coordination arrangements
and response plans (e.g. fuel / power/
transport) need development.
– Need to take a more coordinated approach
within EOCs to assessing / responding to
infrastructure damage.
• There could be an improved use of electronic
information management and provisions on
status key elements, e.g. building status.
9.5 Canterbury Earthquake
 – Lifeline Utility
Coordination Review
(Fenwick T. & Brunsdon D. 2012)
This is a summary of a brief report to the Ministry of
Civil Defence & Emergency Management on lifeline
coordination in the days following the February 2011
earthquake.
The main points in the report are:
• More trained Lifeline Utility Coordinators (LUCs)
are needed to staff the function in EOCs and
ECCs, and to support inexperienced personnel
called in to help.
• Existing relationships developed pre-event
considerably helped LUC work in the response.
• Sector coordination worked well (e.g. in telecom-
munications and transport). Existing “business as
usual” coordination arrangements in the petro-
leum sector also worked well.
• EOC coordination and LUC role clarity needs to
be improved. Promotion and awareness of the
LUC role needs to be fostered.
• TLAs communicated on issues relating to lifelines
that they own (roads, water) direct to
Christchurch Response Centre (CRC) using
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existing intra-corporate communication lines,
bypassing the LUC who therefore had an incom-
plete view of lifeline response issues.
• A lot of time was spent compiling Sitreps includ-
ing understanding technical information. Local
geographic-specific information challenged LUCs
who came from other parts of New Zealand to
assist.
• LUC systems (e.g. email management) and
handovers need to be improved.
The following recommendations are included:
• Work on expanding the number of LUCs nation-
ally, and training, needs to be resumed urgently.
The training needs to be nationally-based, or at
least nationally consistent. Useful modules exist
in several regions and are proliferating. A basis
for engagement of LUCs at regional level is also
needed (pre-event / on-going).
• The principles and practices surrounding lifeline
relationships with EOCs should be reviewed and
publicised with a view to clarifying LUC, SCE and
individual lifelines’ roles. This to include relation-
ships between:
– Individual lifeline companies and EOCs
– TLA-owned lifelines and EOCs, and
– National lifeline companies’ and the NCMC.
• Consideration needs to be given to reporting
arrangements from and to lifeline companies with
simplification, standardisation and accuracy of
summaries in mind. Consideration also needs be
given to tailoring the new Emergency Manage-
ment Information System to meet utility-specific
needs.
• Management and administrative practices in
EOCs should be reconsidered. Issues include
confirming and promulgating the LUC role at the
commencement of EOC activities, optimising
LUC periods of duty (especially for the more
experienced LUCs), and setting up effective LUC
desk operating systems.
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10 MISCELLANEOUS
10.1 Infrastructure Recovery
Following the Canterbury
Earthquakes
(Cleary, G. 2012)
This brief 2012 paper contains observations from
Waimakariri District Council on infrastructure recov-
ery.
The main points are:
• “It’s about the community, not the Council’s
assets”. Public were most interested in the
provision of services to their properties; when
their water would be working, and whether or not
they could flush their toilets.
• The primary focus of the public in the recovery
phase was on rebuilding their houses. They were
not concerned with the reestablishment of
roading or pipe networks, but wanted to know
how to deal with insurers and commencing work
on their houses.
• Having a good understanding of the current
capacity of the existing assets and the future
capacity that would be expected due to growth
allowed the council to make more informed
decisions.
• The Council had developed, in collaboration with
business owners and the community. Rangiora
and Kaiapoi Town Centre strategies. This gave
the Council a base plan to work on, facilitating
progress toward normality faster than would
usually be anticipated.
• Modern materials such as plastic piping stood up
well during the earthquakes, even in areas where
the pipes were used as trunk mains in liquefac-
tion affected areas. It can be concluded here that
the more modern technology has been effective
in achieving a more robust infrastructure in the
Waimakariri District.
10.2 The Canterbury
Earthquake – The Impact
on Farming Organisations
(Whitman, Z., Seville, E., Wilson, T., &
Vargo, J. 2012)
This paper describes the impact of the earthquakes
on the farming sector.
The main points are:
• The most disruptive impact on farmers (particu-
larly dairy farmers), following the Darfield earth-
quake, was the loss of power (e.g. can’t milk
dairy cows, which has a potential health impact
on the cows).
• Other disruptions (particularly to mixed and
arable farmers) arose from interrupted water
supply (e.g. damage to wells or breaks in water
lines). Economic impact of this disruption is time
dependent (i.e. whether or not the water loss
occurs during times of high irrigation or not).
• Turbidity of water in wells affected irrigation.
• Some of the lifelines impacts were mitigated by
good neighbour relationships (ability to share
resources and help each other get resources
needed).
10.3 Observed Performance of
Industrial Pallet Rack
Storage Systems in the
Canterbury Earthquakes
(Uma, S. R., & Beattie, G. 2011)
This is a summary of a paper from the December
2011 Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earth-
quake Engineering, Vol 44, No. 4.
The main points are:
• Investigations by the authors draw attention to an
apparent lack of consistent national control over
the design and construction of racking systems.
• The collapse of pallet and racking systems lead
to significant loss of shop stock and other goods.
• The failure of pallet and racking systems can be
attributed to various reasons including inad-
equate design, inappropriate operational condi-
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tions, improper installation and lack of mainte-
nance.
• National control over design and construction of
racking systems would be beneficial, as would
clarity over what systems require a building
consent.
• The revised seismicity factor in Christchurch will
have an effect on the suitability of racking
systems. Racking owners need to check their
systems and either strengthen or reduce loadings
if required.
• Second-hand racking systems should be consid-
ered scrap metal due to the uncertainty of the
residual capacity of the system.
• Regular detailed inspection of racking systems is
highly recommended to reduce life and economic
losses in the event of an earthquake.
• Professional training programmes are recom-
mended for users and installers of racking
systems.
• Progress towards the publication of a revised and
extended design guide is also described in the
paper.
10.4 Bank of New Zealand:
Response in Christchurch
(Beaumont, C. 2011)
This summary is taken from a BNZ report prepared
for the Continuity Forum.
The main points are:
Key Learnings
• Staff welfare: staff contacted through a variety of
media, cash grants given and EAP services
offered
•  Returning to business as usual has helped
psychological healing of staff.
• Customers welcomed contact about their well-
being and financial assistance packages
• Some disruption occurred to services due to
building damage and ATM inaccessibility.
• Critical functions were moved to Auckland and
Wellington temporarily.
• No long term key supplier issues arose.
 Keys to a Successful Recovery
• Business Continuity Planning: contingency
planning is important but equally, flexibility to
adapt leads to quick and innovative solutions.
• Test Plans: testing increases the skills and
proficiency of staff to cope during a business
interruption event.
10.5 The Recovery of
Canterbury’s
Organisations: A
Comparative Analysis of
the 4 September 2010, 22
February and 13 June
2011 Earthquakes
(Stevenson, J., Vargo, J., Seville, E.,
Kachali, H., NcNaughton, A., & Powell, F.
2011)
This document describes a range of learnings arising
from the earthquakes. The summary below focuses
on infrastructure-related issues.
The main points are:
• Organisations should improve the resilience of
their supply chain to disruption through measures
such as identifying alternate suppliers or suppli-
ers that are outside of the region and therefore
unlikely to be affected in a regional disaster.
• Organisations should consider setting up mutual
agreements or collaborations with other organisa-
tion to ensure critical supplies can be accessed if
disruptions occur.
• Supplier issues were more problematic following
the February 2011 earthquake compared to the
September 2010 earthquake. This suggests that
many organisations may not have adequate
contingency plans in place.
• Very few business indicated having alternatives
or backups to electricity prior to September 2010.
Twenty-nine per cent of organisations surveyed
indicated that they felt they had not done enough
planning for electricity supply disruption.
• Organisations did not feel they had done suffi-
cient planning for sewerage and road network
disruptions, and some of these indicated they
were unsure of how to plan for these kinds of
disruptions.
The report includes the following note:
Following the 22 February and 13 June earth-
quakes, road network problems were found to be
the most disruptive critical service issue for
organisations. As reconstruction continues, road
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networks are likely to continue to be disrupted.
Also long-term changes in road networks, such
as the decision to delay repairing the Sumner
Road, are likely to have major impacts on some
organisations. Organisations will need accurate
and up-to-date information on road network
disruptions and planned road works.
10.6 Lessons from Liquefaction
in the Canterbury
Earthquakes for Enhancing
the Resilience of the Built
Environment
(Brabhaharan, P. 2012)
This summary is from a paper delivered to the
INGENIUM Conference in June 2012.
The main points in this paper are:
• Liquefaction and consequential ejection of sand,
ground subsidence, flooding and lateral spread-
ing caused widespread damage to infrastructure,
commercial and residential properties. Those
most damaged were located close to rivers or on
reclaimed low-lying land and this was due to
lateral spreading.
• Some of the liquefaction effects could have been
avoided if there had been adequate consideration
of liquefaction as a hazard in more recent times.
More knowledge has come to light since the days
when Christchurch was built.
• The importance of hazard assessments is noted;
e.g. publication of maps that identify ground
damage (lateral spreading from liquefaction for
example), the active promotion of these maps,
and community education.
• Attention to land use planning is needed to avoid
zoning areas for urban development where land
is prone to extensive natural hazards.
• Leaving land use planning to developers has
proven ineffective in Christchurch and it would be
more effective to have town planners with
interaction from geotechnical engineers decide
on land use and hazard mitigation in order to
promote consistency.
• Liquefaction caused significant damage to a
number of bridges in the liquefied areas, although
as a whole, bridge structures performed very well
outside these areas. The resilience of bridges
and other transport infrastructure can be en-
hanced through appropriate design.
• Lifeline networks including underground utilities
are vulnerable to liquefaction and ground dam-
age. The resilience of these networks can be
assessed, and enhanced through long term
planning, consideration of resilience in the
development of lifeline network upgrades, and
through selection of appropriate forms.
• It is important to foster early co-operation be-
tween professionals who are involved in the
development of the built environment, such as
planners, architects, structural engineers and
geotechnical engineers.
• Early integrated focus on resilience by building
professionals in the development of projects will
help conceive concepts and forms that are more
resilient to earthquakes, and achieve resilience
without significant additional cost.
10.7 Building Issues for
Lifeline Utilities Following
Major Earthquakes
(Brunsdon, D. 2011b)
This November 2011 presentation to the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group summarises some key
issues relating to seismic performance of buildings.
The main points are:
• Many key facilities were behind the CBD cordon.
• Questions that utilities should ask themselves
include:
– What is the likely seismic performance of your
premises?
– Has an engineering assessment been
undertaken?
– Have the premises been designed to meet the
appropriate Importance Level, e.g. Level 3 or
4 (in terms of Table 3.2 AS/NZS 1170 Part
O:2002)?
– Do you have good access to structural
engineers for immediate safety assessments?
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10.8 Impacts and Emergency
Response to 12th June
2006 South Island
Snowstorm
(Wilson, T. M., Johnston, D. M., Paton, D.,
& Houghton, R. 2009)
This is a summary of a GNS Science report (April
2009) on a survey relating to the emergency re-
sponse to the June 2006 snowstorm.
The main points are:
• The June 2006 Canterbury snowstorm caused
widespread impacts, resulting in a major regional
emergency response. This report presents the
results of a survey covering the issues arising,
together with limited interpretation and analysis.
• There was particularly widespread and severe
damage to electrical distribution networks due to
the heavy weight of the dense, wet snowfall.
Telecommunication services failed as batteries in
exchanges were unable to sustain services once
mains power was lost. Disruption of transporta-
tion networks for periods of a few hours to
several days hindered the emergency response.
• The rural sector in particular was heavily im-
pacted by loss of power and telecommunications
for an extended period of time (up to 3 weeks in
some areas). Livestock losses were minimal on
most farms although the loss of condition resulted
in a considerable reduction in many farms’
productivity. Widespread damage occurred to
fences, trees and some buildings.
• A survey was sent to 92 individuals or organisa-
tions involved in the emergency response. The
survey aimed to record damage, impacts on
urban and rural communities, effectiveness of
organisations’ response plans and lessons for
dealing with future snowstorms.
Key lessons taken from survey responses include:
• There is a strong desire for a more detailed and
accurate meteorological warning of what impacts
snowstorms will cause spatially and temporally,
and the characteristics of the snow itself.
• The value of effective and efficient impact
assessment was highlighted during and following
this event.
• Widespread electrical power failure is largely
inevitable in a large snowstorm. Organisations
and communities need to adequately prepare.
• The failure of communications systems caused
significant problems. Organisations should
diversify their communications systems to
mitigate this problem.
• Disrupted transport networks made it important
for emergency responders and repair crews) to
be equipped with 4WD vehicles / chains.
• Experienced staff, staff training and continuously
updated emergency response plans are highly
effective.
• Coordination of information and communications
at intra-organisational and inter-organisational
levels appeared to be lacking in some cases.
Future planning should focus on effective (co-
ordinated) dissemination of hazard, impact and
resource availability information) and on inter-
organisational issues.
• Rural communities will generally be without
essential services for much greater periods than
urban areas and may suffer isolation for extended
periods. They should plan to adequately deal with
this reality.
10.9 Analysis of the 2008
Flooding in the Hurunui
District
(Alexander, D., Crawford, G., Dixon, B.,
England, K., Falcon, D., Farrell, D., et al.
2009)
This summarises a draft paper prepared by Univer-
sity of Canterbury students in October 2009.
The main points are:
• Strengths of the flooding response were the
effective CDEM group-led evacuation and strong
informal rural networks.
• Weaknesses were the warnings and warning
systems, community awareness of media
warning outlets, CDEM log records and the
hindrance to response caused by RMA (1991)
constraints.
• The key recommendations to improve CDEM
processes, warning systems, infrastructural
resilience, and insurance policy development are:
– Continue to develop and work with the
community in improving the flood warning
system (including weather prediction, rain/
river gauges, modelling) and awareness of
how the system operates, including develop-
ing informal communication networks (i.e.
gathering observation data from locals). In
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particular, limited information / modelling
exists for flood prediction on rural properties.
– Streamline legislation that focuses on
sustainability within a hazard management
paradigm, specifically in relation to updating
the RMA to include consequence-based
decision making processes (e.g. taking
aggregate from river without consent for road
repair).
– Improve the flood modelling capability in the
Hurunui District. This requires upgrading and
expanding the existing river flow and level
gauge stations, as well as modelling inunda-
tion in the lowland and coastal areas.
– Submit an updated application to the NZ
Transport Agency (NZTA) to request the
Inland route (Route 70) from Waiau to
Kaikoura to be designated a State Highway.
– Create a simple pro-forma template that could
be distributed to those taking calls, with
prompts to write down date, time, contact
details and the body of the notification which
would create a more robust master record.
• CDEM outpost communication could have been
improved. Posts were sometimes unmanned due
to volunteers tending their own properties.
• Previous lifelines studies concentrated on
vulnerability of road networks.
• Flood damage to water supply networks, mostly
where pipes located under stream beds that were
scoured out.
• Flood had little or no impact on telecoms and
electricity. Partly due to location of poles (i.e. no
scour around poles and no damage to culverts
carrying services).
• Damage to transportation network had biggest
impact on community.
• Overall flooding had limited infrastructure impact
compared with the 2006 Canterbury snow storm,
where the electricity and telecommunications
networks were non-operational for extended
periods (up to three weeks in some cases).
• Economic impacts arose from loss of transporta-
tion routes and costs to repair damaged roads
and water supply networks.
• Further hazard modelling and analysis of flooding
impact on critical infrastructure in Hurunui is
recommended.
• Limited funding availability for critical infrastruc-
ture maintenance and emergency works due to a
low population density across a large geographic
area. A major concern for the District is that the
economic impacts sustained were from a rela-
tively low magnitude event that did not result in
widespread disruption to critical infrastructure and
yet, the impacts have left the District very vulner-
able to future events.
• Social impacts during the flooding events were
primarily a result of damage to the transportation
network, with 64 per cent respondents reporting
their day-to-day activities were affected by road
access. These social impacts could have been
more extreme if the telecommunication and
electricity supply networks were also impacted,
as would be likely during an earthquake.
Page 94 Lifelines: Lessons from Natural Hazards in Canterbury
Blank pages in this document have been inserted
to facilitate double-sided printing

